POMPEU FABRA UNIVERSITY

THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA

MIHAELA VANCEA

BARCELONA, 2008
INTRODUCTION

- Why studying migrant political transnationalism? (Overview of the research study and the key factors for its inception - few paragraphs summarising briefly the nature of the thesis: subject of the research, the nature of the methodology; the research settings);
- What is the significance of the topic? (Implications for the wider debate, demonstrations of social trends that have become evident from other research);
- The background of the researcher (relation with the research subject);
- Where is the research being conducted and why? (Some of the main features of the location of the data collection, and the reasons for planning the research in that way – discussing some aspects of the sampling process);
- The research aims (the anticipated achievements of the research study);
- The research objectives (more precise statements of intent);
- The structure of the thesis

PART 1: MIGRANT POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES

Chapter

I. MIGRANT POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM (literature review)

Theoretical relevance of the subject: definitions, forms and nature, dimensions, theoretical perspectives, typologies, empirical studies, etc.

II. THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA

- Question to be researched: What is my empirical question or puzzle?
- Historical/Economic/Political relevance: Why is this question/puzzle important to research?
- Theoretical relevance: What has been written on the question/puzzle? What is inadequate’ that prompts me to research it?)
- Proposed alternative theoretical solution: What are the causal claims I am interested in? What is the simplest model I can propose? (Dependent and independent variables; Hypothesis).

III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction
2. Research design, sample, data and data sources

PART 2: ARE IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA POLITICALLY TRANSNATIONAL? WHY?

Chapter

IV. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

- Forms and nature of the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona

V. EXPLICATIVE ANALYSIS

- Explicative analysis: Why migrant associations in Barcelona become transnational? (Testing the proposed hypothesis)

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

- Theoretical significance of the research: Why do you like the model/in what ways is your model superior to what existed in the field/how does it advance our knowledge of the problem that you analyse?
- Historical/Policy significance of the research: What policy implications can we draw from this research? How and where can they be applied? How could it change the policy making process and/or policy output and outcomes?

APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chapter

I. IMMIGRANT POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM (literature review)

Introduction

In this chapter, we explore the concept of immigrant political transnationalism, as one particular form of immigrant transnationalism. We first examine the larger concept of immigrant transnationalism and the main theoretical perspectives developed on it. We then look at the main theoretical contributions on immigrant political transnationalism and explore its relationship with the traditional conception of national citizenship. Finally, we highlight the main lines of empirical research on this relatively new phenomenon and concept in the migration field.

1. Immigrant transnationalism: concept and theoretical perspectives

Establishing and delimitating the phenomenon

In order to define the concept of immigrant transnationalism we first have to situate the incidence of the phenomenon within the migration research field. In other words, we have to establish the scale (immigrant transnationalism has to involve a significant number of immigrants), continuousness (transnational activities have to be constant and flexible over time) and distinctness (transnational activities have to be different and not
included in the already existent concepts) of this ‘new’ phenomenon in the migration studies (see Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2003).

Immigrant transnationalism, although not entirely new, reached at the end of the 20th century a particular intensity at the global scale and became a subject of interest for many researchers from the migration field. More and more people live a double life: they speak two languages, they have houses in two countries and their everyday life implies a continuous and regular interaction across state borders. Helped moreover by the modern technology that makes easier to travel and communicate with their homelands, many immigrants today maintain themselves active in the economic, social and political spheres of their country of origin. Transnational activities vary from informal businesses of import and export of goods, to the emergence of a new ‘class’ of bi-national professionals or to immigrants’ participation in the political campaigns of their countries (Portes 1997, 2001, 2003; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2003; Castels 2002).

The increased involvement of immigrants in diverse activities across state borders has opened many controversial academic debates. Some scholars consider that the phenomenon of transnationalism is new and rising while others believe that it has always existed jointly with migration. Some picture transnational businessmen as a new and particular group of people, while others affirm that all immigrants are part of a transnational community. Finally, there are scholars who describe these activities as deriving from the globalisation of capital, while some others see transnationalism as a popular reaction to the adverse effects of this same process (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2003).
American anthropological studies suggested that transnationalism represents a generalised phenomenon among the contemporary migrant communities that has developed as an alternative to the traditional way of assimilation. As such, transnational migration is been defined as a form of migration through which persons, even if they move across international borders and establishes relations in new societies through information and ‘cultural capital’ or informal networks, maintain ongoing social connexions with the polity from their home country. In transnational migration people actually live their lives across international borders and are best identified as ‘trasmigrants’ (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999).

The problem with this approach is that it does not create explicit criteria for differentiating who is and who is not a ‘transmigrant’. If we consider the simple act of sending remittances to families or travelling home occasionally as transnational activities, this puts in question marks the existence of the entire field since this kind of activities have always been undergone by immigrants (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2003).

At the same time, the high reliance on case studies in the transnational field has created a methodological problem, that of selecting on the dependent variable. Only those involved in transnational activities have constituted the unit of analysis. Consequently, the phenomenon of transnationalism has been overestimated in its general spread, and its possible absence in the everyday life of many immigrants has been thus overlooked (Levitt 2001; Kyle 2000; Portes 2003; Guarnizo et al. 2003).
Subsequent comparative studies on immigrant transnationalism proved that regular or occasional participation in transnational activities is not a universal practice. Not all migrants develop transnational practices, and many do so only in one sphere of their lives (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Faist 2000a; Portes et al. 2003; Landolt 2001). Many scholars consider that although immigrant remittances, occasional contacts, trips to and activities in homeland communities might be considered as certain forms of transnationalism that contribute to the strengthening of the transnational field, they cannot justify per se the development of a new concept. Moreover, immigrants have been involved for a long time in these types of activities (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).

Precursors of present transnationalism have always existed like returned migrants, periodic trips of immigrants back home, forced political diasporas and their continuous contacts with the homelands (Cohen, 1997), like Russian Jews escaping from the tsarist persecution in the XXth century (Howe, 1976), Armenians escaping from the Turkish oppression (Noiriel, 1995) or the significant Spanish diaspora after the instauration of fascism in Spain (Sole, 1995), etc. All these immigrant activities reinforced the links between their respective communities but did not achieve the regularity, routine and critical nature of present forms of transnationalism. Very few immigrants really lived in two countries in terms of their everyday activities. Although many past immigrants dreamt with returning someday back home, this aim was postponed by daily worries and necessities of their new lives and for many of them, these dreams just disappeared (Handlin, 1973; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1984).
Nevertheless, examples of economic and political transnationalism existed in the past centuries. Previous ‘comercial diasporas’, meaning merchant communities established in foreign jurisdictions with the aim of commercialising products, maintained their networks across borders and travelled from one side to another in search of commercial opportunities (Curtin, 1984). Venetians and Genovese merchants in medieval Europe are one early example of economic transnationalism or transnational entrepreneurs (Pirenne, 1970). During the successive phases of the European colonization of Africa and America, many Portuguese, Danish and English established commercial enclaves of agents involved in various forms of transnational commerce (Dobb, 1963; Hardoy, 1969; Arrighi, 1994). More recent, the Chinese started to represent an archetypical example of a transnational commercial community (Lim, 1983; Granovetter, 1995).

The first examples of economic transnationalism were elitist, including commercials and resource commercial agents who maintained a strong affiliation with their representative firm/house and communities of origin and depended on large distance networks for their economic survival. Only with the labour migration in the XIXth century, we can find more popular precursors of contemporary transnational activities. In this new era of a relatively advanced industrial capitalism, the expansion of commercial industry and agriculture required the over-crossing of barriers or frontiers that limited the local labour force. Transnational enterprises appeared whose workers had few roots abroad, maintained their networks with the homeland through trips and inversions and worked on a regular base abroad (Galarza, 1997; Cohen, 1988; Noiriel, 1995).
As such, to a lesser extent, the massive European labour migration to the United States in the XIXth century or, to a larger extent, the massive recruitment of Polish workers in the hard industry and mining in Germany, of Algerian and Moroccans workers in the French industry before the WWII or the massive migration of Mexican workers to the southeast of the United States that increased with the Braceros programme, a labour immigration treaty between Mexico and the United States, are just few examples of a more recent economic transnationalism (Weber, 1906 [1958]; Barrera, 1980; Samora, 1971; Portes and Bach, 1985). xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Examples of early political transnationalism are less common but those that did exist had transcendental consequences. Among these we could mention the efforts of some leaders and activists abroad to free up their land from foreign control or to support the creation of a nation-State. We commonly find these examples among immigrants who emigrated from nations without states in the XIXth century or the beginning of the XXth century, like Lithuanians or Czechs in the United States. Polish immigrants to the United States contributed with money to the cause of the Polish liberation at the beginning of the XIXth century, while Cuban expatriates in the United States helped in the foundation of the Cuban Republic (Glazer, 1954; Rosemblum, 1973; Thomas, 1971).

All these examples demonstrate that contemporary transnationalism has many precedents in the history of migration. But the first transnational economic and political enterprises, apart form their importance, were not regular and common among the vast majority of previous migratory movements. Contemporary transnationalism corresponds to a global economy and to new strategies of popular actors who find
themselves in a subordinate position in respect to the system, but who come to accede to new technical mediums in order to overcome this position (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2003).

The novel and important character of contemporary immigrant transnationalism resides in the high intensity of interchanges, the new forms of transaction and the multiplicity of activities that cross state borders and require this kind of geographical movement for their fulfilment, the high degree of institutionalisation of transnational linkages and the forms these might take (Itzigshon et al. 1999; Itzigshon 2000; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2003: 18-19). Transnational activities and occupations require regular and stable social contacts across state borders for their accomplishment like, for example, the monthly trips of a Pakistani businessman to deliver correspondence and supplies to his co-nationals’ parents in Pakistan or the community development projects undergone once a year by an Ecuadorian hometown association in some deprived Ecuadorian locality. Occasional gifts in money or goods that immigrants send to their parents or friends (this is not an occupation) or the buying of a house in the home country (this is not a regular activity) do not constitute a transnational activity.

Present transnational communities possess a distinct character that give good reason for the emergence of a new research field: 1) an increasing number of people involved; 2) the nearly instantaneous character of communications across space due to the technological progress; and 3) the cumulative character of the process that makes participation normative within certain immigrant groups (Portes 1997, 2001, 2003). Long-distance connections maintained by migrants one hundred years ago were not exactly transnational in the contemporary meaning of regular, sustained and, especially,
‘real time’ social contacts. Such earlier links were rather just border crossing migrant networks sporadically maintained by migrants as best as they could at the time (Portes et al. 1999). These conceptual differences between the meaning of newer transnational practices and older migration networks represent an important contribution of the transnational approach to the theoretical development on migration studies (Vertovec 2003).

The concept

In the post-War period, socio-political analysts were mainly concerned with the problem of immigrant assimilation into an ethnically homogeneous society. By the 1980’s they shifted to the ‘softer’ notion of integration developing, thus, a new policy perspective, that of multiculturalism. Later on, in the 1990s, socio-political scientists started to focus on new forms of citizenship and inter-group relations in the city and in the 21st century they moved their interest towards transnationalism (Castels 2002: 2).

Transnationalism, as a new concept in social and political sciences, was first developed from a top-down perspective (transnationalism from above) directing the research interests to the cross-border activities of governments or multinational corporations. More recent sociological literature has started to look at the initiatives of common people in establishing solid economic, political and socio-cultural networks across national borders (transnationalism from below) (Portes 1999; Portes et al. 2003, 2005). Accordingly, the term transnationalism has been used when referring to both human activities and social institutions that expand across national borders. States were seen as delimited political entities whose borders are crossed by flows of people, money or
information and are expanded by social networks, organisations or fields (Bauböck 2003a).

Immigrant transnationalism was first analysed by a group of social anthropologists who related it with transmigration and defined it as “multi-stranded” social relations and activities shaped and sustained by immigrants across state borders. According to them, many immigrants today build social fields that over-cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. One of the essential elements of this process is the multiplicity of social, political and economic involvements that migrants sustain in both, home and host societies. They furthermore suggested the term transmigrants for these people who live their lives across borders and develop social, familial, political, economic and religious networks that incorporate them into two or more states (Basch et al. 1994; Guarnizo 1997; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Glick Schiller 1999; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999).

Cultural studies scholars gave the concept a curious cultural orientation and a particular normative, post-modern connotation as “counter-narratives of the nation” that question the viability of the state and indicate the emergence of “post-national” societies (Appadurai, 1990; Bhabha, 1990; Clifford, 1992; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). Both theoretical views come to converge when defining transnationalism as a form of popular resistance “from below” rather than global activities “from above” performed by large economic enterprises or states (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).

Sociologists who have performed more recent comparative empirical work on transnationalism (Portes et al. 2003, 2005) also distinguish between “transnationalism
from above” - those transnational activities initiated and developed by institutional actors such as multinational corporations or states, and “transnationalism from below” - those activities that result from grass-root initiatives of immigrants and their counterparts in the country of origin. Since most transnational activities from above are well known and have been examined from different conceptual frameworks like economic globalisation, international relations or cultural diffusion (Sassen, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997), the researchers tend now to focus mainly on transnational initiatives from below, particularly the civic projects developed by hometown immigrant associations in their communities of origin.

“Transnationalism from below” has come to be defined as grassroots activities carried out across state borders by civil society actors such as immigrants (Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc 1992, 1994; Portes 1996, 1997, 2003; Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2003; Smith and Gurnizo 1998), social movements (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997; Tarrow 1998…), and nongovernmental organisations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Evans, 2000), independent of and sometimes in opposition to official political systems. Empirical findings have proved that through the networks established across political borders, an increasing number of people frequently have homes in two countries and pursue economic, political and cultural interests in both of them, they are able to lead dual lives, and they are often bilingual and culturally more open.

But many social scientists still question the emancipating nature of transnationalism and give explanatory priority to capital accumulation rather than to power-contesting practices when studying diasporas (Katharyne Mitchell, 1996; Aihwa Ong, 1997). Some
of them do not even differentiate between “transnationalism from above” and “transnationalism from below” and define it instead generically as “a set of sustained, border-crossing connections” among various groups of geographically dispersed social actors, such as immigrants, global corporations and business partnerships, media and communications networks, social movements, criminal groups and terrorist organisations (Vertovec, 2003).

According to Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 6), a guiding principle for determining the counter-hegemonic nature of transnationalism could be “to discern how this process affects power relations, cultural constructions, economic interactions, and, more generally, social organization at the level of the locality”. The ‘dominated’ (or subordinate) forces could gain control or become counter-hegemonic through political and economic contest or through cultural and ideological struggle. By measuring the practices and activities of non-institutional actors and also their networks of alliances of interest with the civil society, in general, we could identify the counter-hegemonic nature of their transnational activism.¹

Main theoretical perspectives on transnationalism: Kymlicka, Bauböck and Portes

Most social and political science theorists interested in transnationalism have first tried to delimit and differentiate the scope of transnationalism from other international, multinational or supranational phenomena that also entail cross-border interactions but

¹ Hegemony could be defined as the means and practices of the dominant group in a society in order to maintain its dominance by securing the natural consent of subordinate groups (including the immigrants). This consent is assured through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus that incorporates both dominant and dominated groups (Gramsci, 1971; Strinati, 1995).
conducted by more institutionalised and considerably more powerful actors. They have then tried to distinguish between different types of transnationalism.

Will Kymlicka perceives minority nationalism and transnationalism as two possible challenges to the traditional model of national citizenship. Although minority nationalism asks for forms of ethnic minority accommodation like self-government and collective minority rights, it does not seem to challenge the very idea of nationhood but rather that of statehood like state’s sovereignty and its mutually exclusive jurisdiction. The states are incapable of recognising substate national groups and give them the possibility to democratic cultural expressiveness. Thus, minority nationalism “replicates” rather than “challenges” the model of liberal-democratic national citizenship within the present political communities. Immigrant transnationalism, instead, apart from questioning the nation-state in the name of another nation or minority group, it also queries the idea that citizenship should be circumscribed within the territorial boundaries of a national community. In other words, it challenges the very idea of national citizenship (Kymlicka, 2003: 13-16).

Consequently, Kymlicka (2003) examines five forms of political activity that have been described as examples of “transnational citizenship”: (1) immigrant transnationalism; (2) transnational advocacy networks; (3) international legal authority; (4) transnational legislative/parliamentary bodies; and (5) intergovernmental regulatory authorities. He finally concludes that none of these five forms of transnationalism really erodes the model of democratic citizenship and its political legitimacy that remains tied down to national political communities.

---

2 Kymlicka defines *minority nationalism* as “mono-national political communities,…, which mobilise to maintain or regain their historic rights of self-government, with their own public institutions, operating in their own language” (2003: 13).
Table 2: Forms of “Transnational citizenship”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant participation in homelands politics</td>
<td>NGOs that pressure on one’s own government</td>
<td>International law (HR law); intergovernmental regulatory bodies (WTO); international legislatures (EU Parliament).</td>
<td>EU’s European Parliament or a possible common North American Parliament</td>
<td>“…delegated powers by states to exercise in accordance with the interests of these states”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Personal elaboration, source: Kymlicka, 2003)

*Immigrant transnationalism* is defined as immigrant participation in homelands politics. Kymlicka, however, refers here only to one form of immigrant transnationalism that is the political transnationalism, which he merely sees in terms of dual nationality acceptance and external voting rights. These rights, however, do not actually challenge the normative assumption that “politics should be organised through territorially-bounded national political communities” (Kymlicka, 2003:16).

*Transnational advocacy networks* consist of recruiting supporters from other countries, usually NGOs, to help pressure on one’s own government. But this sort of transnational activism represents a “weak” transnational political agency since it assumes that “the ultimate locus of decision-making is territorially-bounded national legislatures” (Kymlicka, 2003: 16-19).

Not only some sort of transnational activism but also of transnational decision-making or governance that could replace or contest the nation-state power might be a real challenge to liberal/national models of citizenship. Accordingly, Kymlicka analyses

---

3 Kymlicka gives the examples of indigenous people in Canada and their appeal to international allies in local policy issues: the development taken up in James Bay by the Quebec Government, environmental groups trying to put pressure on Canada to stop the seal hunt, or Canadian environmental NGOs pressuring the Government of Brazil to change its policies in the Amazon (2003: 18).
three forms of transnational or international legal authority: (a) international law, such as human rights law; (b) intergovernmental regulatory bodies like the World Trade Organisation (WTO); and (c) international legislatures like the European Union Parliament. He concludes that international legal authority does not actually challenge liberal/national models but rather universalises and exports them, though it does impose limits on state sovereignty (Kymlicka, 2003: 19-22).

A democratic transnational parliament at the global scale is, in Kymlicka’s opinion, utopian in a world in which many countries do not have democratic elections for their own governments. Common citizens are also “unenthusiastic” about transnational democracy because this might imply a return to the “pre-national phase”, in which “the masses will be governed by elites who do not share their own language and culture, and in which politics is conducted in a language and in a media that is ‘foreign’ to the masses”. People’s perceptions about the appropriate boundaries of a political community have less to do with size but more with “a feeling of belonging together, of being a nation, people or community of fate” (Kymlicka, 2003: 22-24).

If the idea of transnational democracy does not seem to be realistic at least for the foreseeable future, the level of democracy in our transnational institutions can still be supervised through intergovernmental regulatory authorities that is “…delegated powers by states to exercise in accordance with the interests of these states”. But these institutions could serve, in the end, the interests of their own agents and not of the people who elected them. Democratic accountability at a transnational level might not

---

4 Kymlicka gives the example of the Bank of Canada - a democratically elected national legislature that supervises national regulatory institutions like the WTO. Regional democratic elected bodies like the EU Parliament or a possible common North American Parliament to make decisions regarding North American Free Trade Agreement - based institutions seem more feasible, even though there is little public support or quite indifference to the idea of transnational democracy (2003: 22-24).
only be difficult to put in practice but also more limited than that at a domestic level (Kymlicka, 2003: 24-26).

The so-called “postnationalism”, being this minority nationalism or migrant transnationalism, should be best understood in Kymlicka’s opinion (2003: 26-27) as “latest adaptations of nationalist impulses” rather than “a new postnational political order”. His idea of transnationalism requires not only a form of transnational activism (migrant transnationalism or transnational advocacy networks) but also of transnational governance (transnational legislative/parliamentary bodies), thing that does not seem to be feasible in the estimated future.

Rainer Bauböck, another famous political science theorist, takes as a starting point in defining transnationalism the dual meaning of the term national: (1) as “an attribute of a territorially bounded state”; and, as well as, (2) “of communities that aspire for, or exercise, comprehensive self-government” (2003a: 4). He thus distinguishes four basic types of political relations: international, multinational, supranational and transnational.

Table 1: Types of political relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
<th>Multinational</th>
<th>Supranational</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When state and polity coincide - external relations between independent states, and organisations in which these states are represented by their governments (United Nations, free trade zones or military alliances)</td>
<td>When several political communities can be nested within a larger state - multinational states, such as Canada, Spain, Belgium or the UK, and the internal relations between their historic and relatively autonomous minority groups</td>
<td>When several states can be nested within a larger political community - the European Union</td>
<td>When several political communities can overlap between separate states - political institutions and practices that involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Personal elaboration, source: Bauböck, 2003a)
The label *international* is used when state and polity coincides and refers to external relations between independent states and organisations in which these states are represented by their governments like the United Nations, free trade zones or military alliances. When several political communities can be nested within a larger state, the right term is *multinational* that denotes multinational states, such as Canada, Spain, Belgium or the UK and the internal relations between their historic minority groups, which enjoy substantial political autonomy (Bauböck, 2003a: 4-5).

When several states can be nested within a larger political community, we refer to *supranational* relations between independent states that have concerted their sovereignty by forming a larger federal polity like the European Union. Finally, the term *transnational* is used when several political communities can overlap between separate states and includes those political institutions and practices that transcend the borders of independent states by involving simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities (Bauböck, 2003a: 4-5).

Following Bauböck’s analytical perspective, migrant transnationalism is not seen anymore as a one-side process, meaning its relation with the home society, but rather as a two-side process, which involves both home and host countries. This transnational perspective that centres on overlapping membership helps us to understand how “patterns of integration into the receiving polity” and “unfinished projects of nation building in the homeland” form migrants’ attitudes towards their country of origin (Bauböck, 2003a: 17). Thus, migrant transnationalism is not only about a narrow set of activities (external voting rights or dual citizenship) through which migrants become

---

5 In Bauböck’s opinion, free trade zones or military alliances are considered international organisations rather than supranational ones (2003a: 4).
involved in the politics of their homeland (Kymlicka, 2003), but also about how these activities affect in turn the “collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native population in both receiving and sending societies” (Bauböck, 2003a: 16).

Bauböck’s and Kymlicka’s typologies on transnationalism are quite different but united in scope as they both try to define new forms of political relations and communities. As they are both quite abstract and distinct, they do not allow us to construct very clear measures on the phenomenon we are interested. In order to encounter more junction points between these two theoretical perspectives on immigrant transnationalism and to delimit more exactly the nature, forms, dimensions and possible indicators of this phenomenon, we bring into the discussion Alejandro Portes’ standpoint, by far the most empirical one.

Sociologists like Alejandro Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al. 1999, 2003, 2005) support their own analytical perspective on previous social anthropology contributions on migrant transnationalism. They distinguish between transnational, international and multinational activities according to different types of actors involved: international activities are conducted by states or nationally-based institutions; multinational activities are carried out by formal institutions whose aims and interests transcend a single nation-state; transnational activities are initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors across state borders. They also differentiate among types of activity: political, economic and socio-cultural.
Two theoretical premises are necessary when performing empirical work on transnationalism: (1) the concept, in the way it is being used in contemporary literature, refers mainly to cross-border activities (economic, socio-cultural and political) of private actors, including immigrants; and (2) a clear linguistic distinction between transnational activities of private actors (including immigrants) - “transnationalism from below” and activities realised by big bureaucracies and other global institutions – “transnationalism from above” (Portes et al. 1999).

“Transnationalism from below” means grassroots activities carried out across state borders by non-institutional actors such as non-governmental organisations, human rights activists, humanitarian agents and agencies, hometown civic associations or immigrant groups. Immigrant transnationalism is just one possible form of
“transnationalism from below” and refers to the activities carried out across territorial borders by hometown civic associations and other immigrant groups in order to improve the political and socio-economic conditions in their sending communities or to protect and preserve their own cultural heritage and identity (Portes et al. 2005).

There are three types of immigrant transnational activities: 1) economic initiatives of transnational entrepreneurs who mobilise their contacts across borders in searching for capital and markets; 2) the political activities of members of political parties, governmental functionaries or community leaders whose main purpose id to achieve political power and influence in the exit country and the expatriate communities; 3) socio-cultural enterprises oriented toward national identity reinforcement abroad or collective cultural divertissement (concerts of folk music groups that act for immigrants, sport competitions between immigrants and the community of origin, electing beauty queens to represent immigrant community in national contest, celebrating festivity days abroad with the participation of political and artistic celebrities who travel to emigration destinations with this purpose) (Portes et al. 2003; Portes et al. 2005).

By examining the above theoretical perspectives we could conclude that Kymlicka (2003) has a visionary idea on transnationalism as a post-national form of membership and thus conceives different outsets of post-national political communities that require both institutional and non-institutional actors. Bauböck identifies as transnational all those political institutions and practices that involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons (non-institutional actors) to geographically separate polities. Portes has a more empirical view and defines transnationalism as those activities and practices (political, economic and socio-cultural) that entail the active engagement of non-institutional actors, including immigrants, across territorial borders.
The three theoretical perspectives do not come to agree when defining different types of political relations and practices. Portes defines the United Nations as a multinational organisation while Kymlicka and Bauböck describe this organism as international. Yet, international NGOs are seen as transnational by all three authors. Usually both types of organisations are considered to be international. Bauböck defines European Union as a supranational organisation, while for Portes and Kymlicka this is international. Nevertheless, all three authors, coincide when defining immigrant transnationalism as a form of “transnationalism from below”, meaning practices and activities conducted by non-institutional actors across national borders, independent of and sometimes in opposition to official political systems. Nevertheless, immigrants are just one group within the vast array of civil society actors that might get involved in transnational practices and activities from below.

Various ways of conceptualising immigrant transnationalism

A large number of studies have examined different forms of transnational connections, activities and practices, identities and organisations between immigrants and their country of origin (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton 1994; Portes 1996…; Portes et al. 2003, 2005…; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998, 1999; Goldring, 1998; Mahler 1998; Smith 1998; Guarnizo 1997, 1998; Kyle 1999; Popkin 1999; Guarnizo, Sanchez and Roach, 1999; Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Itzigsohn 2000). Due to the novelty of the phenomenon, methodological and theoretical confusions have accompanied the development of the transnational migration research field. As such, different scholars
have emphasised different forms of transnationalism, have conducted their studies at
different levels of analysis, and have used a variety of theoretical and methodological
approaches. Transnational connections and activities have proved to be quite often
heterogeneous and variable in their popularity and character across immigrant
communities (Portes, 2003). Thus, more conceptual and empirical work would help us
to identify types, specificities and differences in migrant transnationalism.

Vertovec (1999) provides a useful description of the present state of development of
studies on transnationalism. He first maps the field of transnationalism into six
different areas of conceptualisation: 1) transnationalism as a social morphology, i.e., the
rise of networks and institutions that create new transnational forms of social relations
and action; 2) a type of consciousness; 3) a mode of cultural production (socio-cultural
transnationalism, Portes et al. 2005); 4) an avenue of capital (economic
transnationalism, Portes et al. 2005); 5) a site of political engagement (political
transnationalism, Portes et al. 2005); and 6) the (re)construction of place and locality.
These six areas of study are not mutually exclusive and many studies of
transnationalism have addressed more than one of them.

He then maps the possible types and levels of migrant transnationalism emphasised by
various studies. This last differentiation help us to find out channels and factors
(infrastructures) that facilitate transnational activities such as family and kinship
organisation, transportation or people smuggling routes, communication and media
networks, financial arrangements and remittance facilities, legislative frameworks
regarding movement and status, and economic interdependencies linking local
economies (Vertovec 2003: 5).
Vertovec finally underlines three ways of categorising transnational migrant activity. 

One way is through a better refinement of the different types and levels of transnational activity among migrants. Such types of transnationalism vary among different groups of people depending on many factors, such as geographical proximity of sending and receiving contexts, histories of cooperation and interdependence between nation-states and localities, patterns of migration and processes of settlement (Vertovec 2003: 3-4).

A second way is through distinguishing between migrants themselves. The proposed categories of people involved in transnational activity spot those whose quests for work or “mobile livelihoods” involve them in transnational migration circuits or patterns of...
circular migration. The majority of cases portrayed in the literature refer to unskilled labour migrants. Other categories more and more significant to the transnational approach are represented by: undocumented migrants, return migrants, retirement migrants, forced migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, religious specialists servicing migrants, highly skilled workers, generally and specifically information technology workers employed through global labour market and trained occupational specialists drawn back from diasporas to contribute to the development of their homelands (Ibid: 4-5).

Finally, the third way focuses on degrees of mobility in regards to transnational practices and orientations. Thus, we can differentiate transnationalism among people: (a) who travel regularly between specific localities; (b) who mainly stay in one place of immigration but engage people and resources in a place of origin; and (c) who have never moved but whose locality is significantly affected by the activities of others abroad (Ibid: 5).

The diversity of approaches underlined by Vertovec (1999, 2003) responds certainly to the new and developing nature of this field of study. Nevertheless, if we want to conduct comparative studies on immigrant transnationalism we have to try to systematise different findings and organise the way in which we conceptualise these phenomena in order to avoid conceptual and methodological fussiness and confusion (Itzigsohn, 2000).

2. Immigrant Political Transnationalism or the Political Activism of Immigrants across State Borders
The globalisation processes have brought about various changes in the way that groups constitute political identities and mobilise for political goals. There has been a change in the way groups formulate recognition and rights claims and a transformation in the spatiality of political practices (Landolt 2008: 53). The scholarship world has underlined three shifts in civil society politics: 1) an expansion in the territorial orientation of politics to include allies and agendas situated across different nation-states (Itzigsohn and Giorguli Saucedo 2001); 2) a greater ability to build networks that overpass distance and shift territorial location and levels of governance within which groups make political demands (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ostergggard-Nielsen 2003); and 3) and extension of citizenship rights beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and into the transnational (Baubock 1994) and supranational (Soysal 1994) sphere.

New forms of political action and citizenship that transcend the territorial and political boundaries of states are emerging currently. Systematic forms of intervention by immigrants in their country of origin are increasing. Recent research literature has depicted migrants as active political participants (Glick Schiller at al 1992; M. Smith 1994; Graham 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Itzigsohn 2000; Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2003). Several immigrant communities continue to be part of their country’s electorate due to the fact that political parties from these countries have opened offices in immigrant settlements and political candidates regularly campaign among expatriates to gain their political and monetary support (Graham 1997; McDonnell 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999). Even people who have lived for decades abroad seem to maintain their involvement with their homelands either in support of or in opposition to the government in practice (Kearney 1991, 1995; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; M. Smith 1994; Kyle 2000).
At the same time, an increasing number of states have introduced constitutional reforms to provide dual citizenship rights and formal political representation to their nationals living abroad (Lessinger 1992; Mahler 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998). These new rights have changed the way in which migrants incorporate themselves into the host societies. These incentives provided by sending states are aimed to maintain the loyalty of their expatriates and attract their remittances, investments, and political contributions. Moreover, such incentives provide migrants with a new and stronger ‘voice’ in the politics of their country of origin and home communities (Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Asencio 1999).

But political transnationalism is not exclusively immigrant linked (Itzigsohn, 2000). Other groups might also get involved in transnational political action: indigenous movements that create alliances with other movements across national boundaries or with core countries’ nongovernmental organisations in order to strengthen the support and give international resound to their demands (Brysk, 1996; Van Cott, 1994; Yashar, 1998); transnational advocacy networks that work globally to defend causes like human rights, the environment, labour rights or women’s rights (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Evans, 2000).

There is a growing literature in international relations, political science and political sociology that tries to conceptualise political transnationalism. Some scholars address the disjunction between “ones’ legal identity as citizen of a territorial state and one’s political identity as an actor in the public sphere” (Mandaville, 1996: 657). Other scholars emphasise the emergence of rights that are guaranteed across national borders.
and affirm that the convergence nation and state is being challenged and that new forms of politics are emerging that transcend and do not depend on the territorial boundaries of the state (Agnew 1999; Brock, 1999; Mandaville, 1999; Kymlicka, 2003; Bauböck 2003; Östergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003; Portes et al. 2003). This disjuncture between state and nation leads to the creation of new boundaries of political action and the emergence of the so-called “transnations” encompassing the native population of a country and its diaspora (Laguerre, 1999). Authors like Itzigsohn (2000) focus on the institutional structures of immigrant political transnationalism (on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organisations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin) in order to assess whether and how the state is expanding and in which new areas political rights are created.

