

## PRESS KIT

### **ECONOMIC CRISIS, SOCIAL TRAJECTORIES AND EDUCATION**

**PaD longitudinal analysis (2003-2009)**

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## 1. Conclusions

From 2003 to 2009, there was a predominant trend of social immobility (67%), with only a third of adults moving into a different social class, either to a higher class (14%) or to a lower one (19%).

(4.1.) Page 8

Up until 2009, the greatest impact is not from a drop in social class but the gradual fall in standard of living. From 2003 to 2009, 38% of Catalans became poorer and 36% have experienced social vulnerability (a drop in income, in class and in employment status).

(4.2.) Page 9 + (4.3.) Page 10

The risk of vulnerability (gradual fall in standard of living) affects 40% of women and 31% of men.

(4.3.) Page 10

The defining factors for the risk of vulnerability are gender, age and level of education, but not an individual's social background.

(4.4.) Page 11

The growth of tertiary education means that it is the new gateway to a good standard of living. It is no longer enough to complete secondary level education; a specialism must be developed through tertiary level education. An advanced level FP (vocational qualification) reduces the risk of vulnerability by 29%, while a university degree reduces it by 70%.

(4.5.) Page 12-13

Given the key role of education in social trajectories, the issues of equity and inequality of opportunities in tertiary education (university and advanced vocational training) are a real challenge for education and social cohesion policy-making. The children of university-educated parents have 15 times more likely to graduate with an engineering degree than the children of non-graduates.

(4.6.) Page 14

**In Catalonia, we have identified a serious issue: lifelong learning does not translate into an opportunity for the less-educated to raise their level of education. Indeed, it reinforces the inequality between the least and the most educated: half of all courses between 2005 and 2009 were taken by university-educated students.**

(4.7.) Page 15-16

**A second area of lifelong learning, namely adults re-entering the education system, also creates considerable inequality: graduates are 17 times more likely to go back than non-graduate respondents. Only 6% of adults with no education and 2% of adults with a basic education re-enter the formal education system.**

(4.7.) Page 15-16

**With the current economic crisis, Catalonia, which had traditionally remained on the moderate side of social inequality (S80/S20 ratio), has moved into the group of countries with the highest levels of inequality. Inequality of income rose by 23% between 2005 and 2010.**

(4.8.) Page 17

**Despite the increase in income inequality due to the current recession, Catalonia has a weaker class structure and does offer greater equality of opportunity than Great Britain (12% more) or Italy (38% more), although it ranks below the Netherlands' equality of opportunity (14% less).**

(4.9.) Page 18


## 2. Prior considerations

The period from 2003 to 2009 is historic and transcendental due to the profound changes that came about during that time. It is an unusual period, combining an economic boom (with social upward mobility) with the outbreak of a prolonged and unprecedented economic recession (with sustained downward mobility and social vulnerability).

The dramatic impact of this current economic crisis is obvious, given that it is the most sudden and profound economic crash of the past thirty years.

Chart 1 shows the trends in job creation and destruction in Catalonia since 1978. Even in the worst years of recent economic crises or recessions, the record figure of 8.7% shrinkage in the total number of jobs in a single year, as occurred in 2009, was never reached.

**Chart 1.** Job creation and destruction (interannual variability in %)



Source: Produced by the authors based on Oliver et al. (2012). The 2012 figure is an estimated forecast. We have highlighted the 2003-2009 period, which is the focus for our analysis.

We have studied social class and income mobility trajectories over a seven-year period using [PaD data](#) and a **longitudinal sample** of 1,294 individuals aged between 19 and 58 in 2003, who we followed until 2009. The representative sample for 2009 uses the same respondents for whom we have 2003 data.

The [Fundació Jaume Bofill's Panel on Social Inequality in Catalonia \(PaD\)](#) is the only panel survey on social structure that exists in Southern Europe that allows longitudinal studies to be done on respondents' social, family, employment or educational trajectories.