Political science theorists tend to define immigrant transnationalism in terms of dual or overlapping membership between two different and independent political communities. Transnational migrants are seen rather as diasporas or dual citizens than transmigrants. But these scholars lack empirical data about the forms and extent of this social phenomenon and also on the link between immigrant incorporation and transmigrants (or transnational communities) or between immigrant transnationalism and exit or reception contexts.

Kymlicka (2003), for example, defines immigrant political transnationalism as the political participation of immigrants in homeland politics via external voting rights and dual citizenship. Bauböck (2003a: 16) has a more complex analytical view on political transnationalism, not only as a narrow set of activities (external voting rights or dual
citizenship) through which migrants become involved in the politics of their homeland, but also about how these activities affect collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both host and exit societies. The way in which migration impacts on or changes the institutions of both exit and host polities and their conception of membership has to be considered when studying political transnationalism. Political transnationalism differs from international, multinational and supranational political relations because it generates overlapping forms of membership between two territorially separated and independent polities.

In order to defend this new form of membership, Bauböck offers some normative insights into the concept of migrant political transnationalism. First, he considers that transnational migrants should not be seen as threatening the national integrity of the host country. External voting rights or dual citizenship do not necessarily lead to or give good reasons for discourses or projects of extra-territorial nation building. On the contrary, they should be considered only as “legitimate means for involving those immigrants who have strong social and political stakes in their political community of origin” (2003a: 16).

Second, he somewhat defends the meaning of democracy in transnational relations. According to him, overlapping membership of migrants creates different kinds of claims and rights towards both countries involved. Migrants’ rights in the host country are derived from residence and are territorially-based, while migrants’ affiliations to the country of origin give them the right to be reaccepted to their country’s territory, but does not give the exit state the right to make any claim to the territory of the host state. This is the difference between transnational migration and colonialism and irredentist nationalism. Political theory has to cautiously distinguish between the challenge of
multinational and international conflicts that refers to delineation of territorial jurisdictions and the distribution of political powers between self-governing polities and, the challenge of transnational migration that is about the permeability of international borders for geographic mobility and the types of overlapping membership, rights and identities linking both exit and host polities (Bauböck 2003a: 17).

According to Bauböck, the boundaries of polities are for the political transnational action not only “demarcations of territorial jurisdiction”, but also “contested sites for determining political identities”. Studies on immigrant transnationalism, therefore, cannot be anymore confined only to relations between independent states, but have to be also extended to regional and local levels of government. City polities are in many ways more open to transnational affiliations than nation-states, thus research on immigrant transnationalism should be circumscribed to the local and regional level of government (Bauböck 2003a: 16).

The etymological and historical origins of citizenship are in the city: “citizenship was born in the Mediterranean city-states of Athens and Rome, it was reinvented in the liberties of Renaissance city republics and its modern national form arose in the urban revolutions that swept across Europe from 1789 to 1848” (Baubock 2003b: 17). It is therefore extremely challenging to conceive the city as a political space inside the territorial nation-state and to redefine a more attractive concept of urban citizenship in the new cosmopolitan democracies.  

6 The models of cosmopolitan democracy have extended federal principles from the domestic to the global arena (Held 1995, Bauböck 2003a). Bauböck’s arguments (2003b: 18) for a model of cosmopolitan democracy and urban citizenship are: (1) an urban citizenship would not only provide an alternative basis to territorial federations, but it would also transform national identities and nationalist ideologies from below and from within; (2) the model would strengthen the autonomy of cities vis-à-vis the state and would erode the claims of internal and external sovereignty attached to national government; (3) it would provide an alternative model of membership that could eventually help to overcome some of the
Sociologists like Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al. 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005) define political transnationalism as one particular form of “transnationalism from below” that consist of cross-border political relationships initiated and maintained by contemporary immigrants (immigrant hometown associations or other immigrant groups) in order to improve social conditions in their sending communities. They, moreover, examine the nature, forms and extent of this social phenomenon and also the link between immigrant transnationalism and immigrants’ socio-demographic characteristics or immigrants’ integration (incorporation) in the host country. Another useful indicator used by these researchers is the intensity of this field. They distinguish between ‘broad’ (occasional and regular) and ‘strict’ (only regular) transnational political practices as a clearer criterion for delimiting these phenomena.

Eva Nielsen-Östergaard (2001b: 4-5; 2003: 762), another social science scholar interested in transnationalism, uses a much broader definition of transnational ties. She focuses her research interests on migrants’ transnational political practices and develops a clear conceptual category. First, she defines migrants’ transnational political practices and activities as “various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees (such as voting and other support to political parties, participating in debates in the press), as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international organisations)”. Indirect participation would include the way in which political participation in one country, such as voting patterns or lobbying, is influenced by particular political events in another.

exclusionary features of national citizenship - cities would provide a space not only for transnational cultural diversity, but also for cosmopolitanism within the nation-state.
Ostergaard (2003: 762) embraces Itzigsohn’s distinction (Itzigsohn et al. 1999) between ‘broad’ (less institutionalised) and ‘narrow’ (more institutionalised) transnational practices that translates in terms of transnational political practices in “(occasional) participation in meetings or events” and “actual membership of parties or hometown associations”. Thus, indirect participation constitutes a major part of the political activity of migrants and refugees since actual mobility of the migrants involved is not a main parameter for the degree of ‘transnationalness’ of the political practices. Contrary to economic and social practices, regular cross-border contact, but not necessarily actual travel, is a constitutive part of political transnational practices (Itzigsohn et al. 1999: 329).

Literature on transnational migration advocates that immigrant practices and normative frameworks are territorially oriented. That is transnational practices may be oriented toward people and institutions in places of origin (a transnational orientation), toward the place of settlement (an assimilationist orientation) or toward a multisited, more decentred, and potentially diasporic orientation. All these orientations are not mutually exclusive but rather overlap and intermingle (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Landolt 2008).

In line with this, Ostergaard-Nielsen distinguishes among four types of immigrant transnational political practices and activities: a) homeland politics - political activities of immigrants that belong to domestic or foreign policy of sending country; b) diaspora politics - for some, a subset of that type of transnational practices confined to those groups that are taken away the possibility to participate directly in the political life of
their country of origin; for others, it has a more extensive connotation and refers to the politics of sensitive issues like national sovereignty and security political disputes, overlapping thus with the previous category of homeland politics; c) *immigrant politics* – political activities that immigrants undertake to better their socio-economic situation in receiving country, and that are supported by sending country; and d) *trans-local politics* – initiatives from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates. Nielsen-Östergaard (2001b: 5-6) considers that these four types of transnational political practices are not pure but rather “overlap and blend into each other” depending on the particular combination of converging/diverging interests of the main actors involved.

Östergaard focuses more on immigrants’ networks and activities that engage them in the politics oriented towards their country of origin and less on how this migrant activism affects the ‘receiving’ country, how Bauböck would propose. Nevertheless, her typology provides more valid and clear criteria for measuring who is and who is not a transnational political activist. The effect of this type of transnational activism on exit or host societies might become a subject of interest in subsequent research studies.

### 3. Does immigrant transnationalism really challenge the traditional conception of national citizenship?

Human societies under the influence of complex phenomena like migratory movements, economic, social and political development, international cooperation, have evolved throughout the history from tribes to communities of people, from states and nation-states to federations and confederations of states. With the construction of the modern
liberal nation-state the main marker of belonging or identity has been the national citizenship. Modern politics and citizenship have been organised around the correspondence between citizenship rights and state boundaries.

Today, ongoing social processes like globalisation, descentralisation and power devolution (regionalisation or federalisation) or international mass migration affect the conventional nation-state model and raise issues like social exclusion or limited public participation. The formal matters of belonging to a nation-state are thus extended to more substantive ones of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and duties. Accordingly, the limits of classical analyses like T.H. Marshall’s distinction (1949) between civil, political and social forms of citizenship are being exposed by other theories on citizenship. New rights such as economic rights in the workplace, cultural or collective minority rights of recognition (see Santos 1995, Stavenhagen 1995, Kymlicka 1995b) and the corresponding duties and obligations are advanced in the present general debate on citizenship. The national conception of citizenship or the compatibility between individual liberal values and group rights is being now questioned and argued (Rogers and Tillie 2001: 2-3).

As a result, many scholars have underlined the alteration of the conventional nation-state model and its conception of national citizenship under the influence of these complex processes and phenomena. Some authors have underlined the effects of economic globalisation on the nation-state (Sassen 1996, Castells 1996, Castells et al. 2001). Others have embraced a new concept of citizenship, that of cosmopolitan citizenship and described how various inter-state, intra-state and ultra-state practices challenge the viability of the conventional model of nation-state and the international

Migration movements have always questioned the territorially based form of organisation of citizenship. On the one hand, there is the problem of immigrants’ inclusion within the imagined national community of the host state and its legal and political order. On the other hand, immigrants create socio-cultural, economic and political linkages with their country of origin and establish institutions that transcend the political boundaries of the exit and host countries (Itzigshon 2000). The latter is the question of immigrant-based transnationalism, or the nation-state border-crossing identities and politics (Landolt 2008: 53), the focus of our interest in this research study.

The intensification of migration within Europe in the last decades has led to many changes in the rules of national citizenship. In many countries there has been a shift from *ius sanguinis* (citizenship through descent that tends to exclude immigrants and their descendents), to more inclusive forms of citizenship like *ius soli* (citizenship through birth in the territory) and *ius domicilii* (citizenship on the basis of residence). More immigration countries give now the right to dual citizenship as a way of improving the social integration of minorities and preventing thus ethnic conflict and racism (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2000; Castels 2002: 12).
Transnational migration have come to challenge the nation-state models of citizenship in both exit and reception countries. As migrants develop social projects in their home communities, they claim forms of citizenship that would allow them to cross the boundaries of nation-states without losing all their rights in their places of origin (Fitzgerald, 2000). Transnational migrants usually request legal rights of citizenship, such as voting from abroad and a kind of moral citizenship or ‘extra-territorial’ citizenship in the community of origin. In recent years, more emigration countries give the right of citizenship to their emigrants as a way of biding them to the home country and getting in turn benefits like remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance (Kymlicka 2003; Castels 2002: 12; Fitzgerald 2000).

But can we accommodate the global migration to the inherited national design of present societies? Can we still classify persons by taking into account primarily their national citizenship when present societies are more habitually resided by individuals and groups with multiple national and cultural identities? To what extent transnationalism, if it does exit as a ‘generalised’ phenomenon, raises problems to the traditional model of national citizenship?

Transnationalism represents one by-product of the globalisation processes and of the increase in international migratory movements. In the academic area, it is often debated in terms of a possible ‘post-nationalist’ outset of political community (Baubock 1994 2003; Castels 2002; Joppke 1998, 2001; Kiss 2001; Kymlicka 2003; Soysal 1994), thing that rises a contradictory understanding of the term: “post-“ or “trans-“ nationalist conception of political community?

Fitzgerald defines extra-territorial citizenship as citizenship in a territorially bounded political community without residence in the community. It does not necessarily mean legal citizenship, as citizenship has a moral dimension that is not always congruent with juridical status (2000: 4).
Some scholars (Kiss 2001) suggested that new forms of self-government might be
developed within the European Union or under the frame of human rights organisations,
which will enable ethnic minorities, who currently live across national borders, to act
collectively. These new forms of self-government do not actually aim at making the
nation and the state coincide, but somewhat create overlapping forms of membership
that will cut across the existing state boundaries and will be sheltered by larger
frameworks like the European Union or international human rights organisations.\(^8\)

Other scholars (Soysal 1994; Joppke 1998, 2001) examined “postnational” forms of
political membership among immigrants in Europe and emphasised the increased
immigrant appeal to international human rights instruments and organisations. Non-
citizen residents of a state can claim civil, social and even some limited political rights,
based on discourses of universal personhood since national identity is no longer linked
to the right to make claims on the (national) polity.

Although there seem to be an important shift in the citizenship politics of the EU, the
congruence between identity and citizenship is far from being universally accepted.
Citizenship, in many cases around the world, depends on essentialised national
identities that legitimate rights claims. This kind of ‘traditional’ identity seems to be
especially strong among diasporas and transnational migrants (Tölölyan 1996, Das
Gupta 1997). Migrants’ claims of citizenship on their communities of origin are likely
to be framed within particular discourses of this strong sense of national identity and
origin rather than on appeals to universal rights (Fitzgerald 2000: 3).

\(^8\) Janos Kiss gives the prospective example of ethnic Hungarians who live abroad and the current one, of
the Irish republican minority, which through the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland can exercise
a degree of collective action with their kin in the Republic of Ireland (2001).
There are scholars like Will Kymlicka (2003: 12, 18) who do not see the European Union or other international organisations to nurture the formation of a post-nationalist form of citizenship, but rather accommodate nationalist identities and aims. Migrant transnationalism, rather than a form of postnational citizenship that challenges the idea of nation-state, is seen as a form of dual membership, the latest adaptation of nationalist goals. While the general principle of a constitutional democracy is virtually unanimous in Western democracies, transnationalism as a broader suprastate political community might challenge “the scope of citizenship” or the primacy of the nation-state as “the locus of citizenship”, but it does not represent a real threat to “the values or principles of liberal-democracy per se”. Transnational immigrants are literally “dual nationals”, not “postnationals”, and the empirical data suggest that they are as devoted as anyone else to the idea that politics should remain organised through bounded national political communities in both host and home countries (Kymlicka 2003:12, 18).

Rainer Bauböck believes that migration becomes transnational “only when it creates overlapping membership, rights and practices, which reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different political communities”, without necessarily questioning the nation-state per se (Bauböck 2003a: 5). Nevertheless, comparative empirical studies (Portes et al. 2003) have proved that immigrants’ transnational political engagement is far from being as widespread, socially unrestrained, ‘deterritorialised’ and liberator as to really challenge the nation-state system itself. Transnational political action is regularly undertaken by a small minority, is socially restrained across national borders, takes place in quite specific territorial jurisdictions, and appears to reproduce pre-existing
power asymmetries. The potential of transnationalism for transforming asymmetries within and across countries has so far to be determined and proved.

In spite of all this, understanding migration from a transnational social field perspective entails at least revisiting the meaning of nation-state membership (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Delgado and Stefanicic, 2003). While states grant membership through laws that accord legal citizenship and nationality, people also make demands of states regardless of their legal status. Persons without full citizenship may act as substantive or social citizens, claiming rights or assuming privileges that are, in principle, accorded to citizens (Flores and Benmayor, 2000): immigrants without citizenship who fight and die as members of a host country’s military, protest in the streets about public policies, and access various social programmes and services without being citizens. Individuals connected through social networks to a transnational social field make claims, take actions, and may even see themselves as members of a country in which they have not lived.

Substantive citizenship as exercised within transnational social fields differs from findings of proponents of post-national citizenship (Soysal, 1994). These scholars put aside the domain of nation-states and look to global rights regimes to protect and represent individuals living outside their homelands. Persons in transnational social fields who are refugees or religious or racial minorities may draw on plural legal systems in their quest for rights, but the international rights regimes is still very much dependent on individual states for enforcement (Foblets, 2002; Woodman, 2002).

Persons living within transnational social fields may not make claims on states as legal or substantive citizens until a particular event or crisis occurs. They may engage in
lobbying, demonstrating, organising or campaigns of public information to influence either the government of the state in which they now reside, their homeland, or some other state to which they are connected. By focusing simply on legal rights and formal membership we might overlook this broader set of people who, to varying degrees, act like members of a society while not formally belonging to it. So, they influence and are influenced by the state. Sometimes are named “transborder citizens” that is those people who may or may not be citizens of both their sending and receiving polities but who express some level of social citizenship in one or both (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001a).

Partial membership in two polities challenges core aspects of governance in at least two ways. First, dual belongings call into question the very notion of governance because it is not readily obvious which state is ultimately responsible for which aspects of transnational migrants’ lives: Where they should get health care, pay taxes, or serve in the army? Which state should protect and represent them? What happens when migrants are sentenced to the death penalty in their host country while death sentence is prohibited in their country of origin? Second, the multiple experiences of governmentality and political socialisation of transborder citizens do not occur in isolation from one another. Persons in transnational social fields enter the political domain with a broader repertoire of rights and responsibilities than citizens who live only within a state. The fact that migrants may also have direct experience with international rights regimes provides them with useful knowledge to reconceptualise their relationship to the state (Pessar, 2001; Levitt and Wagner, 2003).
Migrants also bring ideas about governance with them that transform host-country politics, they reformulate their ideas and practices in response to their experiences with host states, and they communicate these social remittances back to those in their homelands or to members of their networks settled in other states (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001a). Shared experiences of democratic incorporation in the receiving state may feed back into transnational activities that lead to more transparent politics at home (Shain, 1999).

Although there is little academic support for the idea that transnationalism represents a real challenge to the nation-state system itself, it does seem to question the *locus* of membership formation, thing that requires a re-interpretation of the meaning of the nation-state membership (Kymlicka 2003). Moreover, transnationalism is an emerging phenomenon whose nature, forms, scale, intensity and implications still have to be studied but which might influence considerably in long run the traditional model of national citizenship.

### 4. Lines of Empirical Research on Immigrant Transnationalism

Empirical studies on immigrant transnationalism are highly fragmented because of a lack of analytical rigor and a well-defined theoretical framework. The existent studies often use different units of analysis (individuals, groups, organizations, local states) and mix diverse levels of conceptualisation. This tendency threatens the viability of this emerging research field (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2003: 16).
Social anthropologists like Glick Schiller and Levitt (2004: 1004-1006) ingeniously sum up the foundational research approaches to transnational migration. They affirm that researchers have explored transnational identity formation and the economic, political, religious and socio-cultural practices that propel migrant incorporation and transnational connection at the same time. In their opinion, a transnational social field approach to the study of social life is needed in order to distinguish between the existence of transnational social networks and the consciousness of being embedded in them.

They first distinguish the researchers who have proposed typologies to capture variations in the dimensions of transnational migration (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Laguerre, 1998; Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Smith, 2003; Levitt, 2001a,b; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001a, b; Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2002; Kyle, 2001; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Fitzgerald, 2003; Landolt, 2001; Goldring, 2002; Vertovec, 2003; Gold, 2002; Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Riccio, 2001; Van der Veer, 2001; Abelman, 2002; Morgan, 1999; Faist, 2000a, b; Schiffauer, 1999; Sklair, 1998; Itsigsohn, 2000; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999; Kivisto, 2001; Mahler, 1998; Duany, 2000; Morawska, 2003b, Eckstein and Barberia, 2002).

They subsequently mention the researchers who have explored the extent to which transnational migration is a new phenomenon or whether it shares similarities with its precursors (Foner, 2000; Glick Schiller, 1999; Smith, 2002; Morawska, 2003b; Weber, 1999). Other studies have examined the scope of transnational practices among particular immigrant populations (Portes, Haller and Guarnizo, 2002; Guarnizo, Portes
and Haller, 2003; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002), while an emerging body of research has tried to explain variations in transnational practices across groups (Levitt, 2002b; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Portes, Haller and Guarnizo, 2002; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003).

In Glick Schiller’s and Levitt’s opinion, there are four distinct traditions developing among scholars of transnational migration:

1) The research done by sociologists and anthropologists in the USA: some developed as a critique of the unilinear assimilationist paradigm of classical migration research (Glick Schiller, 1999; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1995); other focused on the kinds of networks that stretch between a sending community and its migrants (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Levitt, 2001a; Rouse, 1992; Smith, 1998; Kyle, 2001); other determined the conditions under which migrants maintain homeland ties and identities and how commonplace transnational practices include the migrant population as a whole (Morawska, 2003b; Levitt, 2003b; Basch, Glick and Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994); these studies revealed that a small but nonetheless significant number of migrants engage in regular economic and political transnational practices (Portes, Haller and Guarnizo, 2002; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003) and that many more individuals engage in occasional transnational activities; some studies explored the relationship between migration and development, categorising transnational migration as a result of late capitalism which renders small, nonindustrialised countries incapable of economic autonomy and makes them dependent on migrant-generated remittances (Itzigsohn, 2000; Portes, 2003; M.P. Smith and Guarnizo, 1998); other studies focused on the ways in which sending and receiving states continue to play a critical role in migrants’ lives.
more recent research on the second generation follows the debate on assimilation, proponents of the classical approach arguing that transnational migration is an ephemeral first-generation phenomenon while some transnationalists speak of new forms of transnational connection or replace the term second generation with transnational generation to include youth in the homeland and the new land (Levitt and Waters, 2002; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2002).

2) Studies realised by the Transnational Community Programme based at Oxford University that use a much more broader definition of transnational ties (Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Riccio, 2001; Van der Veer, 2001; Abelman, 2002; Morgan, 1999; Faist, 2000a; Schiffauer, 1999; Sklair, 1998; Castles, 1998), transnational connections forged by business, the media, politics, or religion being all examined under the rubric of community; this work demonstrates that migrants are embedded in networks stretching across multiple states and that migrants’ identities and cultural production reflect their multiple locations; some studies highlighted the need to distinguish between patterns of connection on the ground and the conditions that produce ideologies of connection and community (Gomez and Benton, 2002; Ostergaard-Neilsen, 2003);

3) A literature on transnational families (kinship) developed in the U.S. and Oxford (Ballard, 2002: Chamberlain, 2002; Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002) to document that family networks constituted across borders are marked by gendered differences in power and status;
4) Scholars using a transnational approach to migration to challenge social theory in an effort to reformulate notions of space and social structure (Morawska 2001a, 2003a; Faist 2000a, b; Guarnizo, 1997; Landolt 2001).

*Potential determinants of immigrant transnationalism*

The potential explanatory variables for immigrant transnationalism (at an individual level) have usually come from three different theoretical sources: 1) the classical theories on the role of the individual characteristics in immigrant assimilation; 2) the contemporary theories of the contextual roots as a determinant factor in immigrant incorporation in the host society; and 3) the theory of social networks (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2003: 1215).

*The classical theories of assimilation* consider that persons who emigrate will get ‘assimilated’ by the economic and socio-cultural systems of the host society losing, therefore, their ‘old’ cultural practices and political allegiances (Alba 1985; Alba and Nee 1997). Thus, the main hypothesis is that, as longer immigrants reside and get socialised in the manner of the host country, as higher the possibilities to be completely ‘absorbed’ by it. In terms of political transnationalism, the consequence would be that longer periods of residence in the host country would lead to a progressive separation from the allegiances in the home country. Besides, immigrants are expected to have a single national identity and political representation in one political community. Thus, another hypothesis might be that naturalised immigrants would get involved to a lesser extent in the politics of their home countries (Portes et al.2003: 1215-16).
In line with these theories, educational background, to the extent to which it favours a rapid integration and mobility in the host country, might also lead to a breakdown of the networks in the home country (Borjas 1987, 1990). Educated immigrants would tend to shift their allegiances and transfer their interests toward the host country (Pickus 1998). But an extensive literature questions this assumption by considering that education increases the overall political participation in both countries. In that case, higher education would lead to an increase in migrant transnationalism (Portes et al. 2003: 1215-16).

Recent literature on the relationship between gender and immigration shows that men and women have different views towards their exit and host countries. Studies on Latin American immigrants in USA proved that men normally experience occupational descent mobility upon immigration and a loss of status. Migrant women tend to experience something in the opposite direction, meaning that by immigrating to USA many of them come to work for the first time in their life. Accordingly, Latin American immigrant men have a stronger political perspective and are more likely, therefore, to get involved in transnational political activities than migrant women. This comes mainly as a compensation for the loss of status in the receiving country (Portes et al. 2003: 1216-7).

Apart from the individual characteristics of immigrants, the sending and receiving contexts also influence to a great extent migrants’ propensity towards participation in transnational activities. The second theoretical line looks at how exit and reception contexts influence migrant transnationalism. Accordingly, as bigger the socio-cultural differences between the recently arrived persons and the host society, as more difficult
the process of their incorporation. Thus, we could expect that migrants that come from remote rural areas to metropolitan areas of distinct countries would have lesser possibilities to adapt and, therefore, will tend to preserve the connections with their home countries (Portes et al. 2003: 1217-18).

USA studies found out that immigrants from urban areas who emigrate from a generalised context of violence in their home country tend to look for a quick integration in the host society and to avoid whatever form of active participation back home (Colombians in USA - Guarnizo et al. 1999). In contrast, immigrants that come from small towns or rural areas and whose country is peaceful are more likely to get involved in transnational civic and political activities in order to help their native communities (Salvadorians in USA – Landolt et al. 1999; Menjivar 2000).

Another variable could be the “socially expected durations” (SED- developed by Merton in 1984), meaning the expectations held by relatives and friends about the proper duration of the staying abroad. The main hypothesis coming from here is that temporary SEDs (normative expectations of return), to the extent to which they will help preserve the home networks and commitments, will also increase migrant transnationalism. The context of reception might also influence the political and economic incorporation of immigrants. So, a more negative context of arrival characterised by an occupational descendent mobility might lead to the perpetuation of the networks and commitments with the home country. Transnational activism could thus function as a compensatory mechanism for the loss of status in the host society (Portes et al. 2003: 1217-18).
The third theoretical line describes migration as a process that builds up networks that influence, in turn, the exit and settlement of newcomers when the original economic incentives have disappeared (Tilly 1990; Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994). Early departures, for example, facilitate the following ones by reducing the costs and risks of the initial journey (Massey and Espinoza 1997). The main hypothesis here is that, as larger and more spatially diversified the social networks, as higher their opportunities to get involved in political activities and initiatives across national borders (Portes et al. 2003: 1218).

The empirical link between immigrant incorporation in the host society and transnational communities

There are three trends of conceptualising immigrant transnationalism in the scholarly world. The first group of scholars suggests that transnational communities threaten the feeling of national identity and lead to a disintegration of social cohesion in the country of residence. The second group argues that transnational communities may constitute, on the contrary, a new form of immigrant adaptation to the mainstream society. Finally, the third group considers that there is nothing new about transnational communities and that they have existed since long time ago in the form of diasporas. These academic debates have lead to a growing number of empirical researches on the phenomenon of transnationalism (Castels 2002: 2).

Many empirical studies have shown that there is a link between immigrant incorporation in the host society and transnational communities. Castels (2002: 7-8) develops this idea by analysing three main approaches to incorporation of immigrants into society: assimilation (classical immigration countries like the USA, Canada and
Australia and some European immigration countries), *differential exclusion* (“guestworker system” in European countries like Germany up to the 1970’s or “overseas contract workers” in Gulf oil countries and Asian tiger economies today) and *multiculturalism*.

Castels (2002: 7-8) further on considers that transnational communities have much in common with the cultural diversity accepted by multiculturalism with regard to “cultural maintenance and community formation”. He, however, argues that transnational communities differ from multiculturalism because “they maintain strong cross-border affiliations, possible over generations” and “their primary loyalty is not to one nation-state or one territory”, how multiculturalism does assess. In this regard, that of maintaining allegiances with two or more nation-states, transnational communities might constitute a challenge to nation-states.

Some empirical studies have, for instance, shown that immigrants have started to get involved in some sort of transnational activities as opposing ‘assimilation’ or different forms of discrimination and exclusion in the host society. Consequently, they suggest that the process of immigrant incorporation into the host society influences immigrant propensity to participate in transnational activities. Accordingly, those immigrants that get dispersed and almost lost in the new context, by seeking to protect themselves from discrimination, are less likely to participate in political activism.9

Transnational activities, moreover, grow up in communities that are highly concentrated and have experienced a hostile receiving procedure from local authorities and the native

---

9 See the experience of Haitians, Dominicans and Mexicans in USA and of Hindu and Pakistan immigrants in Great Britain (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigson et al. 1999; Roberts et al. 1999).
population. These highly concentrated zones create multiple opportunities for transnational activities. The increased external discrimination makes immigrant communities to look in within and augments, therefore, the strong contacts with the communities of origins. In this kind of contexts, transnational cultural activities and civic associations offer an important tool of defence against the external hostility and may protect the personal dignity of the threaten ones (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Roberts at al. 1999).

Other studies, on the contrary, suggest that transnational activities create an alternative way of socio-economic and political adaptation of immigrants to the host society and do not come, therefore, against the process of immigrant ‘assimilation’ or integration. Accordingly, Alejandro Portes gives empirical evidence that, typically, those immigrants who are better established or integrated into the host society, having therefore a higher security, are more likely to get involved in transnational activities.10

Why Study Immigrant Political Transnationalism in the European Context?

Most of the literature on transnational migration has come from economic sociology. These studies focus on the macroeconomic driving forces of global migration or the microeconomic practices of immigrant entrepreneurs that turn into transnational communities resisting the hegemonic logic of global capitalism (Sasken 1988; Portes 1996; M.P.Smith 2003;). As a reaction to this dominant position of economic sociology in the transnational migration field, anthropologists and cultural studies scholars

10 Portes in his analysis on Latin American groups in USA has found that political transnationalism is strongly associated with national origin and a product of greater human capital, greater stability and experience in receiving society, plus strong social connections and enduring moral ties with sending communities (2003 et al.: 1233)
working on this subject have focused on the cultural meaning of transnational networks and practices and how these in turn foster enduring transnational ties (Shein in Smith and Guranizo, 1998; Ong, 1999; Ong and Nonini, 1997).

Nevertheless, there are just few transnational scholars who have made politics the central focus of their analysis of transnational practices. Some of them have acknowledged that transnational practices are unavoidable determined by while also transcending the institutional and geographical boundaries of a state (Kearney, 1995; Schein, 1995). Others have offered evidence of the role of the state in trying to reincorporate transnational immigrants or drawn on their investments and social capital, and all this as a state-centred effort to construct a ”deterritorialised” nationhood (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). But the emphasis in all these studies have been on economic and cultural forces explaining transmigration and the emergence of transnational migrants. Despite some more recent research on transnational political practices (Itzigsohn 2000; Radcliffe 2001; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003; Nielsen-Ostergaard 2001, 2003; M.P.Smith 2003; Margheritis 2007), political transnationalism of immigrants is still a largely underdeveloped studying area within the transnational migration field.

European comparative research on migrant transnational political activities and how these, in turn, foster or inhibit immigrant incorporation into the polity of the host country has been more or less absent from the political and social science research agenda. Some scholars, however, like Soysal (1994) or Joppke (1998, 2001) have tried to investigate “postnational” forms of political membership in European countries as a
result of an increased immigrant appeal to postnational norms of human rights, independently of immigrants’ period of living or level of integration in the host society.

Studies on immigrants’ transnational political practices and activities come mainly from the United States and the research perspective is quite different from that adopted in Europe (Rogers 2000). Moreover, some important research aspects of migrant transnationalism have not been yet investigated by European-based studies. First, there is much less attention to and research available on political transnationalism in Europe than on the other side of the Atlantic and this has less to do with phenomenon’s incidence than to “the extent to which it is observed and the political context in which it is observed” (Nielsen-Östergaard 2001b: 6-8).

Second, European-based research has tended to focus on immigrants’ political participation in receiving country, meaning immigrants’ efforts to better their situation in the receiving country like obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting marginalisation and discrimination and so on (Soysal 1994, Bauböck 1994, Joppke 1998, 1999). Thus, transnational ties or networks have been included more as a cause in the analysis of political integration than as a phenomenon in its own right. Yet, United States-based studies have mainly focused on the mobilising role of the sending country like particular politics and initiatives towards citizens and former-citizens abroad in an attempt to attract more economic and political resources, or local initiatives from abroad and cooperation with local organisations and associations at home (Itzigsohn 2000; Guarnizo et al. 1999; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Mahler, 1998, 2000; Landolt et al. 1999; Levitt, 2000, 2001; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Menjivar 2000; Rosenblum 2004; Smith 2003b; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003b). There are fewer studies
that emphasise the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and receiving states (Portes et al. 2002, 2003; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Roberts et al. 1999).

Third, there is a difference in the level of analysis. There is more local-to-local bottom up research of political practices in the United States than in Europe where researchers are more interested in those practices that are more directly related to national ideologies and policies (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Levitt 2001). There are next to no studies of hometown associations among immigrant groups in Western Europe although these might be situated at the centre of economic, political and socio-cultural trans-local activities even if in a less institutionalised shape. Instead, researchers continue to focus their interest on the main ethnic, religious or party political organisations (Nielssen-Östergaard 2001b: 8).

United States-based anthropological studies have suggested that transnationalism represents a generalised phenomenon among contemporary migrant communities that has been developed as an alternative to traditional ways of assimilation. Transnationalism was described as a permanent back and forth movement in which immigrants lived concurrently in two or more societies and cultures, and this lead to the emergence of “deterritorialised” communities (Basch et al. 1994). This approach, by focusing on transnational entrepreneurs or political activists and excluding other immigrants not involved in these actions, has created a methodological problem that of selecting on the dependent variable. All immigrants were seen as “transmigrants” and transnationalism was overestimated in its purpose as an alternative to assimilation, and
in its general spread. Hence, its possible absence in everyday life of many immigrants was overlooked (Levitt 2001; Kyle 2000; Portes et al. 2003; Portes 2003).

Subsequent comparative quantitative and qualitative researches have proved that regular or occasional participation in transnational activities is not a universal practice (Portes et al. 1999; Portes et al. 2002; Portes et al. 2003; Orozco 2003; Portes et al. 2005). Although immigrant remittances or visits back home might be considered as particular forms of transnationalism, they cannot justify per se the development of a new concept. There are scholars who consider that immigrants have always been involved in these types of activities with their countries and communities of origin, and they do not see anything new about the concept of transnationalism (Waldinger and Fitzegerald, 2004).

Particular comparative studies on political transnationalism have also proved that this is far from being as widespread, socially unrestrained, ‘deteritorialised’ and liberator as to really challenge the nation-state system itself. Transnational activism is regularly undertaken by a small minority, is socially restrained across national borders, takes place in quite specific territorial jurisdictions, and appears to reproduce pre-existing power asymmetries. The potential of political transnationalism for transforming asymmetries within and across countries has so far to be determined and confirmed (Portes et al. 2003).

Overall, migrant transnationalism as a new theoretical perspective in the migration field is based on the regular activities across national borders of only a minority of the members of the general migrant population (Guarnizo and Smith 1998, Portes et al. 2003; Landolt 2001). It nevertheless provides us a new theoretical lens for seeing and
studying what might have always been there but could not be seen before (Smith 2003). Hence, more comparative qualitative and quantitative studies on transnationalism are needed in order to formulate different causal mechanisms, to test subsidiary ideas and hypotheses and figure out its actual forms and extent, determinant factors and consequences (surveys and aggregate official statistics) or its generational transmissibility (longitudinal information) (Portes et al. 1999; Portes et al. 2005).
CHAPTER

II. THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA. PROPOSED THEORETICAL MODEL

Introduction

There are no fixed rules that might indicate us how to decide on a certain research study. There is always a degree of irrationality or some creative intuition in the moment of choosing a research subject. When starting a research we are many times determined by personal reasons (personal origin, inclination or values), but from the perspective of a possible contribution to social and political sciences, these reasons are neither sufficient nor necessary in order to justify our choice. The scholarly community is not so much interested in what we think but rather in what we can demonstrate through scientific empirical methods (King, Keohane and Verba 2004: 14-15).

In general terms, whatever scientific research study should respect at least two conditions in order to be valued by the scholarly community: 1) it should introduce a relevant or ‘important’ question from a political, social or economic point of view; 2) it should make a real contribution to what has been written or researched in the academic world, so the collective capacity to give scientific explanations of some aspect of the world would increase (King, Keohane and Verba 2004: 15).

The first condition leads us to the real world of political and social phenomena and to the present and historical record of the events and problems that influence people’s
lives. In other words, in order to determine if a research question fulfils this condition we have to evaluate its social and political significance for our society. The second condition directs our attention to the academic literature of social and political sciences, that is, to those intellectual paradoxes not yet formulated or that remain to be solved, and to the scientific theories and methods offered to resolve them (King, Keohane and Verba 2004: 15).

In this chapter we will first formulate the research questions and illustrate the socio-political and theoretical relevance of our research subject. Then we will propose our alternative theoretical solution or model: descriptive and causal hypothesis, dependent, and independent variables.

1. Questions to be researched

The first criteria for a scientific research study that is that of formulating an important question for the real world does not seem to be such a difficult task given the diversity and complexity of our social and political life. Nevertheless, according to King, Keohane and Verba (2004: 16), all hypotheses need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge.

This is a comparative research study on the political transnationalism of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. The main objective of this research study is to analyse the transnational political practices and activities of immigrant associations in Barcelona, more exactly, the various forms of direct and indirect (via the political institutions of the reception country or international organisations) cross-border participation of Barcelona’s immigrant associations in the
politics of their country of origin. We seek to establish what forms, scope and intensity characterise the political activism of immigrant associations across national borders and to determine the social and organisational factors that shape this kind of transnational political participation.

Research questions:

- Are there any politically transnational immigrant associations, meaning immigrant associations that become involved (directly and indirectly) in their home country polities on a regular basis?

- If yes, which are these associations and what are the main determinants of their participation in this form of activism?

- Are there any patterned differences across different national origin immigrant associations in the incidence and forms adopted by this phenomenon?

2. Socio-political relevance of the research subject

Social science scholars generally portray immigrant transnationalism as a growing phenomenon, though it is numerically limited, that involves ordinary people and has an important impact on both immigrant adaptation in destination countries and the development prospects of exit countries and communities. The rise of different forms of grass-roots transnationalism (transnationalism from below) offers new life options to ordinary people either in their own countries or in those to which they migrate. Grass-roots transnationalism has the potential of undermining in time one of the fundamental premises of capitalist globalisation that is: labour stays local while capital becomes global (Portes et al. 1999; Portes 2001).
Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al. 1999: 227-230; Portes 2001: 186-191) summarise the possible implications of grass-roots transnationalism, on the basis of the existent empirical evidence, in three substantive propositions: 1) the emergence of transnationalism from below is driven by the very logic of global capitalism; 2) transnational communities, though they follow well-established principles of social network development, represent a phenomenon at variance with conventional expectations of immigrant assimilation; 3) grass-roots transnationalism, as being stimulated by the dynamics of capitalism, has greater potential as a form of individual and group resistance to dominant structures or as way of development of exit countries than alternative strategies.

The first proposition relies on the evidence that the increasing demand for immigrant labour in the advanced countries provides the appropriate conditions for the rise of transnational enterprise. At the same time, a significant number of immigrants and their home country counterparts have mobilised for political action or transformed the character of local religious and cultural forms through their continuous cross-border exchanges (Portes et al. 1999: 228; Portes 2001: 187-188).

Today immigrants are less likely to get good jobs in the industry sector but rather low-paid jobs in agriculture, cleaning and domestic services with few possibilities for advancement (Sassen 1998; Roberts 1995). These precarious and discriminatory conditions stimulate them to look for better strategies of survival and resistance among which knowledge and access to goods and services across state borders represent an important one. Technological advances in transport and communication facilitate these cross border connections and exchanges. As such, a new class of transnational
entrepreneurs, cross-border political activists, socio-cultural reformers or hometown associations emerges to fulfil the distinct but complementary needs of migrant and home country populations (Portes et al. 1999: 228).

The second proposition questions the well-established assumption in immigration literature that by time immigrants tend to assimilate in the host society (Gordon 1964; Alba 1985; alba and nee 1997). Today’s empirical evidence demonstrates the existence of back-and-forth migrant movements and regular exchanges of goods and information between origin and destination countries or communities. This transnational field, created by contemporary migrants, amount to an alternative way of immigrant adaptation in the advanced world. Rapid acculturation is not anymore a precondition to economic success and social status, immigrants being able to develop their life expectations through the social networks established across state borders (Goldring 1996; Guarnizo 1997b).

The process of integration to the destination country of both first- and second-generation immigrants can be altered in various ways by transnational activism. One possibility is that successful transnational entrepreneurs finally return home, taking their families along, and invest in land and ‘retirement houses’ in their communities of origin. Another more interesting possibility is that transnational activities like economic and political initiatives based on strong social networks with the country of origin may actually go together with and support successful adaptation to the destination country where practices of labour market exploitation and discrimination continue to exist. Empirical evidence demonstrates that immigrant transnationalism is associated with a
more secure economic and legal status in the destination country (Portes 2001; Guarnizo and Portes 2001).

Though there is no clear evidence at present that economic or political transnationalism is transmitted inter-generationally (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Smith 2001; Fitzgerald 2000), this involvement may have durable effects on second generation both through its influence on the socio-economic integration of parents and through their efforts to create bridges between their children and the culture and communities left behind (Portes 2001: 189-190). Parents may try to pass on to their offspring both their transnational skills and assets, perpetuating this social field across generations. All these alternatives may transform the assimilation assumption in immigration literature, with major consequences for both exit and destination countries (Portes et al. 1999: 229).

The third proposition relies on the emergence of transnational networks in defence of labour rights and standards in poor countries that become increasingly threatened by the international expansion of capitalism (Piore 1990; Fields 1990). An increasing number of ordinary people have started to confront the challenges of the new capitalist world economy through resistance or through designing their own economic alternatives (Sassen 1988; Guarnizo 1992; Portes and Dore 1994). Aggregate immigrant remittances often exceed the value of the exit country’s national exports or the development aids received from rich countries. Domestic industries like residential construction can become severely dependent on migrants’ acquisitive power and demand. Small transnational enterprises have been created to cover the needs of both migrant and homeland populations. Returned immigrants have been creating a significant range of
businesses with capital and knowledge accumulated abroad (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Levitt 2001; Marques et al 2001; Roberts et al 1999).

At the same time, governments of exit countries have intensified their contacts with their nationals living abroad and involved them in national life through dual citizenship and dual nationality laws, rights to vote in national elections or even representation in national legislatures, emigrant target agencies and programmes seeking to provide them various services. National parties and political movements in exit country have established offices in cities with major migrant concentration and conduct regular fundraising and campaigning. Migrants have become increasingly important for home governments not only as sources of remittances, investments, and political contributions and support, but also as potential ‘ambassadors’ or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Landolt 2001; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Smith 2000; Itzigsohn et al 1999; Levitt 2001; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001).

Transnationalism is important not only for national development but also for local development. Empirical evidence demonstrate that towns and rural communities in exit countries that are supported by civic hometown associations or committees abroad are better off in terms of physical infrastructure (from church repairs to paved roads, health centres and water and irrigation devices) (Landolt 2000, 2001). Local economies and traditional authoritarian politics are revitalised, respectively revolutionised, by the growing economic power of migrants’ hometown associations and their democratising influence (Fitzgerald 2000; Levitt 2001; Marques et al. 2001).
3. Theoretical relevance of the research subject

In order to fulfil the second criterion that is that of making a real contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature we have to situate the design of our study within the framework of the existent transnational scientific literature. In this way, we guarantee our acquaintance with “the state of the art”, avoid the danger of repeating a study that has been done before and ensure the importance of our work for the scholarly world (King, Keohane and Verba 2004: 16).

As we could see in the Chapter I of this thesis, not only that most studies on transnational migration have come from economic sociology but also that those coming from others fields like social anthropology or cultural studies have not made politics the central focus of their analysis of transnational practices. Moreover, a political science perspective on immigrant political transnationalism has been more or less absent in the scholarly literature. At the same time, social movement theories or evidence on transnational networks have been scantily employed in transnational migration literature to solve an existing but apparently unrelated problem.

The empirical base of the field of transnationalism has relied almost exclusively on case studies that resulted in an extensive list of qualitative and ethnographically–based literature (Margolis 1994; Mahler 1995, 1999; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Levitt 2001a; Guarnizo 1998; R. Smith 1994, 1998; Goldring 1996; Glick-Schiller et al. 1995; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999, 2001a; Basch et al. 1994, Wolf 1997; Mitchell 1997; J. Lin 1998; Ong 1999, etc.). While undoubtedly valuable, these studies invariably sampled on the dependent variables, pointing up to those who
take part in transnational activities, to the exclusion of those who do not participate. Intermittent activities like the occasional trip home or a sporadic financial contribution to a home country political party helps to strengthen the transnational field but do not justify by themselves the emergence of a new concept. We need to look at a new class of immigrants the so-called transmigrants (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999), economic entrepreneurs or political activists who undertake cross-border activities on a regular basis in order to establish a new field of investigation (Portes et al. 2003b: 1213).

On the other side, most comparative research on migrant political transnationalism has come from the United States, European-based comparative studies on this issue being quite scarce and poorly developed. The extent to which this phenomenon has been observed in Europe and the political context in which it has been observed has been fairly limited. For example, the sending context has not been systematically analysed as an important determinant of transnational political practices, the focus of interest being instead on the receiving context as one important variable in immigrant integration (Rogers 2000, Ostergaard 2001).

European-based research have mainly looked at the effect of migrants’ transnational political practices or ties on improving their situation in the reception country like obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting discrimination and so on (Ostergaard 2003). In turn, United States-based studies have shown the significant role of the exit context as a mobilising factor. These studies have focused on the political transnationalism of migrants or refugees from Central and Latin America residing in the USA and emphasised the activating role of a deprived human development context or of
a poor level of democratisation in the exit country (Portes et al. 2005; Itzigson 2000; Landolt et al. 1999; Levitt 2000).

In Europe, maybe because of the important role given to issues of policies of reception and integration, studying one immigrant group in several countries has been the main research approach to migrant transnationalism. But various United States-based studies have shown that differences in transnational political participation depend on the exit context of different immigrant groups: those coming from rural areas, whether immigrants or refugees, tend to form non-political hometown civic committees in support of their original local communities; immigrants coming from more urban areas commonly become involved in the political and cultural life of their countries as a whole, especially if political parties, religious and cultural institutions there seek to maintain an active influence on their expatriates. Particular politics or initiatives of home country governments toward their nationals or citizens abroad that attempt to enhance countries’ economic and political resources can also play a significant role, especially if they move behind symbolic appeals and provide real help for their immigrants abroad (Itzigsohn 2000; Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Mahler 2002; Louie 2000; Portes et al. 2003b; Escobar 2003; Smith 2003; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003).

There is also a difference in the level of analysis between the European-based and the United States-based research. While European studies on migrant political transnationalism have mainly focus on national ideologies and policies, the United States studies have closely looked at local-to-local bottom up political practices of immigrants (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Ostergaard 2003). Hometown associations in Western Europe as main transnational actors though in a less institutionalised manner
have not been given much attention, the main ethnic, religious or party political organisations representing instead the focus of interest of European researchers.

In this research study we attempt to resolve and provide further evidence on some important hypotheses in the transnational literature and investigate whether they are false or whether some other theory is correct. In other words, we attempt to verify the validity of two particular hypotheses in transnational migration literature that are: 1) a descriptive hypothesis that is, not all immigrants are transnational (describing the forms, scope and intensity of immigrant political transnationalism); and 2) a causal hypothesis that is, the exit context is an important determinant of immigrant political transnationalism (explaining the causes of immigrant political transnationalism). We will also test other possible causal hypotheses.

4. Proposed theoretical model

What are the descriptive and causal claims we are interested in, and what is the simplest model we can propose? As we mentioned before, this systematic comparative study looks at the forms, scope, and intensity, and the main determinants of immigrant associations’ transnational political activism. It therefore compares the transnational political activism of different ethnic/national origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. The unit of analysis is different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona and the level of analysis is local-to-local/regional/national/international bottom up political practices of immigrant associations.
4.1 Descriptive hypothesis and dependent variable

The descriptive hypothesis (or inference) of this study is that not all immigrant associations are politically transnational. That means that not all immigrant associations from Barcelona participate both directly and indirectly across borders in the politics of their country of origin, on a regular basis. In this regard we explicitly define our dependent variable, that is immigrant associations’ political transnationalism, and specify its dimensions and indicators.

We start from the previously discussed theoretical perspectives on immigrant (political) transnationalism that we enhance with contributions from social movement and political participation literature. How we could already see, Portes and his collaborators (1999), in their prescription for studying transnational migration, divide transnational activities into a typology of economic, political and socio-cultural practices. Such distinctions are very useful but they nevertheless overlook the interaction between different kinds of practices.¹ Although we acknowledge the interdependence among various domains of transnational activism (political, economic, socio-cultural, and religious) at the level of states, individuals or associations, which might impede us to establish clear empirical boundaries, our main objective in this section is to construct valid and explicit measures on immigrant associations’ political transnationalism.

A number of scholars have argued that contemporary migrants maintain their loyalty and commitment to their homelands. These migrants turn up to be an alternative

¹ For example, a simple immigration policy measure like family reunification restrictions might be seen as a way of impeding the development of transnational social ties in a more politicised debate on immigration. The (re)formulation of the political agendas of different immigrant communities or states into issues of culture and religion also reveals this interconnectedness (Eva Nielsen-Östergaard, 2001).
political force that not only transforms local traditional structures but also opens up new opportunities for the communities of origin. They might become agents of change who support and promote local development initiatives and programmes through hometown associations (Goldring 1996; R. Smith 1998; González Gutierrez 1995), as well as active political participants in homeland politics (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; M. Smith 1994; Graham 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Ostergaard 2001, 2003b; Portes et al. 2003b) and direct international investors in home countries (Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Massey and Parrado 1994; Baires 1997; Kyle 1999, 2000).

Several immigrant communities continue to be an important part of the electorate of their country of origin. Political parties from these countries open up offices in major immigrant settlements, while political candidates regularly campaign among expatriates to gain their political and financial support (Graham 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999: Ostergaard 2001, 2003b). Many migrants contribute financially to the annual fundraising revenues of home country parties (Graham 1997; Guarnizo et al. 2003). Even those people who have lived abroad for several decades are accounted to maintain their engagement with their homelands either in support of or in opposition to the government in office (Kearney 1995; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; M. Smith 1994; Kyle 2000).

More and more states have introduced bureaucratic and constitutional reforms to attract and maintain the loyalty, remittances, investments and political contributions flow of their nationals living abroad. Dual citizenship and formal political representation for nationals living abroad have been lately introduced in many countries (Lessinger 1992; Mahler 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Portes et al. 2003b). Exit governments have
also established agencies and programmes targeting their expatriates and seeking to provide them various services (Levitt and Wagner 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). All these home-state government incentives give immigrants a stronger voice in the politics of their countries and home communities (Roberts et al. 1999). The question is how and to what extent immigrants decide to take advantage of these new opportunities for homeland political action (Portes et al. 2003b).

Transnational political involvement gives immigrants an opportunity to communicate information to government officials (political communities) from both exit and destination countries about their concerns and preferences in regard to homeland and host politics and to put pressures on them to respond. Immigrants who wish to take part in transnational politics have a range of options: they may express their opinions through various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin or through indirect participation (voting patterns or lobbying in host country as a result of particular events in sending country) via the political institutions of the host country or international organisations; they may give time and effort or money contributions to home country parties; they may work alone or in concert with other (local, national or international) organisations; they may be active not only at the transnational level but also at the international, national, or local level in regard to homeland politics. Since different forms of transnational political participation express information to or exert pressure differentially on the governments of exit and destination countries, it is important to know how immigrants take part in this and to what intensity.
Electoral and non-electoral (voluntary) political participation

Political participation is normally measured through indicators related to electoral activity, voting, electoral campaign work (working for one of the parties or candidates; persuading people; displaying preferences: campaign button, sticker or sign; meetings: political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners), money contribution to parties, candidates or any other group that supports or opposes a candidate (Brady 1999: 745). But there are also other forms of non-electoral political involvement like different forms of protest or participation in local development projects (Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 1995). This perspective on political action’s multidimensionality has been lately extended to the analysis of collective actors’ political behaviour like, for example, the political participation of associations (Knoke 1990; Lelieveldt and Caiani 2006). In this study, we refer to a specific segment of the associational sphere that is immigrant associations.

Immigrant associations might participate in the decision-making process, beside the classical forms of electoral participation, through other political channels: forms of protest like petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.; or local community development projects, monetary contribution to philanthropic projects, and so on. Non-electoral activities are political as they influence national, regional and local governments by determining which public projects get financial support from immigrant associations and forcing authorities to take into account the desires and priorities of immigrants. Besides, by financing local development projects or contributing to philanthropic projects, immigrants can maintain a high social status and political influence in home localities (Portes et al. 2003b: 1223-26). Hence, political
transnational participation ought to include both electoral and non-electoral transnational activities and practices that are meant to influence the conditions in both exit and reception countries (Portes et al. 2003; Bauböck 2003a).

Political participation is also understood as voluntary activity and practice. Verba and his collaborators (1995: 38-39) define voluntary activity as “participation that is not obligatory – no one is forced to volunteer – and that receives no pay or only token financial compensation”. Since we are concerned not only with doing politics but also with being attentive to politics, we focus on both activities and practices. Thus, beside particular transnational political activities, we also include transnational political practices like reading about home politics in newspapers or watching homeland political news within the association, discussing home politics (local community politics and affairs) among association’s members, collective letters to editors or calls to talk radio shows (those who have called in to express their views on a radio talk show) in relation to particular homeland politics, organising or participating in public conferences or reunions on important aspects of home politics, and so on.

**Dimensions and indicators of immigrant political transnationalism**

How we could see in the Chapter I of this thesis, there is a growing literature in international relations, political science and political sociology that describes immigrant political transnationalism mainly in terms of a possible challenge to the normative convergence nation and state. Political science theorists like Kymlicka (2003) and

---

2 This definition is been elaborated from Max Weber’s distinction between those for whom politics is an avocation (occasional politicians) and those for whom it is a vocation (they make politics their major vocation) (see Verba et al. 1995: 38). In our study we are interested in those for whom politics is an avocation. Thus, we include only non-profit or volunteer immigrant associations.
Bauböck (2003a) define immigrant political transnationalism in terms of dual or overlapping membership between two different and independent political communities. Transnational migrants are mainly seen as diasporas or dual citizens, though Bauböck emphasises the importance of studying the effects of this form of participation on the institutions and the conceptions of membership of both host and exit polities.

Sociologists like Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al. 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2007) define migrant political transnationalism as *regular* cross-border political action (electoral and non-electoral) connecting immigrants with their countries of origin. Eva Nielsen-Östergaard (2001, 2003a) generally follows this definition but gives it a broader meaning. Migrant transnational political practices and activities are defined as various forms of direct and indirect (via the institutions of the host country or international organisations) cross-border participation of both migrants and refugees in the politics of their country of origin. She therefore distinguishes between four types of transnational political practices and activities: a) homeland politics; b) diaspora politics; c) immigrant politics; and d) trans-local politics.

In this study, although we depart from all the underlined analytical perspectives on migrant political transnationalism, we mainly follow Nielsen-Östergaard’s definition and typology that we further on develop with political science literature on political participation. By migrant transnational political participation we refer here to (voluntary) electoral and non-electoral cross-border political activities and practices (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics) through which
immigrant associations intent to or exert pressure on at least two political communities (exit and destination societies), on a relatively regular basis.\(^3\)

*Homeland politics* refer to those political activities and practices of immigrant associations that belong to domestic or foreign policy of the home country/community such as opposition (or support) for existing homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals: voting; participation in electoral campaigns; monetary contribution to parties or candidates; forms of protest like lobbying the government of reception country to reject or approve a certain national or foreign policy in exit country, petitions, demonstrations, boycotts for specific national sovereignty and security political disputes in the case of particular national minorities (for example, Berbers or Western Sub-Saharan in Morocco, ethnic groups in Guinea Bissau or Equatorial Guinea, etc.); human rights defence or protest actions (denouncement of human rights violations in exit country like petitions, demonstrations, letters, etc.); informative action on homeland political issues (reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs).

*Immigrant politics* refer to those political activities and practices that immigrant associations undertake to better co-nationals’ legal and socio-economic situation in destination country, and that are supported by the country of origin, like obtaining more political, social and economic rights: voting or support for particular destination country political party that favours immigrant rights; forms of protest in defence of immigrant rights (petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.); informative action on

\(^3\) Immigration to Spain is mainly socio-economic, so we include *diapora politics* in the category of *homeland politics.*
immigrant rights (reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs).

Trans-local politics comprise those activities and practices from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates: membership in a civic hometown association or committee created in reception countries to support respective communities and advance local or regional development projects; giving money for community projects in home country or locality; giving money to charity organisations active in home country; informative action on local community’s socio-economic and political affairs (reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs).

Intensity of immigrant transnational political practices and activities

Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al. 2003) discovered that transnational activities are quite often sporadic, heterogeneous and vary across immigrant communities, both in their popularity and character. Though a significant proportion of immigrants engage in the transnational field, core or regular transnational activism is much less expanded than the occasional one. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between two levels of intensity in order to evaluate the importance of studying this phenomenon from a transnational perspective: 1) broad that includes both regular and occasional transnational activities; and 2) strict, in connection only with regular participation.⁴

---

⁴ Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al. 2003) measure the dependent variable - the number of transnational political activities - on a specific scale. They also codify with (1) regular participation or involvement, and occasional or no-participation with (0).
Other scholars like Itzigsohn (Itzigsohn et al. 1999) and Östergaard (2003a) differentiate between narrow and broad migrant transnational political participation as opposite ends of a continuum of different practices. The more a transnational political practice or activity is institutionalised and has migrants involved and the more they move around to realise it, the narrower it is understood to be. Thus, narrow refers to more institutionalised and regular (political) activities and practices like the actual membership of parties or hometown associations and broad refers to (occasional) participation in (political) activities, meetings or events linking immigrants and places of origins. In this study we use Itzigsohn’s and Östergaard’s distinction between “narrow” and “broad” migrant transnational political practices and activities.

4.2 Causal hypotheses and independent variables

Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (2003a: 23-24) identify two necessary conditions for transnational activities that do not depend so much on the empirical evidence (as the identification of main determinants and practical implications does) rather than on the logical comparison with anterior migration periods, when these same activities were not so evident. First, the later technological innovations (rapid flights, diary telephone contact, fax and e-mail communication, etc.) have permitted governments and big corporations to accelerate the process of “transnationalism from above” while common people have been also benefiting from this by establishing their own forms of activities across borders. As higher the access of immigrant groups to new technologies, the higher would be the frequency and scale of transnational activities. As such, immigrant communities with higher economic resources and human capital (education
and professional preparation) would register higher levels of transnationalism by having a major access to the infrastructure that makes possible these activities.

A second necessary condition for transnational activities is the establishment of social networks across state borders. We normally assume that as higher the distance between communities of origin and destination, as lower the number of transnational enterprises. Big distances imply a higher cost and generally more difficulties for a regular contact, thing that would reduce the proportion of immigrants capable of getting involved in transnational activities. A small distance with high possibilities of communication would incentive this kind of activities. However, the distance barrier diminishes gradually with the replacement of traditional personal contact by new forms of electronic communication. Nevertheless, whatever exception to or variation in the above hypotheses would have to be tested empirically through fieldworks in both exit and destination countries (Portes et al. 2003a: 24-25).

Apart from these two necessary conditions - technological innovations and the establishment of new social networks through new forms of electronic communication - there are other possible factors that might explain the transnational political engagement of immigrant associations. Our main causal hypothesis is that the political opportunity structure in home country might influence the engagement of immigrant associations in transnational political activities and practices.

The concept of political opportunity structure was first introduced by social movement scholars like Eisinger (1973), and elaborated later on by Tarrow (1989a; 1989b) in order to systematically analyse the political context that mediates structural conflicts given as
latent political potentials. More recent social movement literature (Kriesi et al. 1992; Koopmans 1992; Kriesi 1995; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1994 2004) points out that collective action proliferates when people achieve access to necessary resources for escaping from their habitual submissiveness and find the opportunity to use them. Collective action also increases when people feel threaten by costs that cannot bear or that came against their sense of justice. According to Tarrow (1994, 2004: 116), the ‘rebels’ find favourable opportunities to reclaim their demands when there is a breach in the institutional frame, conflicts between elites start to emerge, alliances can be established and the repressive power of the state diminishes. When all this gets intertwined with a high perception of the costs that inaction could entail, the opportunities give place to episodes of collective political action. Changing opportunities are also related with more stable structural elements like a state’s strength or debility and the forms of repression that this can employ.

The political opportunity structure (or the external resources perceived by the group - POS) is been defined as a conjuncture of factors or opportunities that determine collective action. These opportunities operate as options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them that depend on factors outside the mobilising group. People choose those options for collective action that are available and expected to result in a favourable outcome (Koopmans 1999: 97). As such, not all of the variation in levels and forms of collective action is due to strategic intelligence, courage, imagination, or plain luck of the different actors involved in conflict situations, but an important part of it is shaped by structural characteristics of the political context in which these actors, willingly or unwillingly, have to act (Koopmans 1999: 100). The (favourable) opportunities for collective action might be: (1) increased access to new
Institutional literature on collective action explains variations in immigrant politics as an outcome of the interaction between a group’s resources (human, social and cultural capital) and the institutional opportunity structure (IOS). The IOS usually employ the character of state elites, governmental bureaucrats, and the party system to explain the rules of interaction between political allies and competitors (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Immigrant organisations, in particular, may prosper or vanish depending on the combination, number, and authorization of institutional actors (Bloemraad 2005; Landolt 2008).

Empirical studies have shown thus far that institutions such as social service agencies, state consular offices, ethnic and religious organisations and so on determine the territorial orientation of immigrant practices. They can motivate immigrants to re-enforce ties with their home country, to engage in local affairs or other multilocal and more decentred diasporic relations, to renounce at any kind of politics, or a combination of these different orientations (Menjivar 1999; Kurien 2001; Gold 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Levitt et al. 2004; Landolt 2008).

Departing from these concepts of political/institutional opportunity structure and also from the available transnational literature, we construct our main definition of political opportunity structure in home country for emigrants living abroad. Some original
dimensions of these concepts can be adapted to our own definition of political opportunity structure while some not. Our concept of political opportunity structure in home country would include the following dimensions: 1) the level of freedom in home country; 2) new political rights for nationals living abroad; 3) other state policies directed at emigrants living abroad.

1) The level of freedom in home country refers to how free (democratic) a country is in terms of political rights and civil liberties and thus opened to attract emigrants’ engagement and sense of loyalty. It is a combined average index of political rights and civil liberties ratings in exit country that takes the following values: 1 – “Not Free”; 2 – “Partly Free”; 3 – “Free”.

Several scholars have shown that instable or transitional political situation in home country may open up more opportunities for immigrants’ engagement in the politics of their country of origin (Portes et al. 2007). The vulnerable geopolitical position of many peripheral sending states, increasing poverty in the wake of structural adjustment policies, and the racial barriers migrants encounter explain recent trends toward extending the boundaries of citizenship in these countries (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; Portes et al. 2003a; Itzigshon 2000).

5 In this research study, immigrant associations’ networks, although it might be seen, according to Tarrow’s definition (Tarrow 2004), as another possible dimension of the variable political opportunity structure, appears as a different independent variable since we consider that in the case of immigrant political transnationalism this variable has a particular causal effect that has to be studied separately. On the other side, the institutional approach fails to consider the more horizontal relations between immigrant organisations and other sectors of civil society (like other migrant and non-migrant organisations in home and destination countries) on the formation and nature of immigrant organising, focusing instead only on vertical contacts with the state and political parties (Landolt 2008). All these horizontal contacts would be examined as indicators of the variable immigrant associations’ social networks.
The instability of political alliances in pluralistic political systems is important in releasing new political opportunities for collective action. In less democratic countries, the lack of routinely competence converts whatever sign of instability in a chance for collective action. At the same time, conflicts among elites encourage the emergence of collective action by motivating groups with low resources (like economic immigrants) to assume the risks of collective action or/and by animating the elite that has been excluded from power (like diasporas) to adopt the role of “people voice” (Tarrow, 2004: 118-20).

Also the well-established democratic governments see the utility of having access to populations settled elsewhere. Countries like Ireland, Greece, Italy and Portugal have recently developed policies and rhetoric that embrace their communities abroad (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1018). These states have different instrumental grounds for regarding their emigrants as a resource, such as “an interest in upgrading human capital”, “in attracting remittances”, or “in using immigrant communities to promote economic and foreign policy goals” (Bauböck 2003a: 17). Democratic governments devise special laws and policies to maintain links with their nationals abroad even when these take the citizenship of the host country (Castles 2002: 10-11; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

2) **New political rights for nationals living abroad** like dual citizenship or external-voting rights might also increase emigrants’ access to homeland politics. The indicator, external-voting rights, is been constructed using the available information on national election systems and laws and takes the following values: 1 - “no external voting rights”; 2 – “external voting rights with some restrictions”; 3 – “external voting rights”.

25
The indicator, double citizenship rights, is been constructed using the information on citizenship, dual citizenship and multiple citizenship based on a survey on world citizenship laws and takes the following values: 1 - “no right to dual citizenship”; 2 - “having the right to dual citizenship with some exceptions”; 3 – “having the right to dual citizenship”.6

New access opportunities for emigrants in home countries can lead to increased transnational political action of immigrant associations. As narrower participation access is (for example, in a less democratic country), as much likely that new openness (new political rights) produces new opportunities for collective action. Nevertheless, neither total access nor total lack of access determines the maximum level of collective action. It is rather a mix of opened and closed factors that influence collective action (Eisinger 1973: 15; Tarrow 2004: 117-18).

The policy packages adopted normally by exit states in order to incorporate or attract the participation of their nationals living abroad are: a) “homeland politics” to encourage state contact with temporary migrants and facilitate their return; and b) “global national policies” through which states maintain links with permanent settles abroad not to facilitate their return but to encourage emigrants’ continued sense of membership and loyalty to the home state (Smith 1998; Goldring 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003).

“Homeland politics” like extending certain political rights (double citizenship, external voting rights) or expanding political campaigns across borders to mobilise their citizens and former citizens abroad might augment and strengthen the involvement of

6 See Chapter III for more information on all these indicators.
immigrants in transnational political practices and activities. Lately, more emigration countries have widen the spectrum of political rights as a way of biding emigrants to the home country and getting, in turn, benefits like remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance.