**This research is significant and unique due to its longitudinal nature, which allows us to follow the trajectories of the same individuals surveyed by the PaD between 2003 and 2009. It thus fills a knowledge gap as it is the first longitudinal research conducted on social structure in Catalonia.**

- The **main purpose** of our research is to measure class and income trajectory mobility from 2003 to 2009 and to identify the risk and likelihood of upward and downward mobility and social vulnerability during this period.
- A **second purpose** was to find out the extent to which education has become stronger in this current economic crisis as a hierarchical determinant of security, power and status, confirming a new knowledge gap in society. In previous research, we had already discovered that the "education" factor was one of the main criteria in social division and segmentation (1).

**Trajectory analysis and longitudinal analysis** produce results that are in marked contrast to cross-sectional or prevalence studies that focus on a specific year, providing, as it were, a snapshot of that year. For example, studies or surveys of a single year (cross-sectional) allow us to measure the rate of static poverty among people who are living in poverty during that year. Longitudinal studies allow us to measure the rate of dynamic poverty, which covers all the individuals living in poverty at any time during the study period (a figure that tends to be double the static poverty rate).

By maintaining the same sample and re-surveying it every year between 2003 and 2009, we have a reliable picture of the life trajectories of Catalans aged between 25 and 64 in 2009. We therefore have dynamic data for learning about changes in their mobility or stability in their income and status, and this better allows us to isolate the most decisive factors.

In terms of **methodology**, as well as using bivariate statistics and mobility matrices, we chose to use logit regression analysis and **generate probability tables using the estimated models of upward mobility, immobility, downward mobility and social vulnerability** as experienced between 2003 and 2009.

**The research that we are publishing begins by putting the 2003 to 2012 period into context, identifying job creation and destruction in an opening chapter entitled "The social impact of the economic and financial crisis" that was produced using secondary sources.**

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<sup>1</sup> MARTÍNEZ-CELORRIO, X. & MARÍN SALDO, A. (2010). *Educació i mobilitat social a Catalunya*. Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill. "Polítiques", 71 (2 volumes).

**Individuals' social trajectories from 2010 to 2012 will be included in future studies based on the PaD panel survey once we have the cleansed data.**

### 3. Key questions

The results obtained provide answers to the following initial research questions:

1. In longitudinal class trajectories (in a seven year period stretching from 2003 to 2009), what is the dominant trend: upward social mobility, downward social mobility or immobility within the same class that the individual occupied in 2003?
2. Is income mobility between 2003 and 2009 more volatile and changeable than the social mobility of respondents?
3. Does social vulnerability (gradual fall in standard of living) affect all social classes, ages and both men and women?
4. Which social factors (gender, age, social background, specialism and level of education) are most decisive in the likelihood of social vulnerability?
5. Which level of education marks the threshold for security and a decent standard of living: secondary or tertiary education?
6. Which the inequalities of opportunity exist in tertiary education and across different specialist fields? Are advanced vocational qualifications or engineering degrees more equitable?
7. Which social classes, ages and levels of education get the most benefit from lifelong learning and training?
8. How has social inequality in Europe increased between 2005 (economic boom) and 2010 (recession and austerity measures)?
9. Aside from the increase in social inequality due to the current economic crisis, to what extent is the structure of Catalan society classist or fluid? Is Catalonia's class system as rigid as that of Great Britain or as fluid and egalitarian as that of Norway?

## 4. Principal results


### 4.1. SOCIAL IMMOBILITY IS THE DOMINANT PATTERN BETWEEN 2003 AND 2009. ONLY A THIRD OF ADULTS HAS CHANGED SOCIAL CLASS, EITHER UPWARDS OR DOWNWARDS.

From 2003 to 2009, the main trend in social mobility is, in fact, immobility or staying in the same class (67%). Thirty-three percent of respondents moved up or down the class system during the course of this period:


- a) Upward mobility, which allows people to climb the social ladder up from the rung they occupied in 2003, was at 14%.
- b) Downward mobility, which brings people further down the social ladder from the position they occupied in 2003, was at 19%.