Symbolic policies are just one example of “global national policies” designed by home states to reinforce emigrants’ sense of continuing membership and loyalty to the home state. These relatively low cost policies are, in many ways, an extension of traditional consular efforts to promote national culture abroad and they are directed at individuals who will remain permanently overseas. They range from creative-writing contests to promote an understanding of the homeland among the second generation to cultural festivals or sporting events in communities overseas (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). Symbolic policies appear below as one indicator of the last dimension of our main explanatory variable, the political opportunity structure in home country.

3) The dimension state-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad comprises the following indicators (Levitt 2001a; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003):

a) Ministerial or consular reforms (bureaucratic reforms): census or studies of emigrant communities abroad; units of assistance, support programmes or ‘mobile consulates’ for emigrant communities abroad; cabinet-level offices that function primarily as governments’ voice on emigration-related issues; Ministry for emigrants living abroad, etc.;
b) Investment policies that seek to attract or channel migrant remittances: investment funds with higher interest rates; matching funds for investment in public works by hometown and home-state organisations; remittance sending agencies; measures to draw on the human capital abroad (database of the technical skills of emigrants living abroad; conferences etc.); creating home-provinces organisations in reception countries;

c) Extending state protection or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond traditional consular services: service delivery by home states to their emigrant communities abroad (programmes providing literacy training and primary and secondary schooling for adults through its consulates; sending books and advisers to train educators in the receiving state, making it possible to obtain sending state’s high school equivalency from abroad; equivalence student programmes, health insurance packages to cover emigrants’ families in home countries; business networks in order to promote small business development in emigrant communities); public condemn by consulates and other state officials of human rights abuses committed against undocumented workers in entering countries; measures to promote emigrants’ continued participation in home-country’s life than to ease their lives in receiving country (customs policies such that return migrants can import their belongings, including one car per household, without paying taxes; housing units built and partially funded by the government specifically for returnees);

d) Symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants’ sense of continuing membership: sponsoring creative-writing contests among second-generation
immigrants; allocating funds to establish cultural houses in areas with sizable immigrant population; promoting hometown organisations and encouraging remittances seeking thus the promotion of a sense of political membership.

States’ engagement in the transnational social field in general as well as the variety of exit countries’ responses to emigration in particular, have been relatively less studied by migration scholarship (Margheritis 2007: 87).\textsuperscript{7} States’ involvement have been commonly understood as a response to migrants’ demands and increasing capacity to organise and lobby, and it is most likely to happen in the cases of massive migrations that may have a significant political impact (for example, Mexicans in the United States). The Argentinean emigration, instead, though increasingly significant, does not imply large numbers, is not primarily motivated by poverty and unemployment, and does not have a high level of organisation. However, the Argentine government recently implemented a number of specific initiatives targeting the Argentinean communities abroad. The motivations behind have to do less with the size and organisational level of emigrant community but rather with specific political projects (rebuilding political representational ties, broadening support and recapturing human capital), specific domestic agents and processes (the presidency rather than political parties, political instability, human rights issues or economic crises), and bilateral and multilateral agreements more or less institutionalised (Margheritis 2007: 87-88). These state initiatives contribute substantially to the development of a transnational migrant space in general, and to the development of transnational migrant organisations (Guarnizo 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Portes 2003; Portes \textit{et al.} 1999; Vertovec 1999; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2003; Margheritis 2007).

\textsuperscript{7} Transnational social fields are defined as “a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organised and transformed” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1005).
Many scholars have shown that there is more resemblance or convergence on the type of home state policies toward nationals living abroad (Guarnizo 1998; Itzigshon 2000) and more divergence or differentiation on how far states are willing to guarantee an enduring long-distance membership of migrants (Smith 1998; Goldring 1998). Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003) suggest that some factors (such as structural imperatives facing poor countries, the economic potential of emigrant communities, and the emergent international norms) are leading towards convergence among states’ transnational policies, while some others, more nationally based (such as the size and organization of the emigrant community vis-à-vis its homeland, the capacity of state institutions to make and implement credible policies, or the unique role of political parties) account for divergence. All these factors together with others such as particular emigration trajectories, type and stability of political regime, economic situation, position in the world economy, and bilateral and multilateral relations with destination countries explain the variations in states’ policies toward emigrants (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Margheritis 2007).

In general, states become involved in the transnational space as this becomes more prominent, in other words, when states perceive the importance and potential economic and political benefits of attracting their expatriate communities (Portes 1999). State-led transnationalism is defined as “institutionalised national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state’s political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendents outside the national territory” (Goldring 2002: 64). The reasons and forms of state involvement might vary although there is an emphasis in the literature on states’ economic and political motivations to
adopt transnational policies (such as the economic potential of emigrant remittances, investments and entrepreneurial activities; emigrant communities as a potential market for home companies or as political representation abroad that can advance home-state’s economic and foreign policy interests; the human capital emigrants represent for home country; trying to retain the loyalty of expatriates and reinforce nationhood bonds) (Mahler 2000; Levitt 2001a; Naim 2002; Saxenian 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Margueritis 2007).

Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004), for example, capture the variation in possible arenas and types of state responses toward emigrants and distinguish between three state positions:

1. States might vary with respect to law or the degree to which they extend political rights. As such, some states distinguish between two categories of membership: citizenship and nationality. Citizenship delineates the character of a member’s rights and duties within the national polity while nationality legally demarcates a category of belonging without granting full citizenship rights. Accordingly, exit states employ a range of legal distinctions to demarcate categories of citizenship and nationality (Jones-Correa 2002; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004: 1019-1020):

   a) Denial of dual citizenship or any form of dual access to rights: countries such as Haiti and Germany do not allow dual sets of rights; Germany allows dual citizenship only for Ausiedler, Jews, and persons whose countries do not allow the repudiation of citizenship; and Haiti, without altering citizenship laws, considers its diaspora as a part of the Haitian nation;
b) Dual nationality with the granting of some legal privileges to emigrants and their descendants but not full dual citizenship: Mexico and India have taken this position, legally recognising nationals in some way;

c) Dual citizenship in which emigrants and their descendants are given full rights, when they return to the homeland, even if they also hold the passport of another country: France, Ireland, Greece, the Dominican republic, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal follow this policy;

d) Dual citizenship with rights while abroad: people living abroad, from countries such as Colombia, have the right to elect representatives to the home-country legislature; in Latin America alone, ten countries allowed some form of dual nationality or citizenship in 2000 while only four countries had such provisions prior to 1991; other countries recognise dual membership selectively, with specific signatories.

Many states have started to extend the political rights of their citizens living abroad by granting them external voting rights. Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka (2000: 56-57) in their study of the constitutions and the election laws of 63 democratic countries reveal that that a majority of countries (40) give citizens residing abroad the right to vote and that “stronger” democracies are less inclined to disfranchise their expatriates. However, there is still an ongoing debate if expatriates or citizens residing abroad should vote (Claudio Lopez-Guerra 2004; Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka 2000). The electoral institutions of countries whose expatriates retain the right to vote are criticised on the
basis that long-term (permanent) residency in a democratic state is what should entitle people to full political rights, regardless of their ethnicity and national origin. Countries like Canada and Australia that disenfranchise their citizens after five and six years of residence in a foreign country offer a more desirable and democratic model for voting (Lopez-Guerra 2004).

In the case of our research study, the expansion of dual nationality or citizenship and the extension of external voting rights in their different forms mean that even persons who are not active participants in transnational politics have access to those membership rights if they want to claim them. As an identity strategy, an investment strategy, or even an exit strategy, multiple memberships provide the individual with several potential positions with respect to the state (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1020). The right to dual citizenship or the right to vote from abroad might particularly motivate immigrant associations to engage in political activism across national borders.

2. States might vary with respect to rhetoric or the kind of ideology of nationhood that is promulgated (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1020-1021). China, Ireland, Portugal, and Haiti, for example, propose a national self-concept based on blood ties linking residents around the world to their respective homelands. They have redefined their territories to include those living outside them, but without necessarily granting these people dual citizenship or nationality (as in the Haitian case). Long-distance nationalism encompasses various ideas about belonging that link together people living in various geographic locations, and motivate or justify their taking action in relation to an ancestral territory and its government (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001a).
3. States might vary with respect to public policy or the kinds of programmes and policies that they pursue in response to transnational migration (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1021). Latin American governments, for example, instituted several different programmes and policies toward emigrants: they reformed ministerial and consular services to be more responsive to emigrant needs; they put into place investment policies designed to attract and channel economic remittances; they granted dual citizenship or nationality, the right to vote from abroad, or the right to run for public office; they extended state protections or services to nationals living abroad that went beyond traditional consular services; they implemented symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants’ sense of enduring membership (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003).

Political parties may also start to establish offices abroad to campaign immigrant communities for financial and electoral support. As such, Mexican, Dominican, and Haitian politicians campaign in the U.S. on a regular basis; Turkish parties with dominant religious and nationalist agendas, like the nationalist Milli Hareket Partisi or the religious Saadet Partisi, frequently send leaders to northern Europe to gather support (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Successful political activists who succeed to mobilise support among immigrants might strengthen their own parties at home, while trying to prevent others from gaining access to the same resources.

Regions with high proportions of emigrants may also begin to act as transnational agents, regardless of the national government’s stance (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1023-1024). Substate policies are different from the transnational activities of national governments in that regional governments do not control immigration and formal
citizenship and their transnational activities are driven by efforts to promote extraterritorial regional or local loyalties rather than nation-building (Bauböck 2003a): creating investment funds and business promotion schemes designed to build on migrants’ localised loyalties, the money raised being used to support projects directed at local municipal development (the case of Brasil); encouraging long-distance economic projects like offering tax breaks and bureaucratic support to potential investors that are separate from any efforts by the national government or political parties to stimulate emigrant involvement (the case of India).

Towns may also define themselves transnationally and engage in development-oriented activities (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1023-1024). In such cases, the actors are usually emigrants living abroad who organise hometown associations: Mexican, Salvadoran and Dominican hometown associations that finance and implement numerous community development projects that were previously the scope of the state (Goldring 2002; Landolt 2001). Towns assume this role in a neoliberal period in which states increasingly give up roles they were rarely able to fulfil in countries beyond the capitalist core.

Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004: 1021-1024) identify, in function of these three state positions or answers toward emigrants with regard to law, rhetoric, and public policy, three broad categories of migrant-sending states. Our study’s country typology would be interpreted in function of Levitt and Glick-Schiller’s typology of migrant-sending states:

1) Transnational nation-states: they treat their emigrants as long-term, long-distance members; they grant emigrants dual citizenship or nationality;
transnational migrants’ contribution (remittances, etc.) and participation become an integral part of national policy; consular officials and other government representatives are seen as partially responsible for emigrants’ protection and representation (Ex. States as El Salvador, Mexico, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, and Brasil) (Portes et al. 2003b);

2) Strategically selective states: they are more common and encourage some forms of long-distance economic and political nationalism but want to selectively and strategically manage what emigrants can and cannot do this; these states also recognise the enormous political and economic influence migrants wield, on which they have come to depend; on the other hand, they want to ensure the continued home country involvement of emigrants, whom they recognise are unlikely to return; they also want to maintain some level of control over emigrants’ home ties in case that migrant interests conflict with those of the state; they offer partial and changing packages of tax privileges and services to emigrants, encourage long-distance membership, but never grant the legal rights of citizenship or nationality or the franchise (Ex. India, Barbados, Ireland, the Philippines, Haiti, and Turkey have all tried at various times to obtain support from population abroad without granting full participation in their internal political activities) (Jevellana-Santos 2003; Khanna 2004).

3) Desinterested and denouncing states: they treat migrants as if they no longer belong to their homeland; migrants are treated as suspects because are seen as having abandoned the homeland or even as traitors to its cause; this stance was more common prior to the current period of globalisation (Ex. Cuba’s
relationship to Cubans in the U.S. is particularly interesting since remittances factor is so important in Cuba’s economic life – see Cervantes-Rodriguez, 2003; Eckstein and Barberia, 2002; Slovakia kept populations abroad at arm’s-length following the Cold War, allowing them no representation within the new political system) (Skrbi, 1999).

The second causal hypothesis contemplated in this study is that a low socio-economic level of development in exit country might increase the engagement of immigrant associations in (socio-economic and political) decision-making processes of national/local communities. The main indicator used for measuring this control variable is the Human Development Index (HDI) with its three values: 1- “low”; 2 – “medium”; 3 – “high”.

Persons migrating from poor and less developed regions to the developed Western Europe have come to constitute an indispensable source of survival for their countries and communities of origin. The level of remittances sent by immigrants in the advanced countries to their respective nation states (families) easily exceeds the foreign aid that these nations receive and even match their hard currency earnings from exports (Portes et al. 2007: 243-244; Sandell et al. 2007: 14-15). According with World Bank estimations, in 2005 the remittances achieved a level of 167.000 millions of dollars, with 7 millions more than in 2004. Oriental Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean were the first two remittance receiving regions followed by South Asia, Middle East and north of Africa, Europe (the developing countries) and Central Asia and, ultimately, sub-Saharan Africa.
Migrants to developed countries have also started to implement a whole array of philanthropic and civic projects in home communities and countries. Immigrants or refugees coming from rural areas tend to form non-political hometown civic committees in support of the localities left behind, while those from more urban origins commonly become involved in the politics and the cultural life of their countries as a whole, especially if political parties, churches, and cultural institutions there seek to maintain an active presence among their expatriates (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Portes et al. 2003b).

Many immigrant associations abroad whose members maintain strong emotional ties with their hometowns want to support the respective communities and advance local development projects, with considerable political implications, through collective (socio-economic and political) strategies. Transnational activities among immigrant organizations possess sufficient weight to affect the development prospects of localities and regions and to attract the attention of sending country governments. At the same time, transnational organisations and activism vary among different national origin immigrant groups, in part, because of the entrance of sending country governments in the transnational field and the policies that they have so far implemented (Portes et al. 2007). Programmes and policies initiated by home country governments toward nationals living abroad play a significant role, especially if they go beyond symbolic appeals and provide help for their emigrants. In these cases, official directives can considerably influence the direction and goals adopted by grassroots transnational activities (Smith 2003b).
Although the study of immigrant transnationalism is still incipient, listing a number of case studies but little systematic quantitative or qualitative evidence, the existent information demonstrate us that the initiatives of immigrants and their home country counterparts possess the counter-hegemonic potential to the contemporary processes of global neoliberal capitalism. While the latter leads to increased inequalities among and within nations and remains largely indifferent to the causes behind the pogroms of people from the Global South to the North, the activities of hometown committees and other immigrant organisations strongly seek to alleviate this situation. Nevertheless, the ways by which people driven from their countries by poverty, violence, and lack of resources and opportunities then turn around and seek to overturn these conditions by using the resources acquired abroad needs to be further investigated (Portes et al. 2007).

The third causal hypothesis is that extended social networks enhance immigrant associations’ engagement in transnational political practices and activities.  

Sociologists have pictured migration as a self-constructing network-building process, facilitating the departure and settlement of newcomers and sustaining the movement when the original economic incentives have disappeared (Tilly 1990; Massey et al. 1994; Portes et al. 2003b). Cumulative causation appears when networks of migration perpetuate by themselves, early departures paving the way for subsequent ones and lowering the costs and risks of the initial journey (Portes and Bach 1985; Massey et al. 1997; Portes et al. 2003b).

---

8 Here might come in a possible selection bias. The social networks of immigrant organisations could be also strengthened by the political activism of immigrants across national borders. I, however, assume that the primary causal mechanism runs in the direction of social contacts leading to immigrant political activism across national borders: “socially isolated immigrants are unlikely to take first steps toward transnational political participation” (see Portes et. al. 2003b: 1232).
Moreover, immigrant social networks present two different characteristics in comparison to those of the natives: 1) they are simultaneously dense and extended over long physical distances; 2) they tend to generate solidarity by virtue of generalised uncertainty. Accordingly, “exchange under conditions of uncertainty” generates “stronger bonds among participants” than that which is characterised by “full information and impartially enforced rules” (Portes 1997: 8).

Departing from these assumptions, we could consider that the beginning and continuation of transnational activities will follow the same network-building migration logic and that social networks of transnational immigrants would be as durable and cohesive as immigrant social networks are.

Many immigrants soon become aware that living in the advance world is not going to improve too much their social and economic status. To overcome the situations of discrimination and social exclusion that host society reserves them, they must activate their networks of social relationships. At the same time, increased immigrant access and appeal to international human rights instruments might expand the political channels of immigrant associations and thus facilitate their possibilities to combine external and internal status and affiliations. On the other side, the proliferation of principles of human rights and democratisation in foreign policy agenda of exit and receiving states might lead to the creation of particular governmental and non-governmental organisations working on human rights. These new organisations monitoring and defending human rights may enlarge the social networks of immigrant associations by assisting them in their transnational political activism.
In the absence of large economic resources, carrying out long-distance projects must depend on the maintenance of strong networks of social contacts. The larger or more difficult the proposed transnational project is, the stronger the social networks required to uphold it. The prediction is that, regardless of immigrant associations’ motivations for engaging in political transnationalism, the latter will be conditioned by the size and spatial scope of their networks. The absolute number of an association’s ties represents the network size while the network spatial scope is measured by the ratio of out-of-town association’s contacts, including those abroad, to those in the city of residence. The larger and more spatially diversified these are, the greater the chances for engaging in political initiatives across state borders (Portes et al. 2003b: 1218, 1224).

The fourth causal hypothesis is that the type of immigrant association (civic, hometown committee, social agency, cultural, political, professional, religious, educational, sports, economic, etc.) might influence immigrant associations’ engagement in transnational political activities and practices. We expect one particular type of immigrant organisation/association to engage more in transnational political activism than the other types of immigrant associations.

Recent empirical studies have shown that the predominant type of immigrant organisations involved in transnational activities are those that define themselves as “civic” entities pursuing an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country. Second in importance are hometown committees whose scope of action is primarily local. Next are social agencies that provide health, educational, and other services to immigrants, but which are also engaged in their home country. The latter are commonly better-financed organizations since their budget includes funds for social
services provided by receiving municipal, county, and state governments. Transnational political organisations are rather a minority and they are represented among particular immigrant groups like for example the Dominicans in the United States, a group within which political home party representation is quite important (Portes et al. 2007).

**Unit of analysis**

Immigrant transnationalism involves individuals, their social networks, their communities and institutional structures like local and national governments. The existent research literature tends to mix these different units of analysis, referring sometimes to the achievements of individual migrants, other times to the transformation of local communities in exit countries or to the initiatives of exit countries’ governments to attract the loyalty and resources of their respective expatriates. This leads to an increasing confusion on the concept and its meaning (Portes et al. 2003a; Portes et al. 1999).

Although scholars like Castels (2002:2) argue that more and more immigrants recognize themselves “as members of transnational communities based on a common identity with their co-ethnics in the ancestral homeland and other migration destinations”,$^9$ Portes and his collaborators (2003a: 19-20) consider that, for methodological reasons, the appropriate unit of analysis in “transnationalism from below” is the individual and

---

$^9$ Even though, community boundaries are ambiguous and subject to negotiation by members, Stephen Castels (2002: 5-6) suggests the term *transnational communities* for “groups based in two or more countries, which engage in recurrent, enduring and significant cross-border activities, which may be economic, political, social or cultural”. Only those groups whose “consciousness and regular activities transcend national borders” make up transnational communities. Consequently, he identifies four types of transnational communities: (1) transnational business communities and multinational corporations; (2) transnational political communities; (3) transnational cultural communities; and (4) transnational social communities. How we can see, Castels does not distinguish between “transnationalism from above” and “transnationalism from below”.

42
his/her social networks. Other units of analysis like communities, economic enterprises, political parties, etc., can also come into analysis but in subsequent and more complex phases of the research. In order to understand the structure of transnationalism and its effects in a more efficient way, we have to depart from studying the history and the activities of the individuals. From the data obtained by interviewing the individuals we can then define the networks that would permit us to identify the counterparts of transnational entrepreneurs and activists in the country of origin and to recollect information for establishing the aggregate effects of these activities.

Individuals’ transnational activities have been commonly initiated as a direct reaction to governmental policies and global capitalism’s effects in poor countries. Immigrants and their families have been trying to evade the enduring poverty resulted from this situation (Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Roberts et al. 1999). State-motivated transnationalism has come in subsequently with the recognition by national governments of the importance of their expatriate communities. From that moment, governments have been trying to gather and manage the initiatives of their communities living abroad (Smith 1996).

Less well-studied is the wide range of collective organisations/associations among immigrants developing a number of projects in their respective countries and communities of origin, as well as the initiatives undertaken by these communities and even nation states to motivate and channel the material and human capital contributions of their expatriates. Our study aims at bringing in more and new information on the

---

10 Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford (2007) undertake a systematic survey of immigrant organizations among three Latin American–origin immigrant groups in the East Coast of the United States. The principal focus of their study is on the implications of the phenomenon for local and national development in sending countries.
transnational activities of immigrant groups through a systematic analysis of immigrant associations’ transnational political action. The data gathered allows us to gain better understanding of the forces creating and sustaining these associations and to test preliminary hypotheses about the effects of exit contexts, social networks and types of associations on the character of immigrant political transnationalism.

**Immigrant associations**

The arena for political decision-making and policy formation in representative democracies is filled by various interest groups, intermediary organisations and civic associations, social movements, voluntary associations, all of them exerting some kind of influence through lobbying or by participating in consultative bodies. The array of these forms of social organisation is basically endless varying from political parties, trade unions, business and professional organisations, welfare and charity organisations to service clubs, community associations, churches, sports, social and leisure clubs, scientific, educational, youth, health and cultural organisations (van Deth, 1997: 1).

Robert Putnam (2000, 2002, 2003), in his work on social capital, emphasises the significant role of the associational life in representative democracies. The democratic function of associations is also underlined by Mark Warren (2001). Important scholars in sociological and historical institutionalism consider that associations are important sources of influence (power) rather than mere channels for individual participation (Skocpol 2002). Associations’ function would be purely political if these can turn into real sources of power and public influence. In this way, associations would contribute to shaping public opinion and develop public agenda issues, exert pressure in order to
include certain subjects in the political agenda, or participate in the processes of public deliberation by representing the excluded or marginalised voices (Warren 2001).

Economic and political restructuring in developed Western societies has produced an array of new modes of exclusion, including unequal access to public resources and policy making. Members of immigrant and ethnic minority groups are particularly affected by these (Vertovec 1999). New forums, types of representation and modes of immigrant participation have emerged to bring about more democratic developments surrounding a range of public policies in destination countries (including education, housing, health and social care) or social development programmes in home countries (or community). Immigrant association is just another form of social organisation that attempt to influence and adjust the political decision-making and policy formulation in representative democracies in accordance to immigrant groups’ interests.

The role, social position, forms of exclusion and possibilities of immigrant inclusion have recently stimulated much rethinking on concepts like citizenship and pluralism, as well as on basic ideas concerning the nature of democratic civic society (Dahrendorf 1994; H. van Gunsteren 1994; Habermas 1994). New concepts of citizenship, such as “transnational citizenship” (Baubock 1994a; Castles 2005), “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 1995a), “differentiated citizenship” (Young 1989), “neo-republican citizenship” (van Gunsteren 1994), “cultural citizenship” (Turner 1994), “postnational citizenship” (Soysal 1994) or “cosmopolitan citizenship” (Held 1995), are proposed as a way of resolving the questions posed by contemporary forms of pluralism and the modes of exclusion that have arisen with them. Most of these new forms of citizenship seek to extend T.H. Marshall’s (1950) classic notion of “social citizenship” and to
explore new meanings of membership and participation. Citizenship comes to refer to an array of rights, duties and activities of individuals and groups that reflect their own interests with regard to public sphere decisions affecting life opportunities, quality of life, and/or representation in society (Vertovec 1999: 5).

Several scholars like Brubaker (1989), Layton-Henry (1990), Baubock (1994a), Kymlicka (1995b), Martiniello (1995), Vertovec (1999) have focused primarily on the politics of immigration, citizenship and minority rights in Europe. As a result, in recent years many academics, policy institutions and politicians have emphasised the need for policy reassessment and formulation in terms of issues like enhancing the modes of immigrant/ethnic minority participation. For some of them, re-defining citizenship means dismantling certain forms of representation in favour of more participatory frameworks and mechanisms fostering greater group involvement (Vertovec 1999: 6).

Migrant associational sphere fulfils an important role in the process of immigrant labour integration in the destination country and, in particular, in the course of immigrant adaptation to a new social context. Immigrant associations provide immigrants useful information about the destination country and the opportunities available there, assist them in their basic needs and in the integration process. By being networks of immigrants funded on cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, etc., resemblance, and by perfectly combining the relational forms imported from homeland tradition or culture with the modern modes of internal organization adapted to the destination country, these associations become active bridges of dialog between the receiving society and the immigrants.
Some immigrant associations are more prone to engage in political activism than the general population associations. The former might actuate with higher frequency as intermediation vehicles between foreign citizens and the political arena (Morales et al. 2005). At the same time, more and more immigrant associations like for example hometown and civic/cultural immigrant associations build up trans-local connections and engage in transnational practices and activities (Orozco 2000a, b, and 2002; Sorenson 2004; Portes et al. 2005; Caglar 2006). As such, immigrant associations might turn into rights demanding associations in respect to both home and destination countries: they may ask for social rights and legal recognition to improve immigrants’ situation in destination country or they may participate in homeland politics.

Our unit of analysis is immigrant associations of different national/ethnic origins whose members reside in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. This category includes various types of associations such as civic, hometown committee, social agency, cultural, political, professional, religious, educational, sports, economic, etc. We analyse if certain types of immigrant associations in Barcelona could be regarded as transnational political collective actors.

An entity, in order to be transnational, must have social and political bases outside its target state or society (Tarrow 2001: 11). Transnational associations are those whose aims and activities are partially or totally located in countries others than where their members reside (Portes et al. 2005: 12-13). Accordingly, a transnational immigrant association must have social and political bases outside the country/community of origin (its target state or society), so in the reception country/community, and conduct

---

11 An empirical study on the political integration of immigrant associations in Madrid and Murcia demonstrate that immigrant associations from Madrid are more likely to participate in political activities than the general population associations (Morales et al. 2005: 16-17).
political activities and practices in the country/community of origin. By transnational political immigrant associations we refer here to those immigrant associations established in one foreign country/community that get involved with regularity in various forms of direct and indirect participation in the politics of their country of origin.

**Level of analysis**

In methodological terms, this research study is structured in function of two different levels of analysis: (1) the contextual or macro (home-state oriented – the political opportunity structure and the level of socio-economic development in home country); and (2) the organisational or meso (migrant association oriented – characteristics and organisational networks).

**4.5 Summary of the proposed theoretical model**

*Table: Theoretical model*
### Transnational Political Practices and Activities of Immigrant Associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Immigrant associations (civic, hometown committee, social agency, cultural, political, professional, religious, educational, sports, economic, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of analysis</td>
<td>Multilevel (bottom up)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Electoral:
- voting;
- participation in electoral campaign;
- money contributions to political parties, candidates or any other groups that support or oppose a candidate

#### Non-Electoral:
- forms of protest like petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, appeals to international human rights organisations etc.;
- informative and debating activities;
- local community development projects;
- monetary contribution to philanthropic projects, etc.

#### Dependent variable: Migrants’ Transnational Political Practices and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland politics</th>
<th>political activities and practices of immigrant associations, which belong to domestic or foreign policy of the exit country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- opposition (or support) for existing homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant politics</th>
<th>political activities and practices that immigrant associations undertake to better co-nationals’ legal and socio-economic situation in the destination country, and that are supported by the country of origin:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- obtaining more political, social and economic rights;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- fighting discrimination and marginalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trans-local politics</th>
<th>activities and practices from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- hometown associations or committee created in destination countries to support the respective communities and advance local development projects;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- contributions to or participation in local philanthropic projects; etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Intensity

**Broad:** occasional and non-institutionalised forms of participation (regular and occasional activities and practices like meetings or events linking immigrants and places of origins)

**Narrow:** continuous and institutionalised forms of participation (only regular activities and practices like association’s continuous involvement in home country national elections or in diverse civic projects)

#### Independent variables

**The political opportunity structure in home country:** a) level of freedom; b) new political rights for emigrants (dual citizenship; external voting rights); c) other state policies directed at emigrants living abroad.

**The socio-economic level of development in home country:** the human development index (HDI)

**The social networks available to immigrant associations:** a) size (absolute number of an association’s ties); b) spatial scope (local and non-local).

**The type of immigrant association:** civic, hometown committee, social agency, cultural, political, professional, religious, educational, sports, economic, etc.

*(Personal elaboration)*
III. RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE, DATA AND DATA SOURCES

Introduction

From an epistemological point of view, there are basically two approaches in the academic world on the query whether or not natural sciences’ research model is also appropriate for social sciences: a) the positivism sustains the importance of using natural sciences’ methods in social sciences, and is based on explication; b) the interpretativism focuses on comprehension and interpretation, and rejects the use of natural sciences’ methods in social sciences. There are also two positions in the academic world when considering if, from an ontological point of view, the social reality is something objective, external to the individual or something constructed: a) the objectivism considers social phenomena as external to the individual, independent of his/her existence; b) the constructivism regards social phenomena as a result of continuous social interaction (all social reality is a constructed reality). These approaches have been translated into two distinct methodological perspectives and traditions, the quantitative and the qualitative, that have influenced the design of the vast majority of social sciences researches.

Although quantitative and qualitative researches have been usually regarded and situated on the opposite sides of the methodological field, authors like King, Keohane and Verba (1994), Bryman (1988) and even Corbeta (2007) consider that both types of research are legitimate and utile. The two methodological lines seem to be very different
at a first view and there are many researchers who try to confront them like, for example, the ‘pure’ quantitativists or, in our terms, the quanti (positivist epistemological assumption; the objective is to explain and make causal inferences with a high number of cases, generalise and find empirical regularities) versus the ‘pure’ qualitativists or the quali I (interpretativist epistemological assumption; the objective is to observe and understand).

For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 3-7; 7-9), both styles of research (quantitative and qualitative) could be systematic and scientific if they are guided by the same inferential logic. Their book “Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research” shows how to design qualitative (small-n) studies so that they satisfy the rules of scientific inference.¹ A qualitative, quantitative or methodologically mixed research study could be regarded as scientific if this fulfils four basic requisites:

1. The research objective is to formulate descriptive (What? Who? How?) or explicative inferences (Why?) based on the empirical information that we have on the world;
2. In order to generalise and analyse the data, the methods have to be explicit, codified and public thus they could be evaluated;
3. The conclusions are uncertain so, a certain degree of doubt is inherent to science;

¹ The author of this thesis is aware about the possible critiques to King, Keohane and Verba’s book (and methodological approach) that were reunited in a review symposium published in The American Political Science Review, 89(2), 1995: the crucial role of conceptual framework formulation in social inquiry; many researchers in the area-studies tradition do not seek generality of explanation because they hold that outcomes are highly determined by the “context” in which politics get played, this itself no subject to variable analysis; the selection criteria may be different when theory is strong as opposed to when theory is weak; better theory (and not increasing the number of observations) might permit inferences from fewer cases, allow restrictions on the independent variable, and may even profit from judicious selection on the dependent variable; the importance of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, etc.
Bryman (1988: 109) too consider that the differences between the two types of research are not epistemological but rather technical. As such, the best research studies tend to combine the characteristics of both methodological traditions, even though this is not always a necessary requirement. Corbetta (2007: 60-61), in turn, although he recognises the legitimacy of both research styles, believes that these are different not only from a technical point of view but also epistemological. For him, the two research styles represent the direct and logical expression of two distinct epistemological perspectives, two different paradigms that imply different ways of understanding the social reality, the research objectives, the role of the researcher and the technical instruments.

However, all these authors would agree that in the same research study we could find data that we can analyse statistically and other relevant data that we cannot analyse with quantitative methods. In order to understand a social world in a continuous change, we have to work with information that is easy to quantify and other that is not. Nonetheless, we cannot afford the risk to renounce at none of this type of information. From here comes in the possibility and sometimes the necessity to combine both types of research and use quantitative as well as qualitative methods and data to interpret and explain the social reality.

As we could see in the second chapter of this thesis, this qualitative research study uses both descriptive and causal inferences in order to analyse the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona. In this chapter we will specify the research design, the sample construction, the methods and, the data and data sources.
1. The research design

In comparative transnational research literature, we usually find two basic ways of studying immigrant transnationalism: one is studying the transnational activities of the same immigrant group in different local/national contexts (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003a; Landolt et al. 1999; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Landolt 2008); and the other is studying the transnational activities of different immigrant groups in the same national/local context (Portes et al. 2002; Portes et al. 2003; Portes et al. 2007; Waldinger 2008).

This is a comparative research study that attempts to identify the common and specific elements of the transnational political activities of various immigrant associations in Barcelona. This is why it focuses on cross-border political activities of different ethnic/national origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. In total, I examine the transnational political activities and practices of 41 immigrant associations.

2. Sampling

2.1 Population sample

The ethnographic evidence analysed in this study is based on fieldwork conducted between 2006 and 2008 in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. The big urban conglomerates are the zones where more immigrants arrive ultimately, principally because of increased work opportunities. Barcelona is the second metropolitan area in
Spain, after Madrid, and one of the main areas of immigrant concentration. The year of reference for the sample selection was 2005.

After the II World War, Europe has been a land of immigration, national policies being fairly liberal during the 1950s and 1960s, before becoming more restrictive from the 1970s onward. From early-1950s to 1973, emergent industrialised countries like Germany, France, and the UK started to run short of labour recruiting workers from less industrialised countries like Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and also from their former colonies like North Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent or, in the case of Germany, from adjacent countries like the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Over this period net immigration for Western Europe reached around 10 million (compared to 4 million between 1914 and 1949) (Stalker 1994, 2002; Appleyard 2001; Solé et al. 2000).

Between 1974 and mid-1980s, Western Europe closed its doors to further labour immigration because of the economic recession, and expected guest workers to leave. These workers had, however, established themselves and preferred to stay. Migrants started to choose other destinations like Italy and other countries of Southern Europe. The economic incentives of joining the European Community also made Greece, Portugal and Spain more attractive to immigrants. Between mid-1980s and 2001 the political upheaval in Eastern Europe brought on to Western Europe thousands of people feeling conflict and seeking asylum. Other people from other regions were also drawn on by the asylum hope. From 1989 to 1998, more than 4 million people applied for asylum in Europe, 35 per cent from Asia, and 19 per cent from Africa (Salt et al. 2000). The pressure grew and Western Europe started to tighten up its borders but more people
tried to enter illegally, either travelling on their own initiative or with the help of smugglers (Stalker 2002; Appleyard 2001; Solé et al. 2000).

The most significant factors behind this significant increase in migratory movements beginning with the 80s have been the economic resurgence of the continent and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. On the other side, the economic depression or the destruction of traditional modes of life together with continuous natural disasters and armed and political conflicts determined many people from North Africa, Latin America and Asia to flee to Western European countries in search for enhanced economic and social opportunities. Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece have changed from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration. Spain, in particular, has converted itself in a reception country from the 80s, registering a significant immigrant increase beginning with 1990. In 2003 and 2004, Spain was among the main EU immigration countries alongside Portugal, Italy and the UK (Solé et al. 2000; Lorca-Susino 2006).

In accordance to Eurostat, the stock of foreigners (i.e., not nationals of their country of residence) in the UE in 2004 reached almost 25 millions, around 5.5 per cent of the total population. Immigrant trends in the EU have been changing over time but present statistics show that they come primarily from the Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya), West Africa, Turkey, and South America, and to a lesser extent from India, and Eastern Europe. These immigrants settle primarily in Germany, France, the UK, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands (Lorca-Susino 2006).

---

In Spain, the total foreign population (persons with other nationality than Spanish) registered in 2006 was of more than four millions, around 10 per cent of the total population, the vast majority coming from European (communitarian and non-communitarian) (38.8%), followed by American (36.9%), African (18.9%) and Asian (5.3%) countries. Immigrant men and women almost came to equalise their proportions, thing that has determined many scholars to talk about a feminisation process of contemporary migration (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Foreign population by sex and region of nationality, Spain 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>1,609,856</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>842,163</td>
<td>767,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE (25)</td>
<td>918,886</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>481,640</td>
<td>437,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU countries</td>
<td>690,970</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>360,523</td>
<td>330,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>785,279</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>533,780</td>
<td>251,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICA</td>
<td>1,528,077</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>700,571</td>
<td>827,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>126,966</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>52,154</td>
<td>74,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>51,149</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>24,065</td>
<td>27,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1,349,962</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>624,352</td>
<td>725,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA</td>
<td>217,918</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>137,236</td>
<td>80,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEANIA</td>
<td>2,363</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATELESS</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,144,166</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,215,469</td>
<td>1,928,697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) (municipal registration).

From the 17 Spanish autonomous communities and the two autonomous cities that compose the Spanish State, Catalonia registered the highest number of foreign population in 2006 (22% of the total foreign population), even more than Madrid (19.3%) (see Table 2).
Table 2: Foreign population by sex and autonomous communities, Spain 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous Communities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>488.928</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>266.149</td>
<td>222.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>105.361</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>58.648</td>
<td>46.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias (Principado De)</td>
<td>30.258</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.963</td>
<td>16.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balears (Illes)</td>
<td>167.751</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>86.433</td>
<td>81.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canarias</td>
<td>233.447</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>120.811</td>
<td>112.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>23.834</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11.826</td>
<td>12.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla y Leon</td>
<td>106.159</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>54.409</td>
<td>51.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>132.725</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>74.100</td>
<td>58.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalunya</td>
<td>913.757</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>504.858</td>
<td>408.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comunidad Valenciana</td>
<td>668.075</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>360.384</td>
<td>307.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>24.467</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>15.146</td>
<td>12.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>73.756</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>35.531</td>
<td>38.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid (Comunidad De)</td>
<td>800.512</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>402.294</td>
<td>398.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia (Region De)</td>
<td>189.053</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>113.888</td>
<td>75.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarra (C. Foral De)</td>
<td>55.444</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>29.971</td>
<td>25.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pais Vasco</td>
<td>85.542</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>43.494</td>
<td>42.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rioja (La)</td>
<td>35.037</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>20.171</td>
<td>14.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceuta</td>
<td>3.078</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.521</td>
<td>1.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melilla</td>
<td>3.982</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.899</td>
<td>2.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.144.166</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.215.469</td>
<td>1.928.697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) (municipal registration)

Within the Catalan Autonomous Community, Barcelona represented in 2006 the province with the highest number of foreign population (71% of the total foreign population), far more than in Girona (13%), Tarragona (11%) or Lleida (6%) (see Table 3).
Table 3: Foreign population by sex and provinces. Catalonia 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATALUNYA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>645.737</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>351.517</td>
<td>294.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girona</td>
<td>116.284</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65.249</td>
<td>51.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lleida</td>
<td>52.633</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.813</td>
<td>20.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarragona</td>
<td>99.103</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56.279</td>
<td>42.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>913.757</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>504.858</td>
<td>408.899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) (municipal registration).

The foreign population came mainly from Latin American, African, European and Asian countries. The Latin Americans (Central and South America) represented by far the largest immigrant group in the province of Barcelona (41.3% of the total foreign population) in 2006, followed by the Africans (23.4%), the Europeans (21.2%) and the Asians (11.8%) (see Table 4).

Table 4: Foreign population by sex and nationality. Barcelona Province 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BARCELONA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>137,263</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>73,168</td>
<td>64,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE (25)</td>
<td>87,430</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>47,818</td>
<td>39,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-European countries</td>
<td>49,833</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>25,350</td>
<td>24,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>151,202</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>99,043</td>
<td>52,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICA</td>
<td>280,303</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>127,811</td>
<td>152,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>25,183</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10,186</td>
<td>14,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>13,746</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6,513</td>
<td>7,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>241,374</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>111,112</td>
<td>130,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA</td>
<td>76,450</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>51,208</td>
<td>25,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEANIA</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATELESS</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>645,737</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>351,517</td>
<td>294,220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) (municipal registration).

Each Spanish municipal registration office establishes continuous statistics on the foreign population with the main residence in that municipality. The data are revised
periodically in function of the number of arrivals and departures. According to the Immigration Law 4/2000, immigrants, once registered, have the right to public health and education, so they have a personal interest in declaring officially their residence. In spite of a possible overvaluation problem because of persons leaving without a notice to a third country, this form of immigrant registration seems to be less biased and more real than other foreign population statistics. Moreover, starting with 2003, a new law was introduced so that immigrants without a permanent residence permit have to re-register their residence every two years. This measure permits a better control of the influx and outfluxes of migrants within a municipality.

The General Territorial Plan of Catalonia defines the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) as an area of 3.236 km² that comprises a total population of 4,392,393 inhabitants distributed in 164 municipals that are structured in 7 comarcas (Barcellonès, Garraf, Alt Penedès, Baix Llobregat, Vallès Occidental, Vallès Oriental y Maresme). The big cities of the MAB gather the majority of immigrants independently of their country of origin, thing that increases the cultural diversity of the area. Barcelona is the most important city in the urban system hierarchy, many economic, social and territorial dynamics varying in their importance in function of their proximity with Barcelona. Accordingly, most European, American and Asian immigrant populations are concentrated in Barcelona, the capital of the MAB, and only the African origin population is distributed between the city of Barcelona and other cities of the MAB like Terrassa, Mataró, Granollers or Martorell (Roca Cladera and Fullaondo Elordui-Zapaterietxe 2004).
Historically, Barcelona has been a city of immigration. In the XIXth century, there was an internal migration to Barcelona from other Catalan provinces. At the beginning of the XXth century, migrants came to Barcelona from various neighbouring regions due to a major improvement in infrastructure. During the 60s, the phenomenon of migration acquired a significant dimension and expanded to other Spanish regions like Murcia, Andalucía and Galicia. With the 80s and 90s immigrants started to come to Barcelona from outside the Spanish borders (Solé 2000).

The absolute value of registered persons with other nationality than Spanish (how an immigrant is usually defined by official statistics that analyse the international migration) has significantly increased in the city of Barcelona from 2000 to 2006. While in 2000 the foreign nationals living in Barcelona represented 4.9 per cent of the total population, in 2006 they represented around 16.5 per cent. This increase of 11.6 percentage points in only six years represents a real migratory boom (see Table 5).

Table 5: Evolution of the municipally registered persons with foreign and Spanish nationality. City of Barcelona 2000-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Foreign nationality</th>
<th>% Foreign population</th>
<th>Spanish nationality</th>
<th>% Spanish population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td>1,512,971</td>
<td>74,081</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1,438,890</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>1,503,884</td>
<td>95,356</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1,408,528</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>1,527,190</td>
<td>112,773</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1,414,417</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>1,582,738</td>
<td>167,223</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1,415,515</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>1,586,604</td>
<td>206,495</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1,380,109</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>1,612,237</td>
<td>248,091</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1,364,146</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>1,629,537</td>
<td>269,595</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1,359,942</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Personal elaboration based on data from the Department of Statistics, Barcelona City Hall and the National Statistics Institute (INE) (continuous municipal registration)
In 2005, the total population of the city of Barcelona was of more than one million and six thousands persons (1,612,237). Around 84.6 per cent of Barcelona’s total population had a Spanish nationality. The next region of nationality was America (7.8% of the total population), with a clear predominance of Latin American nationalities, followed by Europe (communitarian and non-communitarian) (3.6% of the total population), Asia (2.6% of the total population) and Africa (1.4% of the total population). The number of women with European and American nationalities was higher than the number of men with the same nationality (see Table 6).

Table 6: Population by sex and region of nationality. City of Barcelona 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,421,981</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>665,650</td>
<td>756,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>21,862</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14,651</td>
<td>7,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>126,011</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>57,376</td>
<td>68,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>41,984</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>28,909</td>
<td>13,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The five most important immigrant groups in Barcelona in 2005, from a numerical point of view, were the Ecuadorians (31,707), the Peruvians (15,589), the Moroccans (15,180), the Pakistanis (14,741), and the Colombians (14,268).³

2.2 Sampling frame

Informants were selected to represent a broad spectrum of migrant communities in Barcelona. We have first listed all units in the population from which the sample have been selected, meaning all immigrant associations in Barcelona, by country of origin. In order to avoid a selection bias we have excluded immigrant associations whose country of origin is a member of the European Union. We are interested in analysing the effect of the exit context on the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona thus, we look for maximum variation in this key explanatory variable and control for the reception context or the mode of incorporation in the destination country. EU immigrant groups would be excluded from the population sample as their exit context (external voting rights and double citizenship rights, or the level of socio-economic development) might be very similar. Accordingly, we choose only non-EU immigrants as reference sampling groups.

³ For a more detailed statistics on Barcelona’s population by sex and nationality see Annex 1.
We have also included all types of immigrant associations (civic, hometown committee, socio-cultural, religious, political, etc.) that have been characterised in the Chapter II of this thesis. The total number of countries (without those members of the European Union) that are represented in Barcelona by immigrant associations is of 46. The total number of immigrant associations from these 46 countries that have been recollected from official sources is of 103.\(^4\)

2.3 Non-probability sample

The sample has not been selected using a random selection method. Thus, some units in the population are more likely to be selected than others. Since it is an “intentional” design, the observations for inclusion in the study are selected to ensure variation in the key explanatory variable, in this case, a composite index called the political opportunity structure in sending country (and any control variables like, for example, the level of socio-economic development) without regard to the values of the dependent variable. Selecting observations according to the categories of the key causal explanatory variable or of a control variable (if it is causally prior to the key causal variable, as all control variables should be) creates no inference problems (Verba et al. 1994: 137-40).

The first objective was to create a typology of countries depending on the key explanatory variable, the political opportunity structure in sending country and the

---

\(^4\) Sources: Secretaría per a la immigració, Generalitat de Catalunya (www.gencat.net), persona de contacto: Saoka Kingolo, Responsable de Participació, Secretaria per a la immigració; Ayuntament de Barcelona, Servicios sociales – Inmigrantes, Extranjeros y Refugiados (www.bcn.es); Diputació Barcelona, Servei de Polítiques de Diversitat i Ciutadania (www.diba.es/diversitat/); Torre Jussana Serveis Associatius, Ayuntament de Barcelona (http://www.bcn.es/tjussana/), persona de contacto: Victoria Civit (vcivit@mail.bcn.es).
control variable, the level of socio-economic development. Different typologies might be useful for different research objectives. Thus, the elaborated classification strategy has to be related with the final research objective. In this case, the focus of interest is to analyse the effect of the exit context on the nature and forms of immigrant associations’ transnational activism. We thus look at the transnational political practices and activities of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations established in the same local community, Barcelona.

The most important explanatory aspect that has been deduced from the presented potential hypotheses and that could help us to select the target population is the political opportunity structure in the exit country. The level of socio-economic development of the country of origin might also constitute a significant explanatory factor for immigrants’ motivations to emigrate or to engage in local community development projects or in other transnational activities and practices. Thus, the socio-economic development aspect is considered a variable to control for in the selection of our sample.

Indicators like external voting rights, double citizenship or level of freedom reflect various political aspects of exit contexts and have been utilised in constructing a composite index, the political opportunity structure in exit country. The other composite index, the level of socio-economic development in exit country, can cause bias if not controlled for because it might be correlated with both, the key explanatory variable and the dependent variable and it might constitute a key omitted explanatory variable (Verba et al. 1994: 199-206).

---

5 The typology was created in function of three formal criteria that are indispenable for whatever classificatory concept: a) no subcategory of classification (Mi or Si) could remain empty: Mi ≠ 0; Si ≠ 0; b) the classification has to be exhaustive: no element of (M) or (S) can remain outside; and c) the classification has to be exclusive: the members of (M) and of (S) can not belong to more than one subcategory (Domenech, 2001).
Selection criteria of relevant observations (national origin of immigrants) – establishing a country typology in function of the key explanatory variable and the control variable:

A. The level of socio-economic development in the country of origin

The human development index (HDI) seems to be the most appropriate in measuring the level of socio-economic development of a country since its dimensions reflect social and economic achievements. It includes three dimensions of human development – longevity, educational attainment and command over resources needed for a decent living although it leaves out other certainly important aspects. From a human development perspective – that is a people-centred analytical framework - the HDI has clear limitations related to the complexity of distinct or interrelated factors - political, economic, social, legal, epidemiological, and other that could be also included in order to explain our well-being and freedom. But, including more factors into this numerical index is not feasible because this would reduce the importance of each of the other - already included - variables and oversimplify the reality to be evaluated (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2004).

Economic freedom and political empowerment are usually seen as two sides of the same coin. Yet, there are situations where it is possible to have one without the other (for example, China that does well on the HDI as a medium human development country, but its record on human rights and political freedom remains poor). Thus basic needs like literacy or life expectancy could be quite high in a totalitarian regime while political
rights and civil liberties could be completely absent (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2004). Nevertheless, the level of socio-economic development of sending country might determine people’s motivation to emigrate in the first place or to engage in transnational activities and practices and thus it might give us additional insights into the particularities of migrant transnational activism.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars. While the concept of human development is much broader than any single composite index can measure, the HDI offers a powerful alternative to income as a summary measure of human well-being. The country ratings go from 0 to 1 and are ordered in three categories or ranks: 1 – “low HD” (0.0-0.499); 2 – “medium HD” (0.5-0.799); 3 – “high HD” (0.8-1.0).

B. The political opportunity structure in the country of origin

This is a constructed 1 to 3 composite scale-index, where: 1 – “low political opportunity structure”; 2 – “moderate political opportunity structure”; 3 – “high political opportunity structure”. It has been created using three political indicators in accordance to its established definition in the Chapter II of this thesis:

a) Level of freedom in exit country;

This index is a combined average of political rights and civil liberties ratings where: a1) political rights ratings reflect to what extent the system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates (electoral process) and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state (political pluralism and participation), the levels of accountability, openness and transparency between elections (functioning of government); a2) civil liberties ratings refer to constitutional guarantees of human rights like freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, personal autonomy and individual rights and, the actual practices of fulfilling these rights or the rule of law. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of: 1 – “Not Free” (5.5-7.0); 2 – “Partly Free” (3.0-5.0); 3 – “Free” (1.0-2.5).  

b) External voting rights;

This indicator was constructed using the available information on national election systems and laws. The country ratings reflect an overall evaluation of specific voting laws for citizens residing outside the country (all citizens including students, diplomatic staff, armed forces and those on vacations), voting facilities abroad (voter lists, specific pooling stations), and types of elections (Presidential, Senate and Parliament). The ranking is from 1 to 3 and have been adapted in accordance with the research objective, meaning immigrants with or without external voting rights: 1 - “no external voting

---

rights” (prohibited for all citizens residing abroad or accepted only for the diplomatic staff and armed forces); 2 – “external voting rights with some restrictions” (voting by proxy; no specified physical place; the need to return home in order to cast ballots; only in Presidential elections); 3 – “external voting rights” (voting laws for all citizens residing abroad; voting lists and pooling stations abroad like embassies, consulates and other special places; Presidential, Senate and Parliament elections).  

2.  3.

c) Double citizenship rights.

This indicator was constructed using the available information about citizenship, dual citizenship and multiple citizenship based on a survey on world citizenship laws. The country ratings reflect an overall judgement based on national legislation particularities on the right to dual citizenship for co-nationals or citizens residing outside the country. The ranking is from 1 to 3 and have been adapted to the present research objective, meaning immigrants with or without the right to dual citizenship from their country of origin: 1 - “no right to dual citizenship” (in any case or only until 18 or 21 years old); 2 - “having the right to dual citizenship with some exceptions” (restrictions imposed by the law of the receiving country; special petition to or permission by the government of the sending country; second citizenship is not formally recognised until giving up the original national citizenship; only for citizens by descendent or natural citizens; only for women who marry foreign nationals and must take the nationality of their husbands; citizens who marry a foreign national and acquire the citizenship of their spouse remain unofficial dual citizens; recognising dual citizenship but original citizenship takes legal precedence over the other; limited status of sojourn for oversee nationals; preserving

---

8 Election Process Information Collection Project (EPIC), 2004, Comparative and country-by-country data on election systems, laws, management and administration, a joint endeavour of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and IFES, an international non-profit organisation that supports the building of democratic societies (http://epicproject.org/); Interparliamentary Union’s internet website (www.ipu.org).
nationality by birth when adopting a foreign nationality; only children of nationals born abroad; only for nationals who acquire foreign citizenship by marriage); 3 – “having the right to dual citizenship” (full right to dual citizenship or special treaty or agreement with Spain).\(^9\)

d) State-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad

This indicator was constructed in function of various forms of state involvement in migrants’ transnational space, such as home government bureaucratic reforms in response to emigrants’ heightened importance to policymakers, different investment policies to attract or channel migrant remittances, political rights for emigrants living abroad, state services abroad or service delivery to emigrant communities to symbolic politics aimed at reinforcing emigrants’ sense of loyalty and long-term membership. Because of a low rate of responses from embassies/consulates, this indicator could not be properly measured and thus included in the construction of the composite index, the political opportunity structure in home country. Nonetheless, the information received was used to complete the information available on this independent variable.

Using the above constructed indexes, the level of socio-economic development (HD) and the political opportunity structure (POS) in the country of origin, we developed a specific country typology. The typology has been constructed using three cutting points (the distance value) in recoding the values of both scales, socio-economic and political opportunity structure. We have obtained nine possible categories: 1) high-high; 2) high-

---

moderate; 3) high-low; 4) moderate-high; 5) moderate-moderate; 6) moderate-low; 7) low-high; 8) low-moderate; 9) low-low. The case summary by typology is the following:

Table 7: Country typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High HD and High POS</td>
<td>Argentina, USA, Australia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High HD and Medium POS</td>
<td>Israel, South Korea (Rep. Of Korea), Chile, Uruguay, Mexico</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High HD and Low POS</td>
<td>Rep. of Panama</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium HD and High POS</td>
<td>Romania, Ghana, Philippines, Peru, Colombia, Honduras</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium HD and Medium POS</td>
<td>Ukraine, Morocco, Tunisia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium HD and Low POS</td>
<td>Russian Federation, Republic of Congo, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, India, Bangladesh, Lebanon, China, Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Occup. Palestinian Territories, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nicaragua</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low HD and High POS</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low HD and Medium POS</td>
<td>Nigeria, Mauritania, Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal elaboration
We controlled for the variable socio-economic level of development in order to assure unit homogeneity. Countries were classified in three main groups in function of the three values of this variable. Thus from the first group of countries with high socio-economic level we selected countries with high, moderate and low political opportunity structure. From the subsequent group of countries with moderate socio-economic level we selected countries with high, moderate and low political opportunity structure. From the last group of countries with low socio-economic level we selected countries with high, moderate and low political opportunity structure. The minimum number of countries that could have been chosen was of nine.

The variation in the values of another possible explanatory variable that is the type of immigrant associations (civic, hometown committees, social agency, cultural, political, religious, educational, sports, economic, etc) – another potential explanatory variable – was also taken into consideration in constructing the sample. Thus, we included in the sample population those countries from each group of the above constructed typology that had the maximum variation in the type of immigrant associations.

2.4 Profile of selected immigrant groups

Since 2000, the Spanish population has increased significantly due mainly to an augmented life expectancy rate (79, 5 years, 2, 5 more than the medium of the UE-25) and a raise in immigration (from 0, 9 million in 2000 to approximately 4 million in 2006). The vast majority of immigrants have come from poor regions like Latin America, Africa, the Non-EU region and Asia. Despite of this rapid immigration increase in the last years, Spain is situated in the pro-medium of the OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. The migratory flows are distributed heterogeneously in the Spanish territory, the proportion of immigrants being the highest in the Baleares Islands (15, 9%), followed closely by Madrid (13, 1%), Valencia (12, 4%), Murcia (12, 3%), Catalonia (11, 4%) and La Rioja (11, 3%). In the rest of the autonomous communities, the immigration rate is lower than the Spanish medium of 8, 7 per cent.10

Overall, immigration has had a positive economic impact explaining not only over 50% in the Spanish GDP increase of the last five years but also an increase in the income per capita (in more than 600 euros) due to a more elevated immigrant employment rate (almost with 6 points) in comparison to that of the natives. Other notable economic indirect effects are a positive impact on the activity rate of the natives (1/3 of the increase in women’s activity rate due to the immigrant work in the domestic sector) and a more flexible labour market (a two points decrease in the structural unemployment rate due to the immigrant work in less desirable sectors, their higher geographical mobility, and their downward pressure on the increase in real income). In the present, immigrants are net contributors to the Spanish welfare state and supply with approximately 0, 5 per cent of the GDP the public surplus.11

The Latin Americans: Argentineans, Uruguayans, Pennames, Peruvians and Ecuadorians

Over the last decade migration from Latin American countries to Europe, especially to southern European countries like Spain and Italy, has grown significantly. These

11 Ibid.
countries have quickly changed from being countries of immigration during the
nineteenth and twentieth century (especially Argentina, and to a lesser extent Brazil,
Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico and Chile) to countries of emigration starting from the 80s and
90s. Between 1995 and 2003 the number of Latin American immigrants with a
residence permit in Spain have increased from 92,642 to 514,485, a figure that
achieved the level of 986,178 at the end of 2005. The main reasons behind this
increased flow of people from these regions to Europe have been the increased poverty
and the economic recession in these countries, together with more strict immigration
controls and visa regimes in the United States after 11 September 2001 (Solimano 2003;
Pellegrino 2004).

The demographic profile of Latin American migrants in Spain illustrates a young
population, highly feminised (women constitute over half of all Latin American
migrants), with high rates of labour force participation, relatively high levels of
education and elevated levels of remittances. Over one billion US$ are sent annually
from Spain to Latin American countries, and one billion from the rest of Europe. These
figures are expected to grow further on with an improving in the remittance services and
an increase in the Latin American diaspora. Overall, the cultural and linguistic affinities
between EU (Spain) and Latin American countries seem to facilitate the integration of
immigrants coming from these regions. However, with the growing migratory flows, the
proportion of Latin American migrants in irregular situation has also increased and the
human trafficking (in children and women for sexual exploitation) between these
regions and Europe has become a severe problem. There is also an increased

---

12 These figures are likely to be much higher if dual nationals and immigrants in an irregular situation are
also counted. With the 2005 regularization process and the family reunification policy the number of
Latin American immigrants has raised to 1,215,351 at the end of 2007 (Observatorio Permanente de la
preoccupation over brain drain from these regions as Europe seeks to recruit increasing numbers of highly skilled migrants (Pellegrino 2004).

Table 8 presents a summary of the characteristics of the Latin American immigrant groups and of their country of origin. The cultural similarities between these groups and systematic structural differences provide a suitable background for analyzing the forms that transnational activities and practices can take and predict the potential impact in exit and destination countries or communities. As indicated previously, data collection on these immigrant associations focused on one important area of concentration in Spain that is Barcelona.

### Table 8: Latin American Immigrants’ Country of Origin and Spain Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent/Nationality</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Panama</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (millions)</strong> (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>27.97</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>3.1*</td>
<td>43.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban population (% of total)</strong> (2A)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDI (2B)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDI Ranking (2C)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life expectancy at birth (years)</strong> (2E)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adult literacy rate (2F)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>97.7 (2002)</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>96.3 (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total fertility rate (2G)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infant mortality rate (2H)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population below poverty line (% $2 a day)</strong> (2I)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gini index of inequality (2J)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.2 (2001)</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>49.88</td>
<td>43.7 (1998)</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>32.5 (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of freedom (3)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Free (2)</td>
<td>Free (1)</td>
<td>Free (2.5)</td>
<td>Partly free (3)</td>
<td>Free (1.5)</td>
<td>Free (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>986.178</td>
<td>82.412</td>
<td>24.272</td>
<td>82.533</td>
<td>357.065</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrants</td>
<td>826.695</td>
<td>49.950</td>
<td>16.369</td>
<td>73.676</td>
<td>348.052</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General regime of residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communitarian residence</td>
<td>159.483</td>
<td>32.462</td>
<td>7.903</td>
<td>8.857</td>
<td>9.013</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women</td>
<td>54.34</td>
<td>49.17</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>52.28</td>
<td>51.21</td>
<td>59.42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate (4A)</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education (4B)</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-professional education (4C)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree (4D)</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived between 2000-2002 (4E)</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residing in Barcelona</td>
<td>159.022</td>
<td>13.811</td>
<td>5.229</td>
<td>22.417</td>
<td>54.586</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance (millions of US$) (5)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(A) Urban population (% of total). 2003. Data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area. Data refer to medium-variant projections.

(B) HDI. Human Development Index. 2003. It focuses on three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth); knowledge (adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools); and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita in purchasing power parity - PPP US$). The country ratings go from 0 to 1 and are ordered in three categories or ranks: 1 – “low HD” (0.0-0.499); 2 – “medium HD” (0.5-0.799); 3 – “high HD” (0.8-1.0).

(C) HDI Ranking. 2003. There are 177 countries ordered in function of their HDI. Norway leads the ranking with a HDI of 0,963 while Niger ends it with a HDI of 0,281.

(D) GDP per capita (Purchasing power parity, PPP US$). 2003

(E) Life expectancy at birth. 2003. The average number of years a human has before death, conventionally calculated from the time of birth.

(F) Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above). 2003. Data refer to national literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 2000 and 2004, unless otherwise noted.

(G) Total fertility rate (per woman). Estimations 2000-2005. The average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if: 1) she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime; and 2) she were to survive from birth through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by summing the single-year age-specific rates at a given time.

(H) Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births). 2003. The number of deaths of infants (one year of age or younger) per 1000 live births.

(I) Population below poverty line (% $2 a day). 1990-2003. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. In Spain the value refer to those living below 50% of median income. 1999-2000.
(J) Gini Index of Inequality. 2000 (unless otherwise noted). A value of 0 represents perfect equality and a value of 100, perfect inequality.
   (B) Secondary education (% ages 16 and above).
   (C) Technical-professional education (% ages 16 and above).
   (D) University degree (% ages 16 and above).
   (E) Time of residence in Spain (% between 1 and 3 years).

The Africans and the Asians: Moroccans, Equatorial Guineas, Senegalese, Nigerians, Cameroonianis, and Pakistanis

Despite the fact that the EU and Magreb (Morocco, Argelia and Tunisia) immigration to Spain has decreased from 2000 to 2005 (from 60% of the total migration population in 2000 to 35% in 2005) while the Latin American immigration has considerably increased in this period (from 20% in 2000 to 60% in 2005), African and Magreb immigration to Spain continue to be an important issue for the Spanish migration policy. Since the 90s and the beginning of the XXI century, Spain in cooperation with other EU countries has progressively enforced its borders with Africa to stop the illegal immigration coming from Magreb and Sub-Saharan Africa (Sandell 2006).

In spite of this, African immigration to Spain has substantially increased between 1999 and 2005, from 174.400 immigrants to more than 700.000, though to a lower pace than Latin American immigration. Asian immigration has also registered a significant increase during the same period, from 47.300 in 1999 to 186.200 immigrants in 2005. With an increase of about 22 per cent between 2004 and 2005, Asian and African immigration, and also the non-EU immigration augmented more rapidly than the total
immigration to Spain. Tougher state border security measures cannot stop the illegal immigration from African and Asian countries (Sandell 2006).

The “push-pull factor” migration theory explains this massive movement of people from poor to rich countries in terms of increasing labour market competencies due to a growing urbanisation, a rising active population and labour shortage in the country of origin (push factors), and also in terms of better economic opportunities like a higher GDP per capita in the destination country (pull factors). Other macro-incentives to emigrate might be the migration legislation in the destination country that can be more or less permeable. There are also more individual factors that certainly influence a person’s decision to emigrate like personal education and wealth, or family and friendship networks in the destination country. Empirical data demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between, on the one side, an increasing active population leading to higher labour market competences and the increase in migratory flows and, on the other side, a growing urbanisation leading to higher labour market competences and the increase in migratory flows. At the same time, a decrease in the PIB per capita in poor countries (or, as a pull factor, an increase in the PIB per capita in rich countries) relates positively with the increase in migratory flows from these countries (Sandell 2006). In our opinion, the determinant aspect that pushes a person to leave his/her country (a decision with high costs) is for certain an impoverished socio-economic situation in home country.

African and Asian immigration does not seem is going to stop, on the contrary, the prediction is that it is going to grow in the nearby future due mainly to the push factors in destination countries. One way to ease the African and Asian migratory pressure on
the European borders is to employ more absorption mechanisms of legal migration rather than control mechanism of illegal migration from these regions. This paradigm change in migratory policies relies on the fact that legal migration is not only a way of improving immigrant situation in destination country but also of improving the life of those left behind through immigrant remittances or thorough socio-economic cooperation and solidarity action between poor and rich countries.

The demographic profile of African and Asian migrants in Spain illustrates a young population, less feminised (except in the case of Equatorial Guinea where the percentage of migrant women is relatively high) and with lower rates of labour force participation and lower levels of education than Latin American immigrants. The level of remittance is in general lower than in the case of Latin Americans, except for the Moroccan immigrants whose level of remittance is the highest by difference among all immigrant groups. The cultural and linguistic differences between Spain and African and Asian countries do not seem to facilitate the integration of these immigrants though we can talk about an older immigration (like the Moroccan immigration) that that from Latin America. On the other side, with the growing migratory flows, the proportion of African and Asian migrants in an irregular situation has increased and the human trafficking (clandestine cross-border encouraging extortion and sexual exploitation) between these regions and Europe adds to the gravity of this problem.

Table 9 presents a summary of the characteristics of the African and Asian immigrant groups and of their country of origin. The cultural similarities/differences between these groups and systematic structural differences provide a suitable background for analyzing the forms that transnational activities and practices can take and predict the
potential impact in exit and destination countries or communities. As indicated previously, data collection on these immigrant associations focused on one important area of concentration in Spain that is the city of Barcelona.