**Thus there is relatively little change in the social positions of class in the longitudinal trajectories (measured over a seven-year period between 2003 and 2009). Class immobility is the dominant trend, revealing a very rigid class structure.**

**Chart 2. Social mobility**  
(Intragenerational, 2003-2009)



**Chart 3. Parent/child mobility**  
(Intergenerational, 2009)



Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2009).

These charts contrast the findings on intragenerational mobility and intergenerational mobility between parents and adult children. Whilst the social structure is very much sustained and static in the short term (with only 14% enjoying upward mobility), most of its structural change and class mobility take place in the long term (upward mobility between parents and their children lies at 46%).

**The high degree of social mobility between parents and children is therefore in stark contrast to the lesser mobility that exists for individuals in their lifetimes (Goldthorpe's counterbalance thesis).**

**4.2. UP UNTIL 2009 THERE WAS MORE IMPOVERISHMENT (38%) THAN DOWNWARD CLASS MOBILITY (19%).**

Between 2003 and 2009, 38% of Catalans have become poorer and moved into lower income quintiles than those they occupied in 2003. Volatility in income mobility is always greater than class mobility, where the structure tends to remain the same.

**Table 1.** Social and income mobility rates (2003-2009)

	Social class mobility	Income mobility
Upward mobility	<b>14%</b>	<b>21%</b>
Immobility	<b>67%</b>	<b>41%</b>
Downward mobility	<b>19%</b>	<b>38%</b>

Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2003-2009).

Table 2 shows the increase or decrease in income experienced by each income quintile between 2003 and 2009. As can be seen, **income changes tend to be concentrated in adjacent quintiles without great leaps from one extreme to the other:**

- 50% of people in the lowest and poorest quintile (quintile 1) do experience a move into other quintiles but only 3% of them reach the upper quintile by 2009.
- At the core of the middle levels (middle quintile 3), 47% have become poorer and dropped down the quintiles and 26% have gone up the quintiles.
- 53% of the richest quintile in 2003 (quintile 5) have moved downwards by 2009.

**Table 2.** Average income per quintile and increase/decrease in income

Quintile occupied in 2003	Average net yearly income per household	Increase in income 2003-2009	Decrease in income 2003-2009
Lowest quintile 1	€11,500.80	<b>50%</b>	--
Mid-low quintile 2	€21,515.60	<b>21%</b>	<b>33%</b>
Middle quintile 3	€31,119.10	<b>26%</b>	<b>47%</b>
Mid-high quintile 4	€42,828.40	<b>18%</b>	<b>43%</b>
Upper quintile 5	€69,651.80	--	<b>53%</b>

Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2003-2009).

**It is the youngest (aged between 25 and 34) who experience the greatest income mobility,** as is to be expected during their transition into adult life. Almost 25% have seen their income rise, although 44.3% have also

become poorer or dropped to a lower income quintile from where they were in 2003 (when they were still dependent on their family).

### 4.3. THE RISK OF A FALL IN STANDARD OF LIVING IS 40% FOR WOMEN AND 31% FOR MEN

*Social vulnerability is not a measure of poverty or poor living conditions, but rather a gradual fall in standard of living, income and status over a period of time which, in this case, encompasses the years 2003 to 2009.*


A combination of five criteria or regressive situations allow us to identify who has experienced social vulnerability and to what extent: 1) drop in income compared to 2003; 2) fall in social class; 3) loss of fixed wage earner status; 4) loss of small business owner status, and 5) recurrence of the precarious situation by continuing to work as a temporary employee between 2003 and 2009.

**In 2009, 36% of the trajectories are categorised as vulnerable, and this figure is very likely to have increased between 2010 and 2012.**

**The risk of vulnerability is more common among women (40%) than among men (31%). By ages, it lies at 29% between the ages of 35 and 44 and increases progressively until reaching 53% for the 55-64 age group.**

**The risk of vulnerability and insecurity of status are distributed following the class structure hierarchy occupied by the individuals.**

**Chart 4.** Risk of social vulnerability by social class (2003-2009)



Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2003-2009).