Table 9: African and Asian Immigrants’ Country of Origin and Spain Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent/Nationality</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Eq. Guinea</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions) (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>31.48</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>131.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>157.94</td>
<td>43.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total) (2A)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI (2B)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI Ranking (2C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP USS) (2D)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.780</td>
<td>4.004</td>
<td>2.118</td>
<td>1.648</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.097</td>
<td>22.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years) (2E)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate (2F)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>50.7 (2002)</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>66.8 (2002)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>96.3 (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (2G)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (2H)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below poverty line (% $2 a day) (2I)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>10.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index of inequality (2J)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>32.5 (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of freedom (3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not free (6.5)</td>
<td>Partly free (4.5)</td>
<td>Not free (6)</td>
<td>Free (2.5)</td>
<td>Partly free (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not free (5.5)</td>
<td>Free (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Immigrants</td>
<td>649.251</td>
<td>7.616</td>
<td>493.114</td>
<td>2.358</td>
<td>27.578</td>
<td>17.338</td>
<td>177.423</td>
<td>28.707</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General regime of residence</td>
<td>618.843</td>
<td>5.815</td>
<td>473.463</td>
<td>1.983</td>
<td>26.744</td>
<td>15.096</td>
<td>166.374</td>
<td>27.769</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communitarian residence</td>
<td>30.408</td>
<td>1.801</td>
<td>19.651</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>2.242</td>
<td>11.049</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women</td>
<td>32.43</td>
<td>65.97</td>
<td>34.59</td>
<td>34.97</td>
<td>18.01</td>
<td>37.22</td>
<td>39.50</td>
<td>13.34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate (4A)</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70.6*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.9*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Technical-professional education (4C) 4,0 - 1,9 - - - 2,7* -  
University degree (4D) 12,1 - 3,1 - - - 19,7* -  
Arrived between 2000-2002 (4E) 42,2 - 29,9 - - - 27,7 - -  
Residing in Barcelona 120,282 819 99,196 306 4,732 1,652 56,0 31 15,768 -  
Remittance (millions of US$) - - 1,202 0 28 54 - 30 -


(A) Urban population (% of total). 2003. Data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area. Data refer to medium-variant projections.  
(B) HDI. Human Development Index. 2003. It focuses on three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth); knowledge (adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools); and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita in purchasing power parity - PPP US$). The country ratings go from 0 to 1 and are ordered in three categories or ranks: 1 – “low HD” (0.0-0.499); 2 – “medium HD” (0.5-0.799); 3 – “high HD” (0.8-1.0).  
(C) HDI Ranking. 2003. There are 177 countries ordered in function of their HDI. Norway leads the ranking with a HDI of 0,963 while Niger ends it with a HDI of 0,281.  
(D) GDP per capita (Purchasing power parity, PPP US$). 2003  
(E) Life expectancy at birth. 2003. The average number of years a human has before death, conventionally calculated from the time of birth.  
(F) Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above). 2003. Data refer to national literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 2000 and 2004, unless otherwise noted.  
(G) Total fertility rate (per woman). Estimations 2000-2005. The average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if: 1) she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime; and 2) she were to survive from birth through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by summing the single-year age-specific rates at a given time.  
(H) Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births). 2003. The number of deaths of infants (one year of age or younger) per 1000 live births.  
(I) Population below poverty line (% $2 a day). 1990-2003. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. In Spain the value refer to those living below 50% of median income. 1999-2000.  
(J) Gini Index of Inequality. 2000 (unless otherwise noted). A value of 0 represents perfect equality and a value of 100 perfect inequality.  
Employment rate (% ages 16 and above). Employment rate for natives is drawn from *Encuesta de población activa. Tablas anuales 2003*. A possible overestimation of this indicator for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.

Secondary education (% ages 16 and above). A possible overestimation of this indicator for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.

Technical-professional education (% ages 16 and above). A possible overestimation of this indicator for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.

University degree (% ages 16 and above). A possible overestimation of this indicator for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.

Time of residence in Spain (% between 1 and 3 years). A possible overestimation of this indicator for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.


2.5 Selection of immigrant associations

From each of the nine categories of countries we included in the analysis the country that had maximum variation in the independent variable, type of immigrant associations. To assess how well immigrant activist associations represent the transnational citizenry, a representative sample of the public is essential. However, ordinary representative samples may contain very few of the most interesting transnational activist associations - those who engage in relatively rare but important activities such as giving large donations to home country associations or organizations, serving on local homeland governing boards, or taking part in protests, denouncing human rights violations that relate to homeland, etc. (see Verba *et al.*, 1995: 6).

Accordingly, we introduced in our sample those cases of activist associations drawn from politically relevant racial and ethnic minorities in Barcelona. Some of these groups were the Argentineans, the Uruguayans and the Cameroonians, many of them emigrating from their countries in the 70s or 80s because of political reasons. We also introduced in the sample those associations corresponding to the numerically most significant immigrant groups in Barcelona in the year of the sample selection (2005).
The first four immigrant groups, in a numerical order, were: the Ecuadorians, the Peruvians, the Moroccans, and the Pakistanis.13

The final sample of Barcelona’s immigrant associative public was the following:

A. Countries with a high level of socio-economic development and a high, medium, and low political opportunity structure: a) Argentina; b) Uruguay; c) Republic of Panama.

Immigrant associations to be interviewed:

1. Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina
2. Casal Argentí a Barcelona
3. Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona
4. Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos
5. Unión de Argentinos en Cataluña
6. Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña (AUC)
7. Casa de Uruguay
8. Casa Charrua Uruguay
9. Asociación Panamá Cataluña

B. Countries with a medium level of socio-economic development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: a) Peru; b) Ecuador; Morocco; c) Equatorial Guinea; Pakistan.

Immigrant associations to be interviewed:

10. Asociación Solidaria con las Mujeres Peruanas en el Extranjero (ASOMIPEX)
11. Associació Cultural Alma Peruana
12. Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras
13. Centro Peruano de Barcelona (CPB)
14. Perú Alternativa
15. Associació Catalano-Equatoriana per a la Integració i el Desenvolupament
16. Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya
17. Asociación Catalana Ecuatoriana de Mujeres - Intercambio Cultural
18. Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación - Ecuador Llactacaru
19. Associació Amical d'Emigrants Marroquins a Catalunya
20. Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Cataluña (ATIME Catalunya)
21. Associació NAHDA
22. Associació Cultural Dar El Farah
23. Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí-Itran
24. Associació d'Estudiants Marroquins
25. Associació Unió Marroquina-Catalana d'Educació i Cultura
26. Associació Socio-Cultural Riebapua
27. Associació d'Estudiants i Joves de Guinea Equatorial
28. Asociación de Mujeres E'Waiso Ipola
29. Asociación Cultural Viyil
30. Associació Cultural Rhombe
31. Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos
32. Associació Cultural Idara Minhaj Al Quran Pakistaní
33. Federació Associacions Pakistaneses Catalunya (FAPC)
34. Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)

C. Countries with a low socio-economic level of development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: a) Senegal; b) Nigeria; c) Cameroon.

Immigrant associations to be interviewed:

35. Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos
36. Associació Diakha Mandina - Inmigrants Senegalesos
37. Associació de Residents Senegalesos del Vallès Occidental
38. Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya – Nigeria Community
39. Comunidad Igbo de Nigerianos en Cataluña
40. Associació Cultural Adna Bassa (Camerún)
41. Agrupació Camerunés Residents a Barcelona (RACAMERS)

Though our sample list comprised initially a relatively significant number of immigrant associations (41), institutional reasons like the fact that immigrant associations are not obliged to register officially their disappearance or other field research reasons like association’s refusal to be interviewed or the impossibility of getting in contact with the association (wrong or no direction, telephone number, e-mail), the sample of immigrant
associations interviewed recorded in the end only 24 immigrant associations as we see below:¹⁴

A. Countries with a high level of socio-economic development and a high, medium, and low political opportunity structure: a) Argentina; b) Uruguay; c) Republic of Panama.

1. Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina
2. Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona
3. Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos
4. Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña (AUC)
5. Casa de Uruguay
6. Casa Charrua
7. Asociación Panamá Cataluña

B. Countries with a medium level of socio-economic development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: a) Peru; b) Ecuador; Morocco; c) Equatorial Guinea; Pakistan.

8. Asociacion Cultural Alma Peruana
9. Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras
10. Centro Peruano de Barcelona (CPB)
11. Associació Catalano-Equatoriana per a la Integració i el Desenvolupament
12. Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya

¹⁴ A complete sample list with all the additional information appears in Annex 4.
13. Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación - Ecuador
Llactacaru
14. Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Cataluña (ATIME)
15. Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí-Itran
16. Associació Cultural Rhombe
17. Associació de Treballadors Pakistaneses
18. Associació Cultural Idara Minhaj Al Quran Pakistaní
19. Federació Associacions Pakistaneses Catalunya (FAPC)
20. Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)

C. Countries with a low socio-economic level of development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: a) Senegal; b) Nigeria; c) Cameroon.

21. Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos
22. Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya – Nigeria Community
23. Associació Cultural Adna Bassa (Camerún)
24. Agrupació Camerunés Residents a Barcelona (RACAMERS)

3. Data and data sources

The research study includes both qualitative and quantitative data gathered between fall 2005 and spring 2008. Most of the data come from semi-structured interviews in Spanish and English with the main representatives of immigrant associations in Barcelona. Some data come also from many informal conversations with members of
immigrant associations and from their reunions and assemblies. Official documents, programmes, and data on the investigating issues were also included into the analysis. Most interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed, while some few were recorded with extensive notes.

Other data come from a questionnaire on state policies toward nationals living abroad that were applied to those embassies/consulates whose nationals were represented in the sample of immigrant associations. The embassies (consulates) corresponded to the selected eleven countries of origins: Panama, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Morocco, Cameron, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan and Senegal.

3.1 The semi-structured interview

Qualitative interviewing allows us to identify the personal perspective of the investigated subjects. It is ought to be realised to a considerable numbers of previously selected subjects to assure a possible generalisation of the findings to the whole population and it has a cognitive finality. The interviewer guides the interview according to a sketch of flexible and non-standardised questions. The semi-structured interview is commonly used when the issues to be investigated are quite new or when these are so complex that the answers are completely unforeseeable. In this case, the interviewer departs from a guide of themes/topics established in function of his/her research objectives and that have to be discuss as the interview goes on. The interviewer can decide not only the order and the formulation of the questions but also if there is a need for further immersion in one of the themes (Corbetta 2007: 350-357).
The main interviewing topics or themes for analysing the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona were the following:

I. Origins, types and structure of immigrant associations that engage in transnational practices and activities;

II. Types of political activities and practices of immigrant associations that are partially or totally located in countries other than where their members reside (homeland politics; immigrants politics; trans-local politics);

III. Intensity of the transnational political practices and activities of immigrant associations (broad; narrow).\(^{15}\)

The questionnaire

A questionnaire, in comparison to an interview, is highly standardized. The main objective of a questionnaire is to frame the mental categories of an interviewee within a sequence of pre-established questions (answering to closed questions) (Corbetta 2007: 349). The questions and the order of them are the same for each interviewee and most of them are closed. We used just few open questions for covering our possible lack of complete information on the investigated issues.

The questionnaire was about state policies toward nationals living abroad and it was applied to all embassies/consulates whose nationals were represented in the population sample of immigrant associations from Barcelona. The questionnaire was sent by post, e-mail and fax but only around 30 per cent of these embassies/consulates finally

\(^{15}\) For a complete interview guide see Annex 2.
answered it. Because of a low rate of responses, the variable “state policies toward nationals living abroad” was not considered in the end as another possible selection variable for the final sample. Nevertheless, the information received was used in order to improve the general quality of the data interpretation. The questionnaire includes question items about different types of home state policies toward nationals living abroad: 16

I. Bureaucratic reforms in response to emigrants’ heightened importance to policymakers;

II. Investment policies to attract or channel migrant remittances;

III. Political rights: dual citizenship and the vote abroad;

IV. State services abroad or service delivery to emigrant communities;

V. Symbolic politics aimed at reinforcing emigrants’ sense of long-term membership.

16 For a more detailed description of this variable, see Chapter II of the thesis. The complete questionnaire appears in Annex 3.
Chapter

IV. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS’ POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM

Introduction

This qualitative research study uses both descriptive and causal inferences in order to examine the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona. In this chapter we realise a descriptive analysis of the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona. We first describe the origins, types and structure of immigrant associations and interpret the forms, scope and intensity of their political transnationalism. We then realise an initial profile of our sample of immigrant associations.

1. Origins, Types, and Structure of Immigrant Associations. Forms, Scope and Intensity of their Political Transnationalism

Argentinean immigrant associations

Red Solidaria was initially founded in Argentina in 1995 by a group of people from the San Gabriel College of Buenos Aires who sought to connect deprived people with persons or institutions that could solve out their necessities. The association registers today in Argentina more than 3,000 volunteers and has been recognised by the United Nations Organization for its work and good practices. Red Solidaria Barcelona was
established in Spain at the beginning of 2003 as a formal non-profit association that focuses on the basic needs of newcomers (mainly from Argentina) and on their integration process into the Catalan society. Its main objective is to guide and inform immigrants and to create a shared culture as a method of integration. The association is part of Fedelatina, the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia, that reunites more than 100 immigrant associations from Latin America and that was created to provide immigrants (or returned immigrants) and to their corresponding entities services, assistance and coordination in light of a common interest.¹

Association’s services (immigrant assistance and legal information) are free of charge and realised by a group of volunteers and professionals (four persons) that assist and support approximately 400 persons per month. The association does not have any registered member (no annual quotas) and functions mainly through networks and contacts such as: governmental institutions like the Catalan Local Government and Barcelona’s City Hall, the Spanish syndicate Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), non-governmental organisations like the Catalan Association of Solidarity with the Refugees (ACSAR), Caritas (the Official Confederation of Social and Charity Entities of the Spanish Catholic Church), and Argentinean associations like Red Solidaria Argentina. The last subvention they received from the local public administration permitted them to contract a full-time secretary.

Red Solidaria Barcelona engages in homeland politics like informative action on homeland national elections and electoral campaigns or on the voting process of

¹ See http://www.fedelatina.org.
nationals living abroad (special radio programmes; the distribution of various Latin American newspapers in line with the association’s objectives - those published in Spain can be consulted directly at the association’s venue and those published abroad via the website of the association; a TV satellite situated in the association’s venue; reunions with political candidates who want to inform potential voters abroad about their electoral programme). It occasionally defends homeland human rights (for instance, the mothers’ right to know about their disappeared sons and daughters during the Argentina’s dictatorship - *Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo*) via press conferences and lawful demonstrations.

The association involves in immigrant politics like informative and protest action on immigrants’ rights (immigrants’ right to vote; human rights violation - for instance, helping an Uruguayan young woman exploited sexually by a prostitution network to return home and the identification of this network in collaboration with the Argentinean and Uruguayan consulates and embassies). In terms of translocal politics, the association participates occasionally in international cooperation projects (for instance, building a health centre in some deprived community of Argentina) together with non-governmental organisations like *Caritas*.

The association *Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* was founded in 2001 as a supporting group from abroad to the largest and most popular syndicate in Argentina, the *Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA)*. The latter came into existence in 1992 as a new model of syndicate based on direct elections and affiliation, and autonomy from whatever economic group, government or political party. *Grupo de*

---

2 *Red Solidaria Argentina* has two radio programmes on the Radio Gladys Palmera 96.6 FM and the Radio Gracia, one called “New Citizens” and the other “The Latin Community”, whose main objectives are to inform and unite culturally immigrant communities with their communities of origin.
Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos registers around 8-10 members who collaborate voluntarily in diverse activities related to home country’s economic and socio-political situation or immigrants’ situation in Catalonia. The main sources of finance are the member quotas, the public subventions from the Catalan Local Government or other solidarity money from the CTA or the Spanish and Catalan syndicates.

The association engages in homeland politics like informative action on the external voting process, and informative and protest action on homeland politics and human rights (organised discussions with syndicate leaders from Argentina on homeland politics, manifestations against the impunity law in Argentina, bilateral reunions with political parties from Argentina and Catalonia, etc.). All these activities are organised in collaboration with the CTA but also with other syndicates from Spain and Catalonia like the CCOO, the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT), the Unió Sindical Obrera de Catalunya (USOC), or with the Argentinean Consulate or Embassy.

In terms of immigrant politics, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, when two Argentinean young men were accused of beating a civil guardian, the association asked for support from the CTA and the ombudsman in Argentina to defend them; immigrants’ right to vote; residence permits and the regularisation process) but with no support from home country government (consulate/embassy). In all these activities, the association collaborates with the CTA and other supporting groups of CTA established in Spain (Galicia, Madrid, Tenerife, Murcia) or in other countries (Sweden, Finland, France, Italy), and diverse immigrant associations members of the Casa de la Solidaridad (an entity that joins up 14
immigrant associations of different national origins in Barcelona, especially from Latin America and Africa) like *Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina, Plataforma contra la Impunidad, Union de Argentinos en Cataluña*, etc. It also maintains strong links with Catalan left-wing political parties like the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC) or the Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV).

The association also engages in *trans-local politics* like diverse civic and humanitarian projects in home country: for instance, gathering and sending clothes, medicine or computers to children living in a poor neighbourhood in Argentina via a solidarity brigade of Catalans professors involved in developing work there; constructing a school for these Argentinean children together with the Catalan syndicate, USOC.

The sense of dual/trans (political) implication or participation in both destination and home countries is quite strong within this association:

“We see what happens here because we live here…We are not blind, we live all the injustices here because we are part of the Catalan society and we participate in it. And if something happens here we ask for help there. But we are also Argentineans and we have very strong links with our country. It would be a big injustice not to participate in our country, especially for all those people who died for democratising Argentina. This is why we are members of this association.” (President of the association)

The association *Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina* was founded in 1983 with the objective of supporting the Argentinean immigrants in Catalonia and also the marginalised people in Argentina. The association registers around 50 members from
whom approximately 10 are real active, organising all association’s activities. The association’ venue is Casa de la Solidaridad, the establishment that reunites various immigrant associations. The main sources of finance are the local public subvention (the local Catalan Government, Barcelona’s City Hall) and association’s own cultural activities (cultural festivals like a folkloric or cinema festival, the book’s day, or communal meals). The association is divided in working groups some dedicated to immigrant issues and other to solidarity action with Argentina.

The association engages in immigrant politics like informative action on immigrant issues (residence permit, regularisation process, family reunification, municipal registration) and also protest action against immigrant discrimination and marginalisation (discrimination at the working place, education and health systems, or the case of illegal immigration and the right to free international mobility) but with no support from home country government. In these protest action in defence of immigrant rights the association collaborates with other nongovernmental associations like SOS Racisme Catalunya and immigrant associations like Papers and Drets per Tothom (Documents and Rights for Everybody) and all immigrant association registered in the Casa de la Solidaridad.

In terms of homeland politics, the association involves in protest action against particular homeland politics and in home country human rights defence (the disappeared persons during the military dictatorship - las madres de la Plaza de Mayo; protest action against the Avellaneda Massacre in front of the Argentinean Embassy; organised discussions in the universities on the Movement of Unemployed Working People in
Argentina; etc.) together with other Argentinean associations like Plataforma Contra la Impunidad and el Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos.

The association engages also in trans-local politics by giving political and material support to the Movement of Unemployed Working People (MTD- el Movimiento de los Trabajadores Desocupados o los piqueteros) founded in the second half of the 90s in Argentina as a result of the big economic recession (desindustrialisation and the decrease in the Argentinean exports). The association particularly assists the Popular Front Darío Santillán (FPDS), a social and political movement founded as a reaction to the assassination of the social militant Darío Santillán and his compatriot Maximiliano Kosteki by the police in the Avellaneda Massacre (sending money, or material objects like clothes, computers, notebooks, pencils, technical equipment, etc.).

Uruguayan immigrant associations

The Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña (AUC) was founded in 2003 as a formal non-profit association and its main source of finance has been the member quotas (there are more than 400 members who pay quotas). In the last year, AUC has applied for various state subventions and has started to organise diverse activities like collective meals, cultural festivals or other celebrations in order to increase its annual revenue. The main objective of the association is to improve the life of all the Uruguayans worldwide (as a moral obligation), by prioritising the socio-cultural action. Its activities are oriented mainly toward promoting civic participation and legal and informal counselling to the Uruguayans living in Catalonia, and to channel their socio-cultural
initiatives and protect their human rights. The association sends periodical Internet newsletters to its members, with detailed information about all its activities.

AUC identifies mainly with the working class, thus it maintains strong links with the Spanish syndicate CCOO and other syndicates from Uruguay. It also integrates and participates actively in the Federation of Associations and Houses of Uruguayans in Spain (FAYCUE), the Coordinator of the Catalan Immigrant Entities (CEICAT), the Ibo-American Coordinator of the XXI Century’s Migrations (CIBAMI XXI), Fedelatina - the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia, the Promoter Network of Social Consensus over Migrations, and the Working Groups of the Immigration Cabinet of Barcelona’s City Hall. It also maintains strong contacts with other Uruguayan associations from Spain, Argentine, and the USA.

In its activities and projects, the association collaborates with the Barcelona’s City Hall, the Catalan Local Government, the Spanish syndicate CCOO, the Catalan Foundation for Peace and Solidarity (Fundació Pau i Solidaritat), the Catalan socio-cultural Foundation Pere Ardiaca, the Catalan civic association Lliga per la laïcitat (The laic league), the Association of Immigrant Families and Friends Ida & Vueltas, private enterprises like Uruimport and Uruguay in Europe that import products from Uruguay, and with insurance companies in Spain and Latin America like MAPFRE.

AUC engages in homeland politics like informative and protest action on home country politics, and homeland human rights defence (disseminating political news via its website; fighting for the external voting rights by pressuring home country government to change the constitution in this respect; militating for the derogation of the impunity
law established during the dictatorship, etc.). AUC participates also in immigrant politics like informative and protest action on immigrant rights: providing the adequate information for immigrant accommodation in the destination country; defending immigrant rights in case of discrimination and racism; supporting, together with other immigrant associations, immigrants’ right to vote, by pressuring the Spanish and Catalan political parties to modify the electoral law; fighting for the reinstatement of the 1870’s Peace and Friendship Treaty between Uruguay and Argentina that permits Uruguayans citizens to live and work legally in Spain, and this in cooperation with the left-wing Uruguayan government and its elected president Tabaré Vázquez.

Since 2005, AUC has been working in different social development projects in home country together with the Association Ida & Vueltas. As such, both associations have participated in diverse civic projects in areas like education/schools, health, and also in the organisation of various cultural festivals in Uruguay (traditional dances like murgas or tango). Translocal politics seems to be an important aspect of AUC’s activities and practices as a way of strengthening the links between Uruguayans immigrants and their co-nationals at home. Protecting and preserving the Uruguayan identity abroad is a strong objective of this association:

“You never lose your identity but rather enforce it abroad. You never can transnationalise emotionally an individual, only physically as a migrant. A migrant can establish in one place but he/she will never renounce to belong to his/her country of origin…She/he will always have the heart in Uruguay and the body in Spain.”

(President of the association)
The association Casa de Uruguay was founded in 1978 as an opposition political force against the military dictatorship in Uruguay. At that time, the association defended homeland human rights and militated for democratic institutions and liberties in Uruguay. In these aspects, the association collaborated with the United Nations Refugees Agency (UNHCR), the humanitarian organization Red Cross Catalonia and other left-wing sectors of the Catalan society. Most founders came as political refugees though now the association registers an increased numbers of economic immigrants:

“Most of the association’s founders came as political refugees. Later on, the association has been integrating other people…though I do not like to differentiate between political refugees and economic refugees. Economic refugees are the result of bad politics in home country, so we could say that, in reality, they are also political refugees.” (President of the association)

Since 1985 and with the political change in the Uruguayan government, the number of association’s members has decreased to approximately 75 as many refugees returned home while more associations of Uruguayans have started to appear in Spain. The main sources of finance are the membership quota (around 3 euros per month), the money gathered from various cultural activities like collective meals and folklore festivals, and subventions from local public administration (for instance, the Gavà’s City Hall). The association is part of Fedelatina, the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia.

Lately, there has been a shift in the association’s objectives toward translocal politics (for instance, civic projects in Uruguay like a communitarian public house in Santa Catalina, a deprived neighbourhood in Montevideo, sometimes in collaboration with
other Uruguayans associations like Casa Charrua or cultural festivals) and homeland politics (for instance, human rights defence in the case of the disappeared children or sexually abused women during the dictatorship; organised discussions with Uruguayans politicians on subjects like the role of Uruguay within the commercial block the Southern Common Market – *el Mercado Comun del Sur*, Mercosur; the education reform in Uruguay; regular information on homeland politics via the weekly Uruguayan newspaper *Brecha*, etc.).

In terms of immigrant politics, the association engages in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (cases of discrimination and racism; reunions with left-wing Catalan political parties like the Socialist Party of Catalonia - PSC, United and Alternative Left - EUia, Initiative for Catalonia Greens - ICV, Republican Left of Catalonia - IRC to defend immigrants’ right to vote; sending official letters, for instance, in the case of sub-Saharan immigrants dying at the border with Spain, etc.), though with no support from home country government. Casa Uruguay maintains occasional contacts and develops occasional cooperation projects with other immigrant associations like the Federation of Associations and Houses of Uruguayans in Spain (FAYCUE), Casa de Estocolmo in Sweden, or immigrant associations in France.

The association Casa Charrua was founded in 1992 with the objective of preserving and disseminating the Uruguayan culture across state borders, and developing various civic projects in home country, though there was initially a debate on a possible political character of the association. Today the association register around 8-10 members and finances itself via subventions from the local public administration (the City Hall of *Castelldefels*), regional cooperation agencies for development (*Fons Català de*
Cooperació al Desenvolupament), and its own cultural activities like collective meals and cultural festivals. Lately, the association has started a campaign of co-opting more members and establishing a member quota.

The association participates mainly in trans-local politics like diverse civic projects in Uruguay (for instance, reforming or building a hospital in a deprived neighbourhood of Montevideo; financing small organic farms, a quarter of their profits going to orphanages) with the intermediation of homeland non-governmental organisations or associations (like Fuente al Sur). Association’s members regard this kind of trans-local civic action as a compensation duty of Western societies for the colonisation period.

“There is only economic globalisation and no social globalisation. The poor Africans or Latin Americans come here not because they want to, but because in their countries they are dying of hunger. This terrible situation you cannot resolve it with more militarised borders but rather by supporting the socio-economic development of poor countries. Rich countries, after stealing the resources of poor countries for so long time, have now the duty to compensate them.” (President of the association)

The association also engages in homeland politics like informative and protest action on home country politics, and homeland human rights defence (organised discussions with politicians from home country; the defence of the external voting right; homeland human rights defence). In terms of immigrant politics, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (immigrants’ right to vote; the 1870’s Peace and Friendship Treaty between Uruguay and Argentine; other immigrant integration or discrimination aspects in collaboration with non-governmental
associations like *Asociación Solidaria América 2002* (Castelldefels) that gives immigrants legal advice or *S.O.S Racisme Catalunya*), generally with the support of home country government and consulate.

Panamanian immigrant associations

The *Asociación de Panama en Cataluña* was founded in 1997 with the objective of supporting the integration of Panamanian immigrants into the Catalan society, preserving and disseminating the Panamanian culture, and receiving the Spanish and Catalan institutional support in all these activities. It is a cultural association that registers around 50 members. Its main sources of finance are the annual member quotas and voluntarily member contributions to specific cultural events organised by the association. The association maintains strong links with the Catalan Institute for International Cooperation (ICCI), the Foundation Catalonia-America, and it is a member of the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia (FASAMCAT).

The association engages only indirectly in *immigrant politics* like the participation in informative acts organised by the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia on immigrants’ right to vote or immigrant rights within the Catalan autonomous regime. It does not have however any clear position in all these aspects. The relationship with home country government or the Panama’s Consulate in Barcelona is almost inexistent. The association does not engage in any form of *homeland politics* since it does not have sufficient strength and resources for doing this. At the same time, homeland politics is not one of the main interests of the Panamanian community in Catalonia. It also does
not participate in any form of *trans-local politics* as the voice and representation of Panamanians living abroad is very limited.

In terms of a possible transnational identification, the president of the association recognises that for the Panamanian immigrant group this is rather something emotional because of the idiosyncrasy of this people that move for different reasons and many times just temporarily:

“I define myself as a Panamanian who loves very much his country of origin and who has been adopted by a country that he learns to love. We are living in two worlds that are ours, that adopted us and that we have to love and identify ourselves with them. I am a Spanish Panamanian and a Panamanian Spanish who loves his country of origin but also the country that received him.” (President of the association)

*Peruvian immigrant associations*

The non-profit immigrant association *Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras* was founded in 1998, in a moment when the Peruvian immigrants felt somehow abandoned by the Peruvian Embassy in Madrid in terms of legal counselling, immigrants in an irregular situation or the Peruvian cultural preservation abroad. The association registers around 150 members who give money voluntarily for diverse civic projects in Peru. The annual funds of the association rise also with the money gathered from organised cultural activities like collective meals and cultural festivals. The association is part of *Fedelatina*, the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia.
Association’s activities are basically resumed to a radio programme called *La voz del Inmigrante* that started in 2001 on a radio channel from Peru called *Radio Libertad Trujillo*. A Spanish immigrant from Extremadura founded this radio channel 50 years ago in the Trujillo town. The radio programme is transmitted on the Internet each week on Saturday at one o’clock in the afternoon, the Peruvian hour or eight o’clock, the summer Spanish hour and it has a length of half an hour. The programme is about immigrant situation in Spain (rights and how they are treated by the Spanish society) or other political and socio-economic aspects of Spain or Catalonia (how do people live in Spain, what do they eat and how much do they earn; how secure is life in Spain in comparison with Peru and how does the police act; the associational life in Spain in comparison to that from Peru; the Spanish authorities; the autonomy regime in Catalonia; the Spanish public transportation system; the Spanish politicians and their wages, etc.). All this information helps immigrants’ families in Peru to know better the Spanish social reality.

The association engages in homeland politics like informative action on national elections and electoral campaigns (in the 2006 national election, the association did not support the candidature of Alan García Pérez though it maintained contacts with his party *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, APRA) or homeland human rights defence (for instance, in the case of a presumed political repression of some APRA members who denounced the right-wing orientation of Alain Garcia and his implication in the forced disappearance of many persons and human rights violations during the 1983-1996 internal conflict) via non-governmental or governmental organisations like International Amnesty or the European Parliament.
In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (counselling work in aspects like the nationalization process or the family reunification; fighting discrimination practices via non-governmental organisations like International Amnesty, governmental ones like the European Parliament, or other immigrant associations from countries like the United States). It maintains strong contacts with the Socialist Catalan Party (PSC) in terms of immigrants’ right to vote, but receives no support from home country government in immigrant issues.

Through the radio programme the association engages also in some form of *trans-local politics* like contest awards of 25 euros on the Father’s or Mother’s Day. As a result of a *Cumbayá fiesta*, the association raised up around 500 dollars that were used for diverse presents for 60 poor children from Peru. It also plans to organise a dancing festival (a traditional dance called *La Marinera*) together with a homeland organisation called *El Club Libertad de Trujillo* in the Trujillo town and send a winning couple from Spain to participate in this festival. The association has tried to support civic projects in poor villages or towns from various regions of Peru like *Sierra del Perú, Sierra de la Libertad* in social areas like education (building a school or buying education materials) or health (building a hospital), but failed to achieve any agreement with the corresponding mayors who asked for exorbitant amounts of money. In 1991, Barcelona signed up a cooperation agreement with the Trujillo town but this did not come to terms because of a bad management from the part of the public administration in Trujillo.

The association *Centro Peruano de Barcelona*, one of the oldest Latin-American immigrant associations in Barcelona, was founded in 1963 as an association of
academics from Peru. Since the 80s, the association acquired its present name and established as its main objective the dissemination and preservation of the Peruvian culture abroad. It organises debates and conferences on diverse socio-cultural aspects and events from Peru (archaeology, literature, education, Peru’s independence anniversary, etc.) and other cultural activities, together with other Peruvian immigrant associations, like poetry festivals, sport contests, cinema festivals, photography exhibitions, etc.

The association registers around 40 members and its main sources of finance are the public subventions (Barcelona’s City Hall) and the association’s cultural activities (common meals organised every month or cultural festivals that take place usually in July). The association is part of the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia (FASAMCAT) that was created in 2001 as an encountering platform to channel, assist and coordinate the efforts of Latin American associations in their areas of interests, and to intermediate between these and the public and private Catalan institutions.³

The association engages in homeland politics by organising pre-electoral discussions during the Peru’s national elections time-period (in the 2006 Peruvian elections, the association invited representatives of the two main political parties that competed against each other, the APRA and the Union por el Peru, to present their electoral programmes to the nationals living abroad) or participating in the organisation of the external voting process in 2006 together with the Peruvian Consulate in Barcelona. The association also engages in homeland human rights defence by sending official letters to international organisms or participating in lawful manifestations.