As can be seen from chart 4, executives and professionals (I-II) have the lowest risk of vulnerability and therefore the greatest likelihood of maintaining their


status. Vulnerability risk is around 25% for the middle segments (III-IV-V), increasing to 30% for the skilled labourer class and then to 36% for those in the unskilled labourer class.

**4.4. SOCIAL BACKGROUND DOES NOT AFFECT RISK OF VULNERABILITY. GENDER, AGE AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION ARE DECISIVE.**

The most significant factors predicting the likelihood of vulnerability are gender, age and the level of education attained by the individual. Neither class background nor parent’s level of education play a role in explaining social vulnerability.

- Gender is the most important factor, as women have twice the risk of vulnerability (+190%) that men have. **Social vulnerability therefore follows a highly sexist logic.**
- Being born after 1960 (being under 49 years old) reduces the risk of vulnerability by 46% compared to the more senior cohorts. As mentioned above, vulnerability lies at 53% for those between the ages of 55 and 64. Therefore, **vulnerability is also ageist (age discriminatory).**

**Chart 5.** Factors that reduce the risk of social vulnerability



Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2009).

- More so than in levels of education, the greatest likelihood of vulnerability is concentrated among those who have not attained a **specialist qualification in tertiary education** (be it a university degree or an advanced vocational qualification). This can be highlighted as one of the new thresholds for a good standard of living.


- However, the risk of vulnerability is segmented according to the subjects studied during tertiary education: while holders of degrees in **science/health/engineering** see their risk of vulnerability reduced by 75%, holders of **advanced vocational qualifications** see theirs reduced by 29% compared to people who have no tertiary education (the reference group, equal to 1).

**4.5. THE GROWTH OF TERTIARY EDUCATION HAS MADE IT THE NEW GATEWAY TO A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING. IT IS NO LONGER ENOUGH TO COMPLETE SECONDARY EDUCATION; RATHER A SPECIALISM MUST BE DEVELOPED THROUGH TERTIARY EDUCATION.**

According to the PaD (2009), 41% of Catalan adults between the ages of 25 and 64 have tertiary education qualifications that include advanced vocational qualifications (11%) and university degrees and diplomas (30%).

In the cohort of those born between 1975 and 1984 (who were aged between 25 and 34 in 2009), almost 53% went into tertiary education, 14.3% of them into advanced vocational training and 38.3% into a university degree, as can be seen in the chart.

**Chart 6.** Increase in levels of tertiary education by age cohorts



Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2009).

The rate of Catalans going into tertiary education for the group born between 1985 and 1989 (aged 20-24 in 2009) has now reached 62% according to Eurostat (2009), equalling the European Union average (EU-27).

Using logit regression, we have calculated the likelihood of vulnerability by gender, age and completion or non-completion of tertiary education. Table 3 presents the results, showing that **the gender inequalities are cross-sectional and permanent at all levels and in all fields of education:**

- Women without tertiary education (either university or advanced vocational) have a 58% chance of vulnerability if they are over the age of 49, and a 45% risk if they are under the age of 49.
- Men, however, are not at such a disadvantage if they do not have tertiary education: they have a 42% risk of vulnerability (over the age of 49) and 30% under the age of 49.
- Women with an advanced vocational qualification carry a 50% risk of vulnerability in the senior age group, compared to a 34% risk for men of the same age. Women below the age of 49 have a 37% risk of vulnerability, while it drops to 23% for men.

**Table 3.** Maximum and minimum likelihood of social vulnerability

		Seniors aged 49 and above		Adults under the age of 49	
		Female	Male	Female	Male
No tertiary education		58%	42%	45%	30%
Tertiary education	Advanced vocational	50%	34%	37%	23%
	Business and law	31%	19%	21%	12%
	Humanities and education	29%	18%	20%	11%
	Science and engineering	26%	16%	17%	10%

Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2003-2009).

- With university degrees in **business/law**, the differences in vulnerability range from 31% for senior women and 12% for adult males under the age of 49. The differences are similar with university degrees in **humanities/education**.
- The profile with the least risk of vulnerability is a male under the age of 49 with a degree in the field of **science/health/engineering**, with a 10% risk. In contrast, women who have specialised in the same fields face a 26% risk if they are over the age of 49.

#### 4.6. THE ISSUE OF EQUITY IN TERTIARY EDUCATION PRESENTS A CHALLENGE FOR EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL COHESION POLICY-MAKING

Given the growth in tertiary education, the OECD's 2008 report on *Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society* recommends that all member states adopt a consistent and systematic method to evaluate and solve the issues of equity and inequality of opportunity at this level.

Table 4 presents the two axes of inequality of opportunities: 1) educational capital (parent's level of education) and 2) class background.

When it comes to parents' level of education (the educational inequality axis), **the greatest inequality can be found in engineering degrees, where the children of university graduates have almost 15 times more likelihood of graduating than the children of parents with no higher education.** The greatest equity in this axis can be found in the education sciences degrees and in advanced vocational qualifications, where children manage to graduate almost regardless of their parents' level of education.

**Table 4.** Relative inequality of opportunity in graduating from tertiary education, according to parent's level of education and social class background

	Educational axis 1		Class axis 2	
	Parents with higher education	Parents with no education	Parents I-II: Executives and professionals	Parents VII: Unskilled labourers
Engineering	<b>14.83</b>	1	<b>2.70</b>	1
Business/law	<b>8.66</b>	1	<b>7.00</b>	1
Sciences	<b>9.15</b>	1	<b>5.88</b>	1
Humanities	<b>4.26</b>	1	<b>1.98</b>	1
Education sciences	<b>1.24</b>	1	<b>2.05</b>	1
Advanced vocational	<b>1.13</b>	1	<b>1.52</b>	1

Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2009).

When it comes to class background, **the fields of business/law present the lowest equity: children from the executive and professional classes (I-II) are 7 times more likely to graduate than the children with unskilled labourer parents (VII).** The field of sciences is also considerably inequitable (5.8 to 1). Humanities and advanced vocational courses are where class background has less of an impact on children's ability to graduate. These fields are therefore the most permeable and accessible to all class backgrounds.

**As regards the problem of equity in tertiary education, inequality in educational background (axis 1) has a strong impact, more so than**

inequality of socio-economic background (axis 2). However, both are significant.

**4.7. LIFELONG LEARNING DOES NOT SERVE AS A SECOND CHANCE FOR THE LESS-QUALIFIED: HALF OF ALL COURSE PLACES BETWEEN 2005 AND 2009 WERE OCCUPIED BY UNIVERSITY GRADUATES.**


*The Europe 2020 strategy sets a new target for member states of at least 15% of adults aged between 25 and 64 having done formal courses or informal training in the past four weeks. By the end of 2010, Catalonia recorded a rate of 10.5%, still far below the target figure.*

If we add the total number of recipients of informal training between 2005 and 2009, university graduates account for 47.5% of all training, while they only make up 29% of the population aged 25-64. In addition, the third of the population that only has a basic level of education (31%) only accounts for 17% of all the training received between 2005 and 2009.

This inequality of access to lifelong learning across the social classes creates a hierarchy of recipients with five major levels of inequality. As explained by human capital theory:

1) The professional class (II) always stands out as a high consumer of continuous education, linked to its greater academic capital and its creativity and expertise in companies and organizations. It even sees a notable increase of five percentage points between 2005 and 2009.

**Chart 8.** Rate of participation in lifelong learning by social classes



Source: Produced by the authors using PaD data (2009).

2) A second segment of training participants is made up of executives and businesspeople (28%), middle managers and technicians (24.7%) and white collar workers (24%). These are functional classes with above-average rates of lifelong learning, but second to the professional class.