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative action on immigrant rights (roundtables on immigration; free legal counselling to immigrants on aspects like the regularisation process or the residence permits, etc.). The association maintains strong links with various Spanish entrepreneurs, offering immigrants significant information about the Spanish labour market. It also engages in protest action on immigrant rights (the study homologation of Latin American midwives in collaboration with the Association of Latin American Midwives; the preservation of Latin TV programmes on the digital television as main sources of immigrant information; immigrants’ right to vote in collaboration with the main Catalan parties, People’s Party of Catalonia - PPC and the Socialist Catalan Party - PSC). In these immigrant issues the association does not receive any support from home country government (consulate/embassy).

In terms on *trans-local politics*, one of the association’s future objectives is to increase its participation in civic projects in home country. In this regard, the association has already started to participate with another Peruvian immigrant association in a project of sending medicine and medical technology to necessitated hospitals in Peru. The strong feeling of dual belonging is the real reason behind association’s involvement in transnational (political) activities and practices:

“I think nobody renounces to belong to his/her homeland…I grown up and lived in Lima, I have my friends there, my high school, and I have everything there. I go there and my immense satisfaction is to enter and step the soil of my country. It feels as if I would have never gone away… If I can do something for my country, if I can decide at least a little bit on its destiny, I feel more linked to it…I normally vote in all national
elections in Peru and not because it is obligatory but because I believe in this vote… I also vote here in Spain in all the elections, because I believe that it is the only way that we can make our voice heard.” (President of the association; she has dual citizenship)

She continues:

“I sincerely and honestly feel I belong to both countries. I have never felt a stranger here, probably because when I came, Spain was particularly hospitable with Latin-American academics… By disgrace, today immigrants are not received with opened arms… I define myself as a global citizen or more precisely I feel as both Catalan and Peruvian, I feel as if I belong to both parts. This is why I do this voluntary work in this association. I want to continue being in touch with my country and my people, and contribute with whatever I can… It is a feeling of amplitude as if all borders are open. In fact, I have never understood why do state borders exist in the first place?”

The Alma Peruana was founded in 1991 when Peru was coming out of a cholera epidemic. A small group of Peruvians living in Barcelona, who were working with the political party “United Left” in Peru and also with a Catalan support committee of Peruvian people, thought of creating this association. At that time, the association started to organise cultural activities like dancing festivals and gastronomic exhibitions in order to collect money and medicine for Peru. After this, the association has continued as a cultural association, its main objective being the preservation and dissemination of the Peruvian folklore and culture abroad. In the present, the association registers around 16 active members and it finances itself through an annual member quota and the money gathered from its own cultural activities (dancing festivals).
The association participates sporadically in homeland politics like, for example, in the organisation of the electoral process of the 2006 Peruvian elections together with other Peruvian immigrant associations and in coordination with the Peruvian Consulate in Barcelona. In terms of immigrant politics, the association provides little information to Peruvian immigrants trying to derive them to a Peruvian lawyer. In case of immigrant rights violation, the association joins up other Peruvian immigrant associations and sends collective official letters to different human rights organisations. In these immigrant aspects the association does not receive any support from home country government (consulate/embassy).

The association engages in trans-local politics indirectly via other immigrant associations. As such, it organises cultural festivals, for example, together with a sport association called Peña Alianza Lima en Barcelona and the collected money go to particular civic projects in education area (a football school for children in Peru) that are run out by other Peruvian immigrant associations. In terms of transnational immigrant participation, things do not seem to be too easy for particular immigrant groups. Acquiring the Spanish citizenship is still the most adequate option for a free mobility and particular immigrant groups like those coming from EU and certain Latin-American countries (Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, etc.) that have special treaties with Spain can obtain it earlier than most non-European immigrants:

“When I had only the Peruvian passport, I could not travel freely to almost any place. With the Spanish passport I have more liberty…the borders are more open for me now. I do not think state borders should exist in the first place…We all should have the
liberty of movement. If the economic situation of my country is not as good as it should be, we should have the liberty to change this by moving to other places with better economic opportunities… When I first came to Barcelona, 18 years ago, I first lived in an illegal situation for three years then, with the new migration law, I could obtain a residence permit and after a while the Spanish citizenship. I first worked as a housekeeper and taking care of old people then, in a factory for seven years until it closed down and finally in a hotel reception. In all these years, I have improved my educational and professional situation. I have all my family here but I feel myself a transnational citizen: I have my heart in Peru, I am a Peruvian because I love my culture and I try to disseminate it, but I also feel very much from here, from Barcelona. Economically, I live better here and this changes a lot of things.” (President of the association)

_Ecuadorian immigrant associations_

The Asociación Catalana-Equatoriana para la integración y el bienestar was founded in 2003 at the initiative of a former member of the Associació d’Equatorians a Catalunya, discontent with this association, and of other Ecuadorian immigrants. The main objective of the association was to provide useful information, legal counselling and support to recently arrived Ecuadorian immigrants. At the present, the association registers only two active members in Catalonia though around 5,000 have at least once required support from the association. Its main sources of finance are the voluntarily contributions from the association’s members and from other non-governmental organisations (the Spanish broadcasting COPE).
The association involves in homeland politics like informative action on the external voting process in collaboration with the Ecuadorian Consulate or on home country politics in general via organised discussions or the distribution of free newspapers directed at Ecuadorian Immigrants (for example, Mi Ecuador). The association participates in immigrant politics like informative or protest action on immigrant rights (residence permits, regularisation process, labour market discrimination and insertion in collaboration with supermarkets like Mercadona or Corte Ingles, the bad treatment of immigrants by the Ecuadorian Consulate that was denounced to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.) but with no support from home country government.

In terms of trans-local politics the association engages in civic projects in home country, especially in the health area. The association recollects each year off-load medicine from friends and sends it to hospitals and health centres in Ecuador (in 2005, the association sent medicine in a value of 50,000 euros to three provinces from Ecuador). At the same time, it intermediates the contact between those Ecuadorian persons who suffer of unusual diseases that cannot be cured in Ecuador, and specialised health centres from Catalonia (in 2005, the association brought seven persons from Ecuador to be cured in Catalonia). In this humanitarian action, the association receives the support of the Health Department of the Catalan Government that pays for the whole treatment.

Apart from these transnational political activities, the association participates in the dissemination of the Ecuadorian culture through cultural exhibitions (the president of the association is a painting artist) and festivals. In this regard, it maintains strong links with the Cultural House in Ecuador. The association organises each year, in
collaboration with the Spanish broadcasting COPE (Cadena de Ondas Populares Españolas, one of the main national broadcasts financed almost entirely by the Spanish Catholic church), the celebration of the Reyes Magos (Magic Kings) for those Ecuadorian children living in Catalonia (Barcelona).

The Associació d’Equatorians a Catalunya was founded in 1993 at the initiative of a group of Ecuadorian students. Since 2000, the association has enlarged its area of activities toward the socio-economic aspects of Ecuadorian immigrants’ integration into the city of Barcelona. Between 2001 and 2003, the association registered a high increase in the number of its members (around 5,800 members), becoming at that time one of the most representative Ecuadorian immigrant associations. Today, though the association registers around 7,200 members in Catalonia, only around 70-80 of them are real active.

The main sources of finance are an annual member quota of around 15 euros, the money gathered from organised cultural activities, and the public subventions from Barcelona’s City Hall, the Catalan local government, or from financial institution like la Caixa bank. The association maintains strong links with immigrant associations like the Federation of Ecuadorian Associations in Madrid, the Ecuadorian association from Vic, the immigrant association Ecuador Llactacaru, two Ecuadorian immigrant associations from the USA that promoted in the first place the external voting right, and non-governmental organisations like S.O.S Racisme Catalunya, Spanish charitable religious entities like Caritas, the Catalan civic association Lliga per la laïcitat (The laic league), and the Spanish syndicates CCOO and UGT. It is a member of Fedelatina, the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia and of the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia (FASAMCAT).
The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on home-country national elections and the external voting process (organising reunions and roundtable discussions with political candidates from Ecuador; informing about the external voting right to be exerted for the first time in September 2006), and home country politics in general (distribution of newspapers directed to Ecuadorian immigrants; organised discussions on diverse issues of home politics).

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (legal counselling on the regularisation process, resident permits, family reunification and corpse repatriation; job market counselling; the 2001 manifestation against the train accident in Lorca that ended the life of 21 Ecuadorian immigrants travelling in a van, in an irregular situation; the 2002 manifestation against the assassination of an Ecuadorian immigrant in the discotheque *Mare Magnum*; immigrants’ right to vote, etc.), but with no support from home country government and quite a cold relationship with the Ecuadorian Consulate in Barcelona. Beside this, the association also organises diverse cultural activities like particular national celebrations (Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, the National Day, and the Christmas Day), and cultural and sport festivals.

The association does not engage in any form of *trans-local politics*, the main focus of its activity being for the moment the migratory process in Spain. Each Ecuadorian, on an individual basis, inverts in properties in Ecuador (land or houses) or sends family remittances. At a collective level, it is very difficult to develop civic projects in home country because of the corruption of Ecuadorian functionaries from the border control
and the public administration in general (for instance, the association tried to send some bread furnaces to Ecuador but these were all confiscated at the border control with Ecuador).

The *Asociación de Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos en Cataluña para la Solidaridad y la Cooperación - Ecuador Llactacaru* was founded in 2001 as a support group for those immigrants in an irregular situation who self-confined themselves in a church in order to defend their human rights. The association provided at that time information and legal counselling in aspects like the regularisation process, residence permits, voluntary home return, etc., in response to the tough migration policy implemented by the then in power Spanish Popular Party (PP). The association started with a non-hierarchical structure, with no member quotas and a communitarian functioning, registering in short time more than 1,000 members. After a while, it has entered a crisis period (its members have descended to 20 persons) and has extended its activities to other issues like immigrant integration, cultural preservation and solidarity with Peru.

Most of the association’s activities are self-financed through organised cultural events (collective meals, cultural festivals, sport contests, etc.) while some other projects receive financial support from local public administration (Barcelona’s City Hall) or international organisations (the European Union). Since it has been founded, the association has developed four big projects, the most important ones being: the World of Colours (El Mundo de Colores) that focused on the integration of Ecuadorian immigrants in the socio-cultural life of a neighbourhood from Barcelona; the financing and building of an Internet centre in Ecuador; and the organisation in Barcelona of a
general reunion with all Ecuadorian immigrant associations from Spain in order to reunite them.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on the external voting right and on home country politics in general (organised discussions with politicians from Ecuador; planning the vigilance of the first electoral process – electoral campaign and voting – abroad together with the Spanish non-governmental organisation *Asociación Libre de Ciudadanos por la Democracia*, ALCD).\(^4\) It maintains strong contacts with particular political parties from Ecuador like *El Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* and *El Movimiento Popular Democrático* (MPD).

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association engages in immigrant rights defence via non-governmental associations like *S.O.S. Racisme Catalunya*, and collaborates mainly with Catalan left-wing parties (*Iniciativa per Catalunya*, *Esquerra Republicana*) in aspects like social and labour integration of immigrants or immigrants’ right to vote. It does not receive any support from home-country government (or consulate), but maintains strong links with international networks like the *Taller Nacional de Migración* (TNM) and Ecuadorian associations from other countries that defend migrants’ rights (immigrants, refugees, displaced people).

The association involves also in *trans-local politics* through its returned members who collaborate with the association in diverse civic projects. These projects are developed mainly in the southern and northern parts of the Quito province/canton (Pichincha) and focus on education and schools for children or on improving the life conditions of poor

\(^4\) At the time of the interviewing, the external voting right was in a legalisation process, with a perspective of functioning in practice from October 2006.
families living there (the association is in a process of finding a Spanish bank that could finance with low interest rates the housing of those poor Ecuadorians who do not have family members abroad).

When asked about a possible transnational identification, the president of the association considers this aspect something personal. In his case, the nation does not have any significance but rather his ideological orientation:

“I do not consider myself a transnational citizen but rather an a-national. I do not have any national identity…I have a passport because this is compulsory in today’s world, but I do not have an identity from a country in particular and this because of my ideological orientation. I am an anarchist and nations do not tell me anything. For me, the state and the nation are just other oppressing systems.” (President of the association)

*Moroccan immigrant associations*

The *Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya* is a branch office of the *Asociación de Trabajadores y Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España* (ATIME) that has its central venue in Madrid. The Catalan association has started its activities in 1993 and has an independent status from that in Madrid though it often collaborates with this. At the time of its foundation, the association tried to establish a political party in Morocco, called the “Left-Wing Democratic Movement” but failed to achieve it. The association directs its activities to the Moroccan immigrant working class in Catalonia. It registers around 600 members in Catalonia (300 in Barcelona) and develops various activities directed primarily at the integration of Moroccan immigrants
into the Catalan society. It has five employees and its main sources of finance are the public subventions from Barcelona’s City Hall and the Catalan local government, and the members’ quotas.

The association involves in homeland politics like homeland human rights defence (women and children rights; democracy) or informative and protest action on homeland politics (reunions, roundtables, monthly newsletters to its members; denouncing the Moroccan Consulate in Barcelona for corruption and immigrant mistreating, etc.). The association, together with other Moroccan immigrant associations from France, Holland and Belgium, performs lobbying action on the Moroccan government in order to designate a representative from the emigrant community in the Moroccan Parliament. In this regard, it plans to organise an informing campaign on homeland politics and the external voting rights for nationals living abroad at the European level.

The association also engages in immigrant politics like informative action on immigrant rights (legal and labour market counselling) and other socio-cultural integration aspects, and immigrant rights defence (a centre for minor Moroccan immigrants; cases of immigrant discrimination in the labour market). In some of these activities, the association receives support from diverse home-country non-governmental associations or some opposition political parties but not from home-country government (consulate/embassy). In the last four years, the association has been organising an informative activity in Morocco called No más muertes en el estrecho (No more deaths on the seashore) about the tragic experience of migrating in an irregular situation.
In terms of *trans-local politics*, the association has a department on cooperation and development that coordinates civic projects in home country in areas like education/schools, old people/children, local development, etc. In these projects, the association collaborates with the Barcelona’s City Hall and the Catalan Local Government, and also with Moroccan non-governmental associations (the branch office ATIME Rabat Morocco). It also organises every two years together with the branch office ATIME-Madrid and other regional branch offices a conference called “Between Two Cultures” whose objective is to bring together Moroccan and Spanish cultures. Academics, non-governmental associations, representatives of the Ministry of Culture and Education, and also politicians from both countries participate in this conference. The association acts thus as an intermediary between political parties or between political parties and non-governmental associations in home and destination countries.

In terms of a transnational (political) identification, the president of the association does not feel identify with any political community though he has a Moroccan nationality and a residence permit in Spain:

“I belong to Morocco but I do not belong to any political community. It is more a cultural and religious belonging: I belong to the Arab culture, but I do not belong to the Moroccan political community. They do not allow me and I also do not want to belong to it. And this is not only my case. I can speak in the name of a lot of ATIME members. Here in Spain or in Catalonia I belong to a community that is called ATIME, I have been working for a long time in this association and I plan to continue doing this. I belong to this association and until today I am not prepared to belong to any political community.” (President of the association)
The homeland civic association *Asociación Amigos Pueblo Marroqui - Itran* was founded in 1998 with the objective of supporting deprived Moroccan towns like Errachidia, the administrative capital of the *Meknès-Tafilalet* region situated in north-central Morocco, bordering Algeria. The association registers around 20 members who pay a monthly quota of around 6 euros. Other sources of finance are the voluntarily contributions from Moroccan Muslim immigrants (the yearly humanitarian debt Muslims have within the Islamic religion) and the public subventions from the Barcelona’s City Hall, the Catalan local government, or Spanish and Catalan banks. Association’s reunions are organised in an establishment donated by a Catholic parish from Barcelona.

The association does not engage directly in *homeland politics* but rather indirectly via contacts maintained with various home country political parties in terms of voting rights for nationals living abroad or the political representation of nationals living abroad in the Moroccan parliament. Though at the time of the interviewing the external voting right was still in a stage of law project, various Moroccan political parties (for instance, the Islamic moderate and radical political parties, the Feminist party) have contacted with the association to explore to what extent this could engage in the organisation of electoral campaigns among Moroccan immigrants living in Spain.

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association’s activities are rather punctual (when somebody asks for help), and include informative and protest action on immigrant rights (informative stands and roundtables, legal derivation in terms of residence permits,

---

5 *Itran* signifies in the Arab language, star that represents the emblem of the Moroccan national scud. In this way the association emphasises its strong connection with Morocco.
manifestations and official letters, or opinion newspaper articles against immigrant mistreating at state borders or immigrant discrimination in the education system). In all these activities, the association collaborates with other (local or regional) immigrant associations like *Ibn Batuta*, Latin American immigrant associations (Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina), or with Spanish syndicates like UGT and CCOO.

The association engages mainly in *trans-local politics* like various local civic projects in areas like education (supporting the educational programme; buying school materials – notebooks, pencils, computers; financing public school transportation and residences for student living in remote towns or villages), women and children rights (providing women access to Internet; promoting equal education for girls and women) or health (providing medicine and medical instruments). All these projects are realised in collaboration with associations of teachers and other non-governmental associations from Errachidia, and universities and hospitals from Catalonia.

*Guineans Equatorial immigrant associations*

The *Asociación Cultural Rhombe - Comunidad Ndowe* was founded in 1983 at the initiative of students from Guinea Equatorial of the Ndowe ethnic origin, who came to study in Spain (Catalonia), and wanted to preserve and disseminate their culture. The association registers today around 200 members of the Ndowe community. The main objective of the association is the intercultural exchange between Catalan and Ndowe ethnic communities (organising Spanish language and African dance courses in collaboration with Barcelona’s City Hall and the Catalan local government). The

---

6 The Ndowe is one of the four tribes that co-exist in Guinea Equatorial along the Fang, Bubis, Anabonese, and Bujeba, and that lives on the coast.
association finances itself through a member quota, public subventions from Barcelona’s City Hall and the Catalan local government, and voluntarily contributions from Catalan non-governmental organisations and churches.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (legal counselling on the regularisation process; labour market formation and insertion; immigrant women discrimination) but with no support from home country government. In terms of *homeland politics*, there is a group inside of the association that dedicates itself to homeland human rights defence and that maintains strong contacts with opposition political parties in home country. The association involves in *trans-local politics* like financial help to young people from the Ndowe community who want to come and study in Spain or to civic projects directed to Ndowe infants in the nursing period and coordinated by a Spanish non-governmental association.

When asked about a possible transnational identification, the interviewer underlines her Guinean identity though she is aware of the strong Spanish influence from the time of the Spanish colonisation:

“We am a Guinean though I many times joke in my work that I am an exotic Spanish woman. I feel Guinean but I am a Spanish citizen. Many of my co-nationals in Guinea feel Spanish. My mother speaks perfect Spanish.” (Founder member of the association)
Pakistanis immigrant associations

The *Federació d’Associacions Pakistanesos a Catalunya* (FAPC) was founded in 2004 on 14th of August, the Pakistani Independence Day. The federation includes around 28 Pakistani associations, the majority from Catalonia, and registers around 190 members who pay a voluntarily monthly quota. Other sources of finance are the public subventions from the Barcelona’s City Hall and the Catalan bank *la Caixa*, the voluntarily contributions from Pakistani businessmen who reside in Catalonia and the money gathered from organised cultural activities.

The association maintains strong links with the Pakistani Embassy in Madrid (negotiations for establishing a Pakistani Consulate in Barcelona), the Pakistan International Airlines (negotiations for a direct flight from Islamabad to Barcelona), governmental institutions and organisations like the Catalan local government, the Catalan Institute for International Cooperation (ICCI), and non-governmental organisations like *Fons Catalans*, the Muslim Society, the Pakistani Cultural Centre, *Casa Asia*, the Pakistani socio-cultural association *Arman* (the president of the Pakistani Federation is also member of this socio-cultural association) and the *Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa de Dones Pakistaneses* (ACESOP).

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on home country politics (organised discussions with Pakistani politicians; the dissemination of three newspapers in Urdu with news from home country). It also involves indirectly in homeland politics through its members, many of them belonging to the *Liga Musulmana*, a political party that is part of the Pakistani government. At the same time,
immigrants’ families back-home decide their vote in national elections jointly with their family members living abroad:

“We are sending money to our families back home, so we are somehow seen by our families as somebody who can decide upon their lives.” (President of the association)

In terms of immigrant politics, the association engages in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (the regularisation process, residence permits, family reunification, discrimination in the labour market and education system, women discrimination, homeland legal documents like the national identification card and passport), often with the support of the Pakistani Embassy. It maintains strong contacts with the Socialist Spanish and Catalan parties (PSOE and PSC) in issues like the Catalan autonomous regime or immigrants’ right to vote.

The association does not involve in any form of trans-local politics though it is aware that all its members contribute on an individual basis to the socio-economic development of their country not only through family remittances but also with financial support for diverse civic projects. The association plans to participate in development and cooperation projects in Pakistan, but its possibilities to do so are quite low at the moment. However, the association has started to organise regular conferences to motivate investing opportunities in Pakistan.

In terms of a possible transnational identification, the president of the association recognises that the Pakistani culture is very connected with the Islamic religion and this does not help the integration of Pakistani immigrants into the Spanish/Catalan society.
The Pakistani immigrants should first try to understand and integrate into the destination society and then think in terms of dual or transnational belonging. From here comes also his reticence in regard to external voting rights for nationals living abroad.

The Pakistani cultural association *Idara Minhach Al Quoran* (e.g., the road to peace) was founded in 1996 at the initiative of a group of Pakistani immigrants who have been living for sometime in Barcelona and wanted to know better the Catalan culture while preserving and transmitting their own culture. The association registers around 870 members in Catalonia (though the majority of them reside in Barcelona) and does not belong to the Federation of Pakistani Associations in Catalonia. It has two full-time and three partial-time employees, and around three-four volunteers. The main sources of finance are the voluntary member quota and the voluntarily contributions from private sympathisers.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative and protest action on home country politics (organised discussions with politicians from home country; distribution of newspapers from home country; defence of external voting rights). It also maintains contact with and supports certain political parties from home country (many members of the association belong to a political party in home country).

The association also involves in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (legal counselling on residence permits and the regularisation process; labour market counselling and insertion; situations of cultural/religious discrimination), but with no support from home country government. In immigrant issues, the association collaborates with governmental organisations like the Catalan...
Parliament of Religions and other groups of inter-religious dialogue like Barcelona’s Inter-religions Centre and the religious charity entity Caritas, non-governmental organisations like Red Cross Catalonia and the Jaume Bofill Foundation, the Maghreb socio-cultural association Ibn Batuta, the Civic Centres of neighbourhoods like Raval and Ciutat Vella, the Catalan syndicate USOC, etc.

In terms of trans-local politics the association finances various civic projects in areas like health, education, and that are realised by non-governmental organisations from home country. It also sends humanitarian help in cases of natural disasters like, for example, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. When asked about a possible transnational political identification, the president of the association was quite sceptical about this:

“We do not have full political rights so it is impossible that we belong to two political communities. Our community is socio-cultural and religious. I define myself as a Catalan citizen of Pakistani origin because I have got the Spanish citizenship but I live in Catalonia that is an autonomous Spanish community. Well, in fact, I would rather say that I am a Catalan Muslim.” (President of the association)

The Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya (ATPC) was founded in the 90s with the objective of supporting the integration of Pakistani immigrants into the Catalan society. It registers around 300 members in Catalonia (200 in Barcelona), only men (the Pakistani women have a separate association), and it has an employed secretary. The main sources of finance are the voluntarily member quotas and the public subventions from Barcelona’s City Hall and the Catalan local government. The association is not a member of the Federation of Pakistani Associations in Catalonia
(FAPC) but belongs instead to the *Lliga per la laïcitat* (The laic league), a Catalan civic association promoted by diverse civic entities like syndicates and laic foundations, and in convention with the Catalan local government. The association sends periodical Internet newsletters to its members, with detailed information about all its activities.

The association engages mainly in *immigrant politics* like informative/formative and protest action on immigrant rights (residence permits and the regularisation process; family reunification; labour market specialisation and insertion; Catalan courses; legal counselling via the Catalan Information Centre for Immigrant workers, CITE; immigrant discrimination and human rights violation like life insecurity of Pakistani immigrants in the construction sector, cases of racism, or immigrants’ right to vote- the symbolic vote as a form of protest) with no support from home country government.

In all these activities, the association collaborates with Spanish and Catalan syndicates (CCOO, UGT, USOC), with governmental organisations like the Secretary of Linguistic Policy of the Catalan Government and the Consortium for Linguistic Normalisation, the civic entity *Òmnium Cultural* that promotes the Catalan language and identity, the non-governmental association *SOS Racisme Catalunya*, the Catalan socio-cultural Foundation Pere Ardiaca, Spanish left-wing parties like the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the United Left (IU), Catalan left-wing parties like the United and Alternative Left (EUia) and immigrant associations like the Association of Uruguayans in Catalonia, the Association of Ecuadorians in Catalonia, etc.

The association engages to a lesser extent in *homeland politics* like informative and protest action on homeland politics (weekly discussions on home country politics;
roundtables on political and human rights issues with academics or representatives from Pakistani syndicates or other associations like the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan-RAWA; signing campaigns and manifestations on aspects like family reunification and bureaucratic consular barriers, the necessity of establishing a Pakistani Consulate in Barcelona, or the military dictatorship in Pakistan). The president of the association writes opinion newspaper articles as a form of protest against the military dictatorship in Pakistan. Two newspapers in Urdu (mainly with news from Pakistan) are distributed periodically to the association’s members. Many Pakistani Muslim immigrants, members of the association, send money, on an individual basis, to different political parties in Pakistan via the mosques.

In terms of trans-national politics, the association does not engage in homeland civic projects, the Pakistani immigrants being accustomed to help individually their own families back home. However, in the case of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir-administered Pakistan, the association mobilised in order to send humanitarian help to necessitated people. A transnational identification seems quite odd and unrealistic for a group that encounters normally many legal barriers in terms of rights and participation in home country, and even movement between home and destination countries. At the same time, political activism is something unknown (or prohibited) for most Pakistani immigrants, the majority coming from the Pakistani province Punjab that is very much dominated by the Pakistani state armed forces.

The Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP) was founded in 2005 by a Pakistani woman with the objective of defending the rights of the Pakistani women living in Barcelona and to support their integration into the
Catalan society. The association registers around 100 members, the majority Pakistani women, and though it has applied for various public subventions it did not receive any help, as it does not focus on the Catalan language and culture but rather on counseling Pakistani women in aspects like education, health, women rights, etc. The President of the association organizes all activities with personal funds. The association maintains strong links with the Federació d’Associacions Pakistanesos a Catalunya (FAPC) though it is not part of it and with various nongovernmental organizations from Barcelona like Casal dels Infants del Raval, Tot Raval, Gavina, etc.

The association does not engage in any form of homeland politics because it does not approve the form of government in Pakistan. In terms of immigrant politics, the association engages in informative action on women rights and women discrimination but with no support from home country government (embassy/consulate). The association involves also in trans-local politics like humanitarian help (gathering and sending funds) in case of natural disasters (the earthquake in Pakistan). A transnational identification or participation results impossible for a group that feels marginalized and discriminated not only in its own country, but also in the destination country.

Senegalese immigrant associations

The Asociación Catalana de Residentes Senegaleses was founded in 1988 in support to newcomer Senegalese (reception, counselling and orientation). The association started also to assist its members, in body repatriations to Senegal or immigrant family bury in Senegal. This humanitarian orientation has increased the number of its members and its annual revenue. Development and cooperation in Senegal have become a central line of
action within the association. Its prospect is the establishment of a federation of Senegalese immigrants from different countries with the objective of improving the socio-economic conditions of Senegalese immigrants worldwide and of their families and peoples back home. At the present, the association finances itself through member quotas and public subventions from governmental institutions like Barcelona’s City Hall, the Catalan local government or the Catalan Agency for International Cooperation.

The association engages in homeland politics like informative action on the external voting process and homeland electoral campaigns. It also involves in immigrant politics like informative action on immigrant issues (for instance, temporary labour migration, the association acting as an intermediary between the Senegalese and Catalan authorities or syndicates’ position in terms of immigrant rights). Immigrant rights defence is another important area of action in this association (for instance, the 2006 events from Ceuta and Melilla when tons of people tried to climb up barbed wire fences over three meters high, using rudimentary stairs made by themselves; or Barcelona’s law on civic coexistence), in which it collaborates with non-governmental organisations like S.O.S. Racisme, Catalan and Spanish syndicates, African immigrant associations from Murcia and Alicante or from Belgium, France, and the USA, and other national origin immigrant associations in Catalonia or Barcelona like the Association de Mujeres Amazígas, Casal Argenti, the associations of immigrants from Uruguay, Guinea Equatorial and Magreb.

In terms of trans-local politics, the association participates in civic projects in home country in various areas like education, health, local development, etc. The association is aware that a country’s development is something structural and that political change
is needed in order to perform all these socio-economic improvements. The association defines itself as something broader than a purely immigrant counselling association:

“Our association is not something isolated, only solving out immigrant legal documents. We are something more than this. We are part of the citizenship from both countries. Our association’s legal status permits us a higher civic implication and participation that allows us to be attentive to everything is happening here and there…In personal terms, I define myself as a citizen of the world. I am from Senegal, I migrated to South Africa, then to France and now I am here, but maybe tomorrow I go to Canada, USA or back to Senegal. The world in principle should not have any barriers: if goods can circulate freely why persons cannot do the same? Moreover, the right to free movement is a basic human right though it is not respected in practice. I also define myself as a Catalan citizen because I live here, I pay my taxes here and I have all my life here. I identify myself totally with Catalonia but I have my own cultural identity…In fact, a culturally diverse person is a rich person.” (Secretary of the association)

Nigerian immigrant associations

The Asociación de Nigerianos de Cataluña was founded in 1980 at the initiative of Nigerian students who came to study in Spain (Catalonia). Today, the association defends and supports the rights and interests of all Nigerians living in Catalonia. The association registers around 320 members and functions as a federation of Nigerian associations in Catalonia. It maintains links with the Federation of Nigerian Immigrant Associations in Spain (Madrid) and finances itself through voluntarily member quotas
and public subventions from Barcelona’s City Hall or the Catalan local government. It has one employed person that is the secretary of the association.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (immigrants’ right to vote, immigrant discrimination or human rights violation in the labour market or the education system), or on whatever other social, economic, and political aspect of immigrant integration into the Catalan society. In these immigrant aspects, it collaborates with the Nigerian Embassy in Madrid with which it also organises each year the celebration of the Nigerian Independence Day. In terms of *homeland politics*, the association defends and militates for the external voting rights while it does not engage in any from of *trans-local politics*.

*Cameroonian immigrant associations*

The association *Agrupació de Camerunesos i Cameruneses Residents a Barcelona* was founded in 1985 by a group of Cameroonian political refugees. The association’s members have descended from 50 to 15 since then. At the beginning, the association involved in a series of activities like human/immigrant rights defence and protest action against homeland political regime and the imprisonment of political dissidents. Today, the association’s main objectives are the integration of Cameroonian immigrants in Barcelona while preserving and disseminating their African culture, and the development of a dynamic of solidarity between the African immigrants. Its main sources of finance are a member quota of around 30 euros per month and public subventions from Barcelona’s City Hall.
The association engages in *immigrant politics* like protest action on immigrant rights in collaboration with non-governmental associations like *S.O.S Racisme*, Red Cross Catalonia, and immigrant associations from Cameroon, Philippine, Senegal, Congo, Morocco, etc., but with no support from home country government. It also maintains strong contacts with and supports the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC). In terms of *homeland politics*, the association, though it is aware of the authoritarian regime in Cameroon, does not take almost any action against it (except a slight protest in defence of homeland human rights) because of a feeling of impotence:

“We can not do anything against this from here. We could write an article in a newspaper but it would not serve for anything. We do not have the power to do anything. We would like to do something, for example, I am a member of a Cameroon organisation fighting for democracy, but this is an opposition party that fights from abroad, it does not have any legal validity, so it can not do anything in Cameroon…Many members of the association belong to this party but there is always a danger to affirm this, especially if you plan to visit or return to Cameroon. I have not gone home since I came that is 25 years ago.” (President of the association)

The association does not engage in any form of *trans-local politics* mainly because of a lack of resources. Whatever the association can gather up goes to the Cameroonian immigrants living in Barcelona.