3) The third segment is made up of the unskilled labourer class (VI), mostly from industry, with almost 19% participation in 2009 (six percentage points more than in 2005).

4) In 2009, the fourth segment was formed of minor businesspeople, tradespeople and craftworkers with 14% (IVa, with employees and IVb, without employees) who shared this layer with the less-qualified working class (12%). This class underwent a positive evolution between 2005 and 2009.

5) Finally, the data positions agricultural workers (VIIb) at 5% of the training, and this is repeated in 2005 and 2009. It is worth repeating that the lowest income quintile also only received 5% of informal lifelong learning.

**Adult re-entry into the formal education system is low (6%). In particular, it is monopolised by graduates, who are 17 times more likely to return to education than the respondents without qualifications:**

- Between 2003 and 2009, 2% of adults with a basic education, 1% of adults with medium vocational qualifications and 6% of adults with no qualifications re-entered the formal education system in order to improve their level of education.
- In contrast, 19% of 2003 graduates had completed a master's degree by 2009, and 17% of 2003 university diploma holders had obtained bachelor's and master's degrees in 2009.


#### 4.8. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND INCREASES IN SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Between 2005 and 2010, Catalonia and Spain are two of the countries that have seen the biggest rise in S80/S20 inequality of income distribution, i.e. an increased gap between the 20% with the highest income and the poorest 20%.

This inequality gap has increased by 23% in Catalonia and 25% in Spain. Germany has seen its S80/S20 inequality ratio increase by 18%, France by 12% and Sweden by 6%. However, some countries have reduced their inequality, such as Norway (-17%), the United Kingdom (-8%) and the Netherlands (-7%).

Historically, Catalonia has always been a region with a structure that has less inequality than Spain's, and if we took Catalonia out of Spain as a whole, this difference would be even more marked. With the outbreak of the economic crisis and the tough consequences this has entailed, Catalonia has lost its position, which was similar to the European average for inequality. It has now been dragged down by the Spanish crisis so it now presents one of the highest increases in inequality, as can be seen in the chart below.

**Chart 9.** Evolution of S80/S20 inequality of income distribution ratio (2005-2010)



Source: European Commission (2012a), OECD (2011) and Idescat (2012).

The most egalitarian countries in Europe (Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) do not exceed a value of 3.75 in the S80/S20 ratio. Germany and France do not go beyond 4.5 and remain under the Eurozone average. Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom have always been the countries with most


inequality and, since the start of the economic crisis, **Catalonia has moved from the moderate group to form part of this group of countries that traditionally have high levels of inequality.**

**4.9. DESPITE INCREASED INEQUALITY IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION DUE TO THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS, CATALONIA HAS A LESS RIGID CLASS STRUCTURE AND OFFERS MORE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY THAN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.**

In previous research, we calculated the proportional increase of fluidity across the class structure between parents and children in Catalonia, observing a 36% reduction in class rigidity. However, we were unable to position Catalonia in a country ranking that would illustrate its comparative positioning. In order to do this now, we have standardised the samples, following Erikson and Goldthorpe's statistical models (1993).

**Catalonia's class structure is more fluid than that of France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, its degree of fluidity and equality of opportunities is still surpassed by the Netherlands and Norway, the least classist societies.**

**Chart 10.** Comparison of Catalonia's equality of opportunities  
*(Fluidity: positive numbers/Rigidity: negative numbers)*



Source: Produced by the authors based on the PaD (2005 and 2009), Ringdal (2004), Vallet (2005), Schizzerotto (2005), Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2004), and Heath and Payne (2000).

As can be seen in the chart, the class structure in France in 1993 was 51% more rigid than the Catalan class structure in 2009, whereas the Italian one was 38% more so and the British 12% more. However, Norway in 1995 was 5% more fluid than the Catalan class system and the Netherlands were 14% more egalitarian.