The *Associació Cultural Adna Bassa* was founded in 1996 as a cultural association in solidarity with the *Bassa* ethnic group. It registers around 50 members who pay their monthly member quota and collect additional funds from organised cultural events. The
association focuses mainly on the socio-cultural integration of the Bassa ethnic group in Barcelona. It organises each year and together with other African associations a cultural festival in order to disseminate the African (Bassa) culture.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative action on immigrant rights (legal documents and permits, integration in the labour market, etc.) but with no support from home country government. In terms of *homeland politics* the association does not perform any activity, as it does not agree with the political regime in Cameroon:

“We do not carry out any activity in our country because we do not agree with the political situation in Cameroon. In fact, we do not approve any political system in Africa.” (President of the association)

The association does not engage in any form of *translocal politics* though it plans to do so in the nearby future. As such, it foresees to participate in various development and cooperation projects in collaboration with the Catalan non-governmental organisation acting in Cameroon, *Agermanament Sense Fronteres*.

2. **General Profile of the Sample of Immigrant Associations that Engage in Political Transnationalism**

All immigrant associations sampled were formal non-profit associations registered officially in various databases of the Catalan local government or the Barcelona’s City Hall. All these immigrant associations were located in the metropolitan area of
Barcelona. From the 41 immigrant associations initially sampled we finally could interview only 24.

From a total of 24 immigrant associations interviewed, 22 of them (91.7%) engage in some form of political transnationalism (homeland politics, immigrant politics and/or trans-local politics). Only two of them (8.3%), in particular, the Panama Association in Catalonia and the Cameroonian cultural association Adna Bassa do not involve in any form of political transnationalism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Politically transnational immigrant associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Twenty-one immigrant associations (87.5%) engage in homeland politics, eighteen of them (75.0%) in trans-local politics and only six (25.0%) in immigrant politics (see Tables 2, 3 and 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Homeland politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Immigrant politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Trans-local politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents a characterisation of the immigrant associations interviewed by forms of political transnationalism they employ. Only four immigrant associations, in particular, *Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona, Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña, Casa Charrua* and *Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos*, engage in all three forms of political transnationalism (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics). The majority of them employ various forms of political transnationalism.

Table 5. Forms of political transnationalism by immigrant association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Immigrant associations</th>
<th>Homeland politics</th>
<th>Immigrant politics</th>
<th>Trans-local politics</th>
<th>Political Transnationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Asociacion de Uruguyos en Cataluña</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Casa de Uruguay</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Casa Charrua</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Asociación Panamá Cataluña</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Asociacion Cultural Alma Peruana</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Federacion de Peruanos sin Fronteras</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Centro Peruano de Barcelona</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Associació Catalana-Equatorian per a la integració i el</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Association Name</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Associació d’Equatorians a Catalunya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación -Ecuador Llaetacaru</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroqui - Iran</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Asociació Cultural Rhombe</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Associació de Treballadors Pakistanos a Catalunya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quoran</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Federació d’Associacions Pakistanos a Catalunya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Agrupació Cultural Adna Bassa</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Agrupació Camerunes Residents a Catalunya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 presents an initial profile of our sample of immigrant associations that involve in some form of political transnationalism. Each of the previously selected country is represented by at least one immigrant association. Though we looked for a maximum variation in the variable type of immigrant association we could not interview in the end all the recorded immigrant associations. A low variation in this variable will not permit us to make any generalised assumption though at a first glance we can notice that the predominant type are those that define themselves as “social” (12 of the total 22) providing legal, labour, educational and health counselling, and other services to immigrants in Catalonia (Barcelona), but which are also engaged in projects, mainly at a national level, in their home country. These are commonly better-funded associations
since municipal and regional governments usually finance their budget. Examples appear in Table 7 which include such immigrant associations as the Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona, Asociació de Uruguayos en Cataluña, Associació d’Equatorians a Catalunya, Asociació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya, Asociació de Treballadors Pakistaneses a Catalunya, Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos, etc.

Table 6: A Profile of Immigrant Associations that Engage in Political Transnationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social agency</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of projects in country of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of activity in country of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/schools</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old people/children</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local development</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of involvement in home country national elections</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Each national election</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of involvement in diverse</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may be engaged in projects at various levels or might not be engaged in any type of project in home country.

8 Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may be engaged in multiple projects in country of origin.
Second in importance are the “civic” entities (5 of the total 22) that pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country. Examples appear in Table 7 such as Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina, Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos, Casa de Uruguay, Casa Charrúa, Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras. Next are cultural associations that attempt primarily to preserve and disseminate their home culture in the destination country, and which are lesser engaged in their home country. Table 7 provides examples such as the Asociación Cultural Alma Peruana, Asociación Cultural Rhombe, Associació Cultural Idara Munhach Al Quoran, etc. Hometown committees represent a small minority of the sample (1 of the total 22) and their scope of action is primarily local. The only example that appears in Table 7 is the Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroqui Itran.

Table 7. Examples of Politically Transnational Immigrant Associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Year of foundation</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Salaried employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may receive multiple sources of funds.
Table 6 also shows that the prime philanthropic concerns of the majority of these associations belong to education and health in their home communities and countries, followed by local development initiatives (agriculture, water, electricity, employment,...
and housing), care of children and old people (orphanages and retirement houses), and human rights defense. The level of regularity of immigrant associations’ involvement in political transnationalism is quite low which, according to Portes’s definition of transnationalism, impede us to draw generalized conclusions about this type of political participation. Table 6 shows that only six immigrant associations (27.3%) involve with regularity in home country national elections (nine of them or 40.9% both regularly and occasionally), three immigrant associations participate each year in diverse civic projects in home country (16 of them or 72.7% both regularly and occasionally) and four immigrant associations (18.2%) organize occasionally cultural festivals in their home country.

Fifteen immigrant associations (68.2%) that engage (regularly and occasionally) in political transnationalism were founded beginning with the 90s, in a moment when economic migration to Spain has started to increase considerably. Only seven of them (31.8%) were founded before 1990, mostly by immigrants coming for studies like Centro Peruano de Barcelona, Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya, and Asociación Cultural Rhombe de Guinea Equatorial, or as political refugees like Casa de Uruguay and Agrupació de Camerunesos i Cameruneses Residents a Barcelona (see Tables 7 and 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8. Year of foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between 1960-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between 1990-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data on membership (both regular and occasional) indicate wide dispersal, with associations ranging from a handful of committed activists (like 4 members) to hundreds and even mils of members (like 7,200 members). As such, ten immigrant associations (47.6%) register a relatively small number of members (around 100), nine of them (42.9%) register between 101 and 1,000 members, and only two of them (9.5%), in particular, two Ecuadorian associations, register more than 1,001 members (see Table 9).

**Table 9. Number of members (regular and occasional)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid between 1-100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between 101-1000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between 1001-8000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only five immigrant associations (22.7%) that engage (regularly and occasionally) in political transnationalism such as *Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona, Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya, Associació de Treballadors Pakistaneses a Catalunya, Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quran* and *Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya* have at least one salaried employee. The seventeen left (77.3%) do not have paid staff because of a low monthly budget (see Tables 7 and 10).

**Table 10. Salaried employees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid no</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In sum, the descriptive hypothesis that not all immigrant associations are politically transnational has been validated by the results of our research. Though from the 24 immigrant associations interviewed, a majority of them (22) develop some form of political transnationalism, mainly homeland politics and trans-local politics, only few of them do this on a regular manner. Those immigrant associations that engage in political transnationalism tend to define themselves in terms of “social” associations focusing on both immigrant issues and home country, most of them are founded after 1990, are better-funded associations, and tend to pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country, particularly in areas like education and health.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


McAdam, D., J.D. McCarthy, and M.N. Zald (1996) (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


## Annex 1. Population by sex and nationality. City of Barcelona 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality by country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.612.237</td>
<td>766.810</td>
<td>845.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>1.421.981</td>
<td>665.650</td>
<td>756.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.364.146</td>
<td>635.035</td>
<td>729.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.933</td>
<td>7.481</td>
<td>5.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.274</td>
<td>4.066</td>
<td>4.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.064</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>2.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4.733</td>
<td>2.436</td>
<td>2.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.K.</td>
<td>4.378</td>
<td>2.549</td>
<td>1.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3.390</td>
<td>1.250</td>
<td>2.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.492</td>
<td>1.335</td>
<td>1.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.137</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>1.691</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.644</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1.339</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1.146</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leetonia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chipre</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>21.862</td>
<td>14.651</td>
<td>7.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>15.180</td>
<td>9.913</td>
<td>5.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1.945</td>
<td>1.507</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauricia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICA</td>
<td>126.011</td>
<td>57.376</td>
<td>68.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>14.406</td>
<td>31.707</td>
<td>17.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>8.674</td>
<td>6.915</td>
<td>14.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>7.679</td>
<td>6.589</td>
<td>14.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>6.281</td>
<td>6.762</td>
<td>13.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>6.035</td>
<td>3.893</td>
<td>9.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4.531</td>
<td>2.782</td>
<td>7.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2.698</td>
<td>2.918</td>
<td>5.616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>3.134</td>
<td>2.378</td>
<td>5.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2.876</td>
<td>2.610</td>
<td>5.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1.986</td>
<td>1.674</td>
<td>3.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1.742</td>
<td>1.879</td>
<td>3.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>1.581</td>
<td>1.577</td>
<td>3.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>2.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>1.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA</td>
<td>13.075</td>
<td>28.909</td>
<td>41.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1.404</td>
<td>13.337</td>
<td>14.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5.029</td>
<td>5.886</td>
<td>10.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipines</td>
<td>3.657</td>
<td>2.933</td>
<td>6.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>2.901</td>
<td>3.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japon</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>1.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1.317</td>
<td>1.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Correa</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liban</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Democratic Republic of Correa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEANIA</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATELESS</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 2: Interview guide

I. Origins, types and structure of immigrant associations that might engage in transnational practices and activities.

1. Origins of the associations, their members, and the leaders themselves: national/ethnic origin.
2. Number of members (and occasional members).
3. Types of immigrant associations: civic; hometown committee; socio-cultural; religious; etc.
4. Scope of projects in country of origin: local; regional; national.
5. Focus of activity in country of origin: education/schools; health; children/old people (orphanages, retiring houses); human rights; local development (employment/agriculture/water/electricity/housing/communitarian centre), etc.
6. Frequency of association's involvement in home country national elections (organisation of external voting; information on electoral campaigns): never; each national election; occasionally.
6. Frequency of civic events sponsored by the association: never; occasionally; yearly.
7. Frequency of festivals sponsored by the association: never; occasionally; yearly.
8. Monetary funds (per year).
9. Monthly expenses: no expenses; less than 1.000 euros; less than 5.000 euros; 5.000 euros or more.
10. Salaried employees: none; less than 5; less than 10.
11. Sources of funds: members’ dues; governmental institutions; foundations and non-governmental institutions; private companies; churches; association’s own cultural activities; etc.

10. Social networks: a) size: b) spatial scope (local, regional, national, international).

II. Types of transnational political activities and practices of immigrant associations:

1. Homeland politics - political activities (practices) of immigrant associations, which belong to domestic, or foreign policy of exit country like opposition or support for homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals.

- Voting: Does the association engage in the electoral and voting process in home country? If yes, in which way? (informative action on the external voting process and electoral campaigns in home country like reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs, organisation of the voting process together with the consulate, etc.)

- Contacts with home country political parties or monetary contribution to their electoral campaigns: Does the association maintain contacts with certain political parties from home country? Does it send monetary contributions to different political parties (periodically or in the campaign period)?

- Informative action on homeland politics (reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or bulletins, web logs, etc.): Does the association organise informative or debating activities (discussions) on national and foreign policy issues of home country? Does the association organise conferences or
roundtable discussions with social and political leaders from home country in order to inform the nationals living abroad about homeland politics?

- Forms of protest (petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.) on particular home country politics such as form of government, certain national or foreign policy measures, etc.: Does the association involve in protest activities like lobbying the government of destination country to take a stand against certain political issues in home country? Does it involve in lawful demonstrations in order to prove its disagreement with certain national or foreign policy measures of home country? Does it engage in the defence of external voting rights?

- Homeland human rights defence: Does the association take active action (official letters or petitions to international organisations of human rights; lawful demonstrations; disseminating information through leaflets and reunions; etc.) in cases of human rights violations in home country?

2. Immigrant politics – political activities that immigrant associations undertake to better the socio-economic situation of their national group in destination country and that are supported by home country.

- Support for (contact with) particular destination country political party that favours immigrant rights: Does the association support or maintain contacts with certain political parties from destination country? Is there a general political orientation among association’s members?

- Forms of protest in defence of immigrant/human rights (press conferences, petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.): Does the association
engage in protest action like lawful demonstrations or lobbying the government of the destination country (with the support of home government/consulate or embassy) in defence of immigrant rights?

- Informative action on immigrant rights (reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs): Does the association organise informative activities like reunions, conferences, etc. in relation to different immigrant issues?

3. Trans-local politics – initiatives from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates:

- Giving money (or skill support) to civic projects in home country: Does the association participate in diverse civic projects in home country, and in what areas?

- Humanitarian support in case of natural disasters or situations of extreme poverty/economic necessity: Does the association send money or other supplies in cases of natural disaster in home country?

III. Intensity of transnational political practices and activities of immigrant associations - the more a transnational political practice is institutionalised and has migrants involved and the more they move around to realise it, the narrower it is understood to be.
1. Broad: more occasional practices linking migrants and places of origins like (occasional) participation in meetings or events (Itzigsohn et al. 1999); includes both regular and occasional activities (Portes, 2003).

2. Narrow (or strict): institutionalised and continuous activities among immigrants like actual membership of parties or hometown associations (Itzigsohn et al. 1999); includes only regular participation (Portes 2003).
Questionnaire: State policies directed at emigrants that are adopted by individual states

This is a questionnaire by which we want to recollect information about the political measures that states develop and implement, many times through their diplomatic services abroad, in order to attract and maintain the loyalty of their citizens living abroad. Please mark with an “X” the right answer in the appropriate space or, if you have a different answer, write it down where the category “others” appears. We guarantee you the total confidentiality of the answers. The time estimated for filling in the questionnaire is of 15 minutes. Thank you very much for your collaboration.

1. Country: ..................................................................................................................

2. Diplomatic service:
   a) Embassy [ ]
   b) Consulate [ ]

3. Did your government adopt some of these political/institutional reforms to support its emigrants living abroad?
   a) Assistance units in order to deal with emergency situations.
      Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
   b) ‘Mobile consulates’ designed to bring consular services ‘to the people’
      (periodical office hours at churches or other convenient venues).
      Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
   c) Agencies fostering links and mutual understanding between nationals on both sides of the border. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
   d) Agencies in charge of state involvement with hometown organisations and with implementing the services that states offer to emigrants.
      Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
e) Extending the tasks of the embassies and consulates: sections in charge of extending protection and legal advice to emigrants; staff persons linked to the agencies in charge of state involvement with hometown organisations, etc.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

f) Cabinet-level office functioning primarily as the government’s voice on emigration-related issues. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

g) National Council for National Communities Abroad, located normally under the Secretariat of Foreign Relations. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

h) Office of Diasporic Affairs. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

i) Ministry for Nationals Living Abroad. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

j) Census of the estimated nationals abroad. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

k) Others ……………………………………………………………………………..

4. Does your government implement some of these measures to motivate the economic potential of its nationals living abroad?

a) Measures to foster the development of hometown and home-state organisations that raise funds for public projects in home country.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Offices for Service to Nationals Abroad within state governments, which handle the matching-fund programmes whereby state officials match remittances sent by emigrants to support public work projects.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Publishing regular reports comparing the exchange and service rates of different agencies and offering higher interest rates for money deposited.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Directing remittances into productive investments while involving local and state governments. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

e) Mutual Funds for Investment in Emerging Enterprises intended to offer support and investment advice to Nationals abroad who hope to open business at home.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

f) Database of the technical skills of Nationals Abroad.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
g) Conferences organised by consulates or embassies in order to discuss work options in a country for national students in various areas (science and technology). Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

h) Efforts to foster investment in home country by supporting the creation of home-province organisations (supporting fundraising and resource-gathering efforts; offsetting some of the shipping costs).
Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

i) Others ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

5. What type of nationality or double citizenship (and external voting rights) offers your government to its national living in Spain?

a) Double nationality/citizenship. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Full dual citizenship. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Selective, with specific signatories. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Extension of dual nationality rather than dual citizenship.
Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

e) Permitting the vote of emigrants (including those who are naturalised in the receiving country) for state officials as well as run as candidates for proportional representation seats in the state legislature (mayoral offices in the state or candidate lists for federal deputy).
Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

f) Emigrants allowed voting from abroad (by mail or through consulates/embassies).
Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

g) Emigrants having to return to the home country in order to vote.
Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

h) Others ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
6. Does your government (through its diplomatic services) support some collective action to promote dual citizenship?

a) Conferences organised by emigrant activists or other agencies to promote constitutional reforms allowing dual citizenship.
   Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

b) Pro-Vote Movements for Emigrants Living Abroad (demand of emigrant activists or from other agencies). Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

c) Others .................................................................

7. Does your government (through its diplomatic services) realise some of these state services to promote the education of its nationals living abroad?

a) Programmes that provide literacy training and primary and secondary schooling for adults through its consulates. Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

b) Sending books and advisers to train educators in receiving countries, in order to obtain high school degrees equivalence from abroad.
   Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

c) The Document for Transference of the Emigrant Bi-national Student designed to facilitate a student’s passage from one country to the other without having to repeat grades. Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

d) Pilot programmes offering a condensed version of the high-school equivalence course, so that emigrants could earn a high school degree from abroad.
   Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

e) Distributing books to bilingual education programmes in the region.
   Yes [ ]  NO [ ]  DNK/NA [ ]

f) Others .................................................................
8. Does your government (through its diplomatic services) offer some of these other state services to its emigrants?

a) Supporting business networks or non-governmental pilot projects designed to promote small business development in the emigrant community.

   Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Revising customs policies such that return migrants can import their belongings, including one car per household, without paying taxes (customs officers at each consulate to help migrants complete the required paperwork before they leave the receiving country). Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Government programmes for return migrants that allow them to buy housing units built and partially financed by the government specifically for returnees (prospective buyers take out mortgages with designated receiving country banks). Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Others ..........................................................

9. What type of cultural/symbolic policies does your government develop to strengthen the feeling of belonging or the cultural identity of its nationals living abroad?

a) Contests to promote an understanding of homeland among second generation (creative-writing contests among second-generation immigrants to begin compiling a literature of the diaspora). Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Cultural festivals. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Sporting events in communities overseas. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Allocating funds to establish cultural houses in areas with sizeable emigrant populations. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
e) Promotion of hometown organizations and efforts to encourage remittances.
Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]
f) Others …………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Contact person and telephone number:
Annex 4. Sample of immigrant associations

A. Countries with high level of socio-economic development and high, medium and low political opportunity structures: a) Argentina; b) Uruguay; c) Republic of Panama.

1. Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina – interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934434392
E-mail: mtdveronbarcelona@yahoo.es
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Cristina, member of the association
Interview: 20.05.2008. Casa de la Solidaridad.

2. Casal Argentí a Barcelona – not interviewed

Address: C/Àusias Marc 161, Bajos/Izquierda, 08013 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934852517 / 934110484 / 647217664 /665 46 42 86
E-mail: info@casalargentino.org; presidente@casalargentino.org
Website: www.casalargentino.org
Focus of interest: casales extranjeros; immigration and ethnic minorities; social participation; labour market insertion.
Contact person: Diego Arcos, president of the association

Note: We contacted various times with the president of the association who asked for an interviewing offer by e-mail. In the end, he accepted to be interviewed but only for a payment of 25 euros. As the participation in the research is voluntarily for everybody, we did not accept his request.

3. Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona – interviewed

Address: C/Nou de Sant Francesc 15, 08002 Barcelona
Telephone number: 654691682 / 931924114
E-mail: redsolidariaben@yahoo.es
Website: www.redsolidariabarcelona.org
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Javier Garcia Bonomi, president of the association and also of the Federation of Latin-American entities in Catalonia – Fedelatina (www.fedelatina.org)
Interview: 17.06.2006, association’s venue.

4. Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos – interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 610303757
E-mail: ctabarcelona@argentina.com
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Joan, president of the association
Interview: 20.06.2006, president’s house.

5. Unión de Argentinos en Cataluña – not interviewed

Address: C/Sant Salvador 96, Baixos, 08024 Barcelona
Telephone number: 932370693
E-mail: unarca@yahoo.com.ar
Website: www.uniondeargentinosencatalunya.com
Focus of interest:

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number and the e-mail do not function and the association does not figure at the indicated direction. Various neighbors could not tell us anything about this association.

6. Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña (AUC) – interviewed

Address: C/Olzinelles 30, Baixos, 08014 Barcelona
Telephone number: 933225271 / 679903818 / 933311007 / 605625202
E-mail: auc@uruguayosencatalunya.com
Website: www.uruguayosencatalunya.com
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Romulo Correa, president of the association (mobile phone: 666352247)
Interview: 07.06.2006, association’s venue.

7. Casa/Amigos de Uruguay – interviewed

Address: C/Major 93, Baix 3º, 08860 Castelldefels, Barcelona
Telephone number: 934531903
Contact person: Jose Luis Caban, president of the association (mobile phone: 607476496)
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Interview: 19.06.2006, a bar-terrace.

8. Casa Charrua Uruguay – interviewed

Address: Av. 301, No.24, A 3º-2º, 08860 Castelldefels, Barcelona
Telephone number: 936642794
E-mail: info@casacharrua.org
Website: www.casacharrua.org
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Ernesto Ducloson, president of the association (mobile phone: 630507320)
Interview: 08.06.2006, president’s workplace in the locality of Prat de Llobregat.
9. **Asociación Panama Cataluña – interviewed**

Address: C/ Concilio de Trento 13, 8e 3a. Esc.5, 08018 Barcelona
Telephone number: 609098259
E-mail: nieves.martos@coac.net
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Luis Nieves Quintana, president of the association
Interview: 22.06.2006, president’s workplace.

B. **Countries with moderate socio-economic development and high, medium and low political opportunity structures: a) Peru; (Colombia) b) Ecuador; Morocco; c) Equatorial Guinea; Pakistan.**

10. **Asociación Solidaria con las Mujeres Peruanas en el Extranjero (ASOMIPEX) – not interviewed**

Address: C/ Casp 38, pral., 08018 Barcelona
Telephone number: no
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: …

Note: No contact data, except the address. The association used to gather at the venue of the association *Ca la Dona* (tel. no. 934127161), but after a while it did not show up anymore.

11. **Asociació Cultural Alma Peruana – interviewed**

Address: C/ Olzinelles 30, Baixos, 08014 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934497363
E-mail: alma_peruana@hotmail.com
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Miriam Cabrera, president of the association (mobile phone: 617600859)
Interview: 13.06.2006, association’s venue.

12. **Asociación Peruanos sin Fronteras – interviewed**

Address: C/ Viladomat 51, 4º, E-3, 08015 Barcelona
Telephone number: 935393014
E-mail: no
Website: [www.radiolibertadmundo.com](http://www.radiolibertadmundo.com) (Internet direction of the radio programme *La Voz del Inmigrante*)
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Jorge Guibert Alba, president of the association
Interview: 17.06.2006, a cafè-bar closed to the president’s workplace on the Gran Vía Street

13. Centro Peruano de Barcelona (CPB) – interviewed
Address: Av. Diagonal 441, 5E, 08036 Barcelona
Telephone number: 933235734
E-mail: cpb@comb.es; centroperuanobcn@gmail.com
Website: www.terra.es/personal/cperubcn
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Alicia, president of the association (mobile phone: 645649483)
Interview: 7.06.2006, association’s venue.

14. Peru Alternativa – not interviewed
Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934434392
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities

Note: We could not establish any contact with the association. The other Peruvian associations interviewed told us that this association does not exist anymore. The same answer we received from the coordinator of the association Casa de la Solidaridad where this immigrant association figures as a member.

15. Associació Catalano-Equatoriana per a la Integració i el Desenvolupament - interviewed
Address: Av. Meridiana 129, 1r 2a, 08026 Barcelona
Telephone number: 607311415 / 676274527
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Belgica Garcia Dueñas, president of the association
Interview: 14.06.2006, president’s house.

16. Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya – interviewed
Address: C/Antonio Machado 24, Barcelona
Telephone number: 627600228
E-mail: oso_em_cota_bcn@hotmail.com (delivery failure)
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Jose Vera, president of the association
17. Asociación Catalana Ecuatoriana de Mujeres Intercambio Cultural – not interviewed

Address: C/Reina Cristina 8, 3r 1a, 08003 Barcelona
Telephone number: 933153127 / 934265589 / 933297058
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: …

Note: The official presentation letter was returned and the telephone numbers do not function. Other Ecuadorian associations told us that this association does not exist anymore.

18. Asociacion Immigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación Ecuador Llactacaru - interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 619128116
E-mail: llactacaru@llacta.org / ecuador-llactacaru@llacta.org
Website: www.llacta.org/organiz/llactacaru
Focus of interest: casales extranjeros; immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Miguel Victor Chavarria, president of the association
Interview: 16.06.2006, association’s venue.

19. Associació Amical d'Emigrants Marroquins a Catalunya – not interviewed

Address: C/Jerosalem 32, 1º-2º; C/Tallers 55, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934416826 / 934120385 / 651473481 / 932701376(7)
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities; sport; linguistic formation; information and orientation
Contact person: Abdul Samad

Note: The official presentation letter was returned. We spoke with Abdul who did not know if the association still exist or not.

20. Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Cataluña (ATIME-Catalunya) – interviewed

Address: C/Blasco de Garay, 26, local 1, 08004 Barcelona
Telephone number: 933249522
E-mail: atimecat@atime.es
Website: www.atime.es / http://webs.ono.com/egviel/index.htm
Focus of interest: information and orientation; labour market insertion; intercultural mediation; linguistic interpretation; social participation; sensibilization; social services
Contact person: Kamal Benbrahim, president of the association  
Interview: 17.05.2006, association’s venue.

21. Associació sociocultural NAHDA del Colectivo Marroquí en Catalunya – not interviewed

Address: C/Basses de Sant Pere 1, 08003 Barcelona  
Telephone number: 93 268 26 46  
E-mail: no  
Website: no  
Focus of interest: social participation

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number does not function and the association does not figure at the indicated direction.

22. Associació Cultural Dar El Farah – not interviewed

Address: C/Mestre Serrano 15, BX, 08906 L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona  
Telephone number: 687206662  
E-mail: jeanbosco.botsho@campus.uab.es  
Website: no  
Focus of interest: no  
Contact person: Jean Bosco

Note: After various failed attempts, we could get in contact with the former president who told us that this association does not exist anymore.

23. Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí Itran – interviewed

Address: C/De Casanova, 175 baixos, 08036 Barcelona  
Telephone number: 932630842 / 636225985  
E-mail: itran_marruecos@yahoo.com  
Website: no  
Focus of interest: …  
Contact person: Francesc-Xavier Marin i Torné, secretary of the association (E-mail: xaviermt@blanquerna.url.edu); Alami, president of the association (E-mail: alami3@hotmail.com; Mobile phone: 636225985)  
Interview: 23.06.2006, the café-bar of the Pompeu Fabra University.

24. Associació d'Estudiants Marroquins – not interviewed

Address: C/Nonell 8, 2n 3a, 08290 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona  
Telephone number: 676351779  
E-mail: fati-fleur1@caramail.com  
Website: no  
Focus of interest: …  
Contact person: Fatima, former president of the association

Note: We contacted with the former president who told us that the association does not function since two years ago.
25. Associació Unió Marroquina-Catalana d'Educació i Cultura – not interviewed

Address: C/Santa Coloma 82, 08913 Badalona, Barcelona
Telephone number: 933871340
E-mail: assocuniomarroquina@badalona.lamalla.net
Website: no
Focus of interest: integration and support of the Magrebi society

Note: We could not establish any contact with them. The telephone number and the e-mail do not function.

26. Associació Socio-Cultural Riebapua Comunidad Bubi de Guinea Equatorial – not interviewed

Address: C/Pere Verges 1, 08020 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934785953 / 932852016 / 934785953
E-mail: riebapua@eresmas.com
Website: www.terra.es/personal8/icparras
Focus of interest: culture and art; immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: president of the association (mobile phone: 639076924)

Note:
- Llame varias veces al presidente (639076924) de esta asociación para establecer una entrevista;
- Al final, el presidente me respondió muy enfadado que no tiene tiempo para estas cosas;

27. Associació d'Estudiants i Joves de Guinea Equatorial – not interviewed

Address: C/Assaonadors 26, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
Telephone number: 93 268 41 75
E-mail: aejgecat@aejge.org / info@aejge.org / aejgecat@terra.es
Website: http://www.aejge.org
Focus of interest: culture; education; sensibilization
Contact person: Gladys Echeverri / Eusebio Nguma, coordinator of the association

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number does not function and they do not respond at any e-mail. A neighbour told us that this association does not exist anymore.

28. Asociación de Mujeres E’Waiso Ipola (Guinea Ecuatorial) – not interviewed

Address: C/Casp 38, pral., 08010 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934127161 / 934127701 / 626413034
E-mail: caladona@pangea.org
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Remei Sipi, president of the association
Note: We contacted various times with the president of the association but she refused categorically to be interviewed.

29. Asociación Cultural Viyil (Guinea Ecuatorial) – not interviewed

Address: C/Sant Climent 5, 4rt 2a, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934424086
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: casales extranjeros; immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Melchor Perez

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number does not function. A neighbour told us that this association does not exist anymore.

30. Associació Cultural Rhombe (Comunidad Ndowe de Guinea Ecuatorial) – interviewed

Address: C/Comte d'Urgell 251, 6è 1a, 08036 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934590357 / 934307579 / 935890766
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Nati, member of the association
Interview: 15.06.2006, a member’s house.

31. Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya (ATPC) – interviewed

Address: C/Robadors 11, 08002 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934124123 / 654121302
E-mail: atp20042@hotmail.com
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Persona de contacto: Javed Ilyas, president of the association (mobile phone: 654121302); Susana Mayoral, secretary of the association (mobile phone: 653814341)
Interview: 26.05.2006, association’s venue.

32. Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quoran (Pakistan) – interviewed

Address: C/Arc del Teatre 19, Baixos, 08001 Barcelona
Telephone number: 933177123 / 669090031
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Mohamed Iqbal, president of the association
Interview: 06.06.2006, a café-bar close to the association’s venue
33. Federació Associacions Pakistaneses Catalunya (FAPC) – interviewed

Address: C/Tiradors 9, Bajos, Barcelona
Telephone number: 627346163
E-mail: alshi@hotmail.com
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Saquib Tahir, president of the association
Interview: 20.06.2006, association’s venue.

34. Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP) – interviewed

Address: C/Rambla 116, Prl./1ª , Barcelona
Telephone: 647573583
E-mail: acesop786@yahoo.es
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Huma Jamshed, president of the association
Interview: 31.05.2006, a café-bar close to the president’s workplace.

C. Countries with low socio-economic development and high, medium and low political opportunity structures: a) Senegal; b) Nigeria; c) Cameroon.

35. Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos – interviewed

Address: C/Comerç 42, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
Telephone number: 686060662
E-mail: associaciosenegal@yahoo.es / associacioesenegalesos@yahoo.es
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Amadou Bocar Sam, secretary of the association
Interview: 01.02.2006, a Senegalese restaurant.

36. Associació Diakha Mandina (Senegal) – not interviewed

Address: C/Argimon 8, 08032 Barcelona
Telephone number: 933588988
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Cumeras Jodiokapy

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The association does not figure at the indicated direction.
37. Associació de Residents Senegalesos del Vallès Occidental – not interviewed

Address: C/Comerc 42, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
Telephone number: 686060662
E-mail: abocarsam@yahoo.es
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Amadou Bocar Sam

Note: This association is a branch of the Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos, It does not function separately.

38. Associacio Nigeriana de Catalunya – interviewed

Address: C/Ginebra 32-36, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
Telephone number: 639458804/ 933710120 / 933197777
E-mail: interbizarrakis@hotmail.com (president’s workplace, Interbiz Tourism)
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Joseph Osariemen Okuyande, interim president
Interview: 27.06.2006, association’s venue.

39. Comunidad Igbo de Nigerianos en Catalunya – not interviewed

Address: C/Mallorca 425-433, 5 e, 08014 Barcelona
Telephone number: no
E-mail: iyjama@yahoo.com
Website: no
Focus of interest: …

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The e-mail direction does not function. A neighbour told us that this association does not exist anymore.

40. Associació Cultural Adna Bassa (Camerún) – interviewed

Address: C/Apartat de Correus 451, 08080 Barcelona
Telephone number: 932471142 / 609166973
E-mail: yamakouba@yahoo.es; kodog5@celoma.net (secretary)
Website: no
Focus of interest: …
Contact person: Roger Gpeda, president of the association
Interview: 5.02.2008, president’s house.

41. Agrupació Camerunés Residents a Barcelona – interviewed

Address: C/Rambla Catalunya 11, 2n 2a, 08007 Barcelona
Telephone number: 934121918
E-mail: no
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: Paul Aurelien Endocky Sappy
Interview: 30.05.2006, a café-bar terrace in front of the president’s house.