## 5. Proposals and guidance

**If Catalonia could overcome its fiscal deficit and allocate more resources to social and education policies, the Catalan class system would be more fluid and even more socially just.**

Our research examines social mobility in the life trajectories of individuals between 2003 and 2009, and it allows us to isolate the most decisive factors in them. It also allows us to see the extent of Catalonia's class fluidity and equality of opportunities in an international context. If Catalonia could overcome its fiscal deficit and allocate more resources to social and education policies, the Catalan class system would be more fluid and even more socially just.

**Further cuts to the public education system must be counteracted and the more vulnerable schools should be the focus of increased resources, teachers and grants**

Although it does not manage to completely counterbalance the social inequalities that children start out with, the formal education system does much more to create equality and equity than the system of lifelong learning. Therefore, further cuts to the public education system must be counteracted and more vulnerable schools should be the focus of increased resources, teachers and grants, because it is this system that best manages to counterbalance pre-existing social inequalities.

**Greater effort must be put into increasing accessibility, places, grants and the range of advanced vocational qualifications and to develop a solid grant system for university studies, as well as more positive discrimination measures**

Because tertiary level education is now the new threshold for social opportunities (social mobility, income and the employment market):

- a) greater effort must be invested into increasing accessibility, places, grants and the range of advanced vocational qualifications;
- b) universities must engage and collaborate more when it comes to improving and levelling results at the preceding level (secondary education), and
- c) a solid grant system and more positive discrimination measures that take inequalities in family education into account must be developed at university level.

**There must be a strong push towards increasing the rate of participation in lifelong learning as a basic citizens' right to continuously improve their qualifications**

The system of lifelong learning is very weak when considering the crucial role it plays in terms of reactivating the economy and strengthening productivity in the near future. It is because of this role that there has to be a strong push towards increasing the rate of participation in lifelong learning, as a basic citizens' right to continuously improve their qualifications.

**The "Catalan model" of ongoing, vocational and corporate education must be revised and surpassed, and cuts to policy actions and training for the unemployed must be rectified.**

In order to strengthen the system of lifelong learning,

- a) the so-called "Catalan model" of ongoing, vocational and corporate education must be revised and surpassed in order to increase its impact and coverage.
- b) cuts to active policies and training for the unemployed, which were decided by Government in 2012, must be rectified.

**Decisive action must be taken to certify work experience and competencies, in order to increase adult re-entry into all levels of the formal education system, particularly among groups without qualifications and only a basic or negligible level of education.**

In its current form, the system of lifelong learning essentially serves to reinforce social inequalities and does not act as an open and flexible mechanism to provide a second chance. Because of this, decisive action must be taken to certify work experience and competencies, in order to increase adult re-entry formal and higher education, particularly among groups without qualifications and only a basic or negligible level of education.

## 6. Outline of the book

This book analyses the period stretching from 2003 to 2009, a historic and transcendental one due to the profound changes that have occurred in Catalan society. It is an unusual period, combining an economic boom with the early years of the recession.

Some of the findings with the greatest impacts include the evidence that broad swathes of Catalan society have become poorer and more vulnerable. Between 2003 and 2009, around 38% of Catalan adults have become socially vulnerable or poorer.

As was demonstrated in previous studies by the same authors (see no. 71 of this *Politiques* collection) education once again comes out as the main leveller of class background and maximiser of opportunities for those who reach tertiary or higher education.

This publication helps to broaden the continued research on education and social mobility in Catalonia, based on data from the Panel Survey on Social Inequality in Catalonia.

### Contents of the book

Introduction

#### **1. The social impact of the economic and financial crisis**

Growth, crisis, debt and unemployment (2005-2012)

Analysis of life trajectories: objectives and methodology

#### **2. Social mobility in life trajectories (2003-2009)**

Trajectories with social mobility

Likelihood of immobility and upward class mobility

#### **3. Mobility of income and social vulnerability (2003-2009)**

Analysis of job and income mobility

The vulnerable lowest third: likelihood analysis

#### **4. Tertiary education: the new threshold for social inclusion**

Growth and inequality in tertiary education

Adjustment and underemployment in fields of higher education

#### **5. Lifelong learning: reinforcing inequality or a second chance?**

Level of participation and inequality of opportunities in lifelong learning

A second chance or reinforcing inequality?

#### **6. Equality of opportunities compared across countries**

Selection and standardisation of data

Which are the least classist countries with the greatest social fluidity?

#### **7. Conclusions**

Bibliography

## 7. About the data source



**The Panel of Social Inequalities in Catalonia (PaD)** is a longitudinal survey which has, since 2001, provided a unique perspective on Catalan society.

The PaD's objective is to **provide data on social inequality in Catalonia and its evolution over time. This data will contribute to the improved design of social policies that favour equality and justice.**

This survey encompasses a wide spectrum of fields of study, such as socio-demographic data, education, work (labour, domestic, family), health, housing, income, language and political culture. From 2011 onwards, the Survey develops a specific focus on education ([Summary of contents](#))

Data has been collected annually, starting in 2001 with a sample comprising 1,991 households and 5,785 individuals.

The value of the PaD lies in:

- ✓ **The quantity of information it provides** thanks to the PaD's wide range of themed blocks and the fact that information about individuals is accumulated year after year.
- ✓ **Its enormous analytical potential** arising not only from the ongoing accumulation of data for the same sample of individuals over time, but also the possibilities it offers with regards to the combination of analytical perspectives: household/individual and objective/subjective.
- ✓ **The quality of its information** achieved through the data collection via the CAPI survey system (which minimizes coding errors), but also through validation of much of the data collected during previous waves.

The PaD Survey is the **1<sup>st</sup> longitudinal database in Catalonia** and the only one of its kind in the country. So, it provides interesting data on the social structure in the **Mediterranean region**. Its comparability with other international sources is granted by the key variables ([Comparability of the PaD Survey](#))

PaD data can be accessed free of charge by the scientific community. [Data files](#) from the 1<sup>st</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> waves (2001 to 2009) are currently available (see the **Guide for submitting research projects**), as well as the **longitudinal data file** with longitudinally purged and harmonized individual and household variables. We hope data from 2010, 2011 and 2012 will be available by the end of 2013.

The PaD has been recognized by the Catalan scientific community and is currently working on disseminating its results at a European level.

As it is shown in the list below, the PaD results are remarkable:

- ✓ **11 waves of data:** 2001-2012.
- ✓ Development of the **first know-how on longitudinal surveying** in Catalonia.
- ✓ **10 years of analysis of the Catalan society from a dynamic approach**, with more capacity to explain social phenomena in the areas of poverty, work, education and social mobility.
- ✓ **Widely spread social use:** 7 Catalan universities, 2 Spanish universities and 4 international universities; 16 Catalan research groups, 3 Spanish research groups; 3 masters/doctorates; 6 areas of public administration and 9 areas of social partners ([detail users](#))
- ✓ **Privileged view of the change in economic cycle:** economic boom (2001-2008) ⇔ economic crisis (2008-2012) (Key reports: [Polítiques 71 vol I i II](#); [Polítiques 79](#)).
- ✓ **Unique statistical source for the analysis of education in relation with the other areas of society** (years 2011 (97 educational variables) and 2012 (265 educational variables) (see longitudinal report on content).
- ✓ **More than 50 reports published** with data taken from the PaD ([see detail](#)).
- ✓ Results offered in different formats: **symposiums, meetings, seminars, presentation, and debates.**
- ✓ **Technical collaboration agreements, both at a national and international levels** ([partner institutions](#)).
- ✓ Participation in **international forums and projects** (Advanced Grant project eduLIFE : 2011-2016, ERC-TransEurope Programme 2011, Epunet Conference 2006, ESF-QMSS Programme 2004).

For a brief introduction to PaD Survey please [clíc here](#).

For further information visit the PaD website: [What's PaD](#) or [www.paneldesigualtats.cat](http://www.paneldesigualtats.cat